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ABSTRACT 
 
Applying a Gramscian approach, this thesis explores the relationship between hegemonic 
struggles in South and North Korea and the inter-Korean reconciliation from 1998 to 2002 
and it argues that the reconciliation was pursued as hegemonic projects by the ruling 
political groups of the two Koreas.  
In South Korea, the 1997 economic crisis was an organic crisis that Chaebol-
friendly exportist Fordism in the early stages of neoliberalisation yielded. The crisis 
caused counter-hegemonic liberal nationalists to attain political power. The new North 
Korean policy was a ‘national-popular’ programme that pursued nationalism, a 
counterforce to anti-Communism with which the hegemonic group exercised ideological 
leadership. Seoul’s rhetoric was to enhance peace on the peninsula but, in reality, the 
reconciliation process was undertaken at the price of tolerating the North’s armed 
provocations and nuclear and missile development. The ruling political group clung to 
repairing inter-Korean relations because it was a project to obtain hegemony from the 
hands of the hegemonic group.  
In the case of North Korea, the new South Korean policy had a ‘national-popular’ 
outlook of nationalism but, in practice, it aimed to obtain economic benefits to preserve 
hegemony. The economic crisis in the 1990s was an organic crisis resulted from 
Pyongyang's autarkist Soviet Fordism that excessively subordinated the economy to 
politics and thus worsened the shortcomings of the socialist system. The crisis brought 
about unparalleled damage to the existing system and, most of all, severely debilitated 
the state’s tight grip on society. In particular, it undermined the Party's activities that 
indoctrinated North Koreans with the Juche Ideology that legitimized the dictatorship and 
made hegemonic rule possible. Weathering the crisis without a full-scale reform of the 
system was vital to maintaining hegemony, and thus Pyongyang urgently needed 
economic help from Seoul.  
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Chapter I Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction
  
On 13 June 2000, Kim Dae-jung, President of the Republic of Korea (hereafter referred 
to as ‘South Korea’), was greeted by Kim Jong-il, the leader of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (hereafter referred to as ‘North Korea’), at Sunan Airport outside 
Pyongyang. This was broadcasted worldwide, and people around the world expected that 
the meeting could eventually bring peace to the Korean peninsula that had officially been 
in a state of war since 1950 (New York Times 13 June 2000). The next day the two 
presidents signed a joint declaration in which they agreed to work together for unification, 
resolve humanitarian issues, and promote economic cooperation (Hankook Ilbo, 15 June 
2000). The historic agreement was one of the indicators that exhibited the inter-Korean 
reconciliation for the first time after the division of the peninsula in 1945.  
However, the reconciliation of the two Koreas during the presidency of Kim Dae-
jung, from 1998 to 2002, was paradoxical because there were unrelenting military 
concerns between the two Koreas at the same time. Pyongyang test-fired a ballistic 
missile over northern Japan in August 1998 and defied the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) by developing nuclear weapons during that period. There were even direct 
armed engagements between the two Koreas. The two bloody naval battles in 1999 and 
2002 resulted in the greatest number of casualties killed during engagement between the 
armed forces of the two Koreas since the end of the Korean War (CNN, 8 July 2002). 
How can we explain the inter-Korean reconciliation between 1998 and 2002 despite 
worsening security problems in this period?  
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This thesis aims to solve the puzzle by providing political, economic, and 
ideological explanations. It argues that understanding the change in inter-Korean relations 
requires a comprehensive and historical analysis on the spheres of politics, economy, and 
ideology. This is discrete from the conventional interpretation that the inter-Korean 
reconciliation was the result of the South Korean government’s Sunshine Policy of 
engagement and positive responses of the North Korean counterpart, or the recent 
constructivists’ explanation that the shift in the identities of the public mattered most. For 
that purpose, this thesis employs a Gramscian approach that presents the analytical 
framework through which we can explicate various factors at different levels inter-
connected in the process.  
The major contribution of this thesis is, first, to present comprehensive 
explanations about reasons of the change in inter-Korean relations at the levels of politics, 
economy, and ideology. Gramsci's concept of the historical bloc helps us to look beyond 
one level and to explain the three levels in an integrative manner. The historical bloc can 
be referred to as the totality of all levels of society in a particular historical period, and 
the concept can allow us to understand the historical developments of the economic 
structure and the superstructures, and their interactions with one another. Second, it adds 
to International Relations (IR) theory in general by applying Gramsci’s conception of 
international relations to foreign policy analysis. Successfully undertaken, this approach 
will exhibit its usefulness as an analytical tool particularly in understanding and 
explaining the relations between structural changes on a national level and changes at an 
inter-national level. Third, Gramsci’s theory has been rarely used in explaining inter-
Korean relations. A number of scholars applied a Gramscian approach to the analysis of 
the relationship between inter-Korean relations and South Korea’s political economy; 
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however, no Gramscian researches have been conducted into the relationship between 
inter-Korean relations and North Korea’s political economy. Moreover, their interest was 
to explain the role of inter-Korean relations in the context of South Korea's political 
economy development, and in so doing they did not delve into explaining the role of the 
political economy in the change of inter-Korean relations. Claiming that the relationship 
in both directions is of critical importance, this thesis will demonstrate that Gramsci can 
be a good guide in expounding inter-Korean relations and understanding their relevance 
to the political economy of North Korea as well as to that of the South. Fourth, few 
scholars have utilised Gramsci's theory as the main framework in explaining North 
Korean political economy. There have been a number of researches that have used 
Gramsci's concepts in analysing socialist countries such as the Soviet Union and China, 
and they have contributed to a better understanding of, especially, hegemonic rule in those 
countries. By the same token, this thesis attempts to show the process of hegemonic rule 
in the socialist North Korea, with an emphasis on the role of the ruling Juche Ideology 
and the communist party in winning the active consent from the people.  
In accordance with the Gramscian theoretical framework, the thesis hypothesizes 
that the inter-Korean reconciliation between 1998 and 2002 was implemented as 
hegemonic projects by the ruling political groups of the two Koreas. The economic crises 
of South and North Korea in the mid 1990s were so devastating that the existing 
hegemonic groups found it difficult to maintain their hegemony. In the case of South 
Korea, the economic crisis allowed longtime dissident Kim Dae-jung and his party to gain 
political power, and the new ruling political group carried out the new North Korean 
policy to attain hegemony. In the case of North Korea, the existing hegemonic group 
sought to reconcile with Seoul, mostly for material gains, which could help it to maintain 
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hegemony by stopping the economic crisis from developing into regime change and the 
collapse of the whole system.  
In this introduction, Section II reviews the existing literature on inter-Korean 
relations in which security, unification, and political economy perspectives on the 
relations will be presented and reviewed. Section III presents the theoretical framework 
of this thesis. This framework is formulated from Gramsci and other social scientists’ 
concepts and thoughts on the political economy and the relationship between the national 
and the international. Section IV briefly introduces the structure of the thesis.    
  
1.2. Literature Review on Theories of Inter-Korean Relations 
 
To the study of inter-Korean relations, the fact that the two Koreas, divided by foreign 
forces and remaining in a state of stalemate since 1953, has profound ramifications. On 
the one hand, it has urged academia to face up to the grim reality of hostilities between 
South and North Korea but, on the other hand, invoked academia to devise methods for 
the unification of the two countries of one people. In this context, most existing literature 
can be broken down into the following two categories: that which has tried to explain 
inter-Korean relations from a security perspective, stressing the antagonistic relations of 
the two countries which have been technically at war for decades; the other category 
comprises a unification perspective that has emphasised the necessity of cooperation 
between the two Koreas in order to realise unification. And yet, though much smaller in 
number, there are also notable researches which have sought to specifically explicate 
influences of the division upon the political economy of each Korea. While the two main 
perspectives concentrate on South Korea's North Korean policy and North Korea's South 
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Korean policy (and their consequences for inter-Korean relations, particularly whether 
they contribute to security or unification), a political economy perspective is more 
interested in the impacts of inter-Korean relations on each Korea's domestic politics and 
economy, and vice versa. This thesis seeks to develop the political economy perspective 
by analysing the relationship between inter-Korean relations and the political economy 
of South and North Korea. 
To put it in concrete terms, the main goal of the security perspective is to relieve 
security concerns and to perpetuate peace on the Korean Peninsula. This perspective 
generally encompasses writings which paint North Korea as a menace to the national 
security of South Korea, and that any attempt to cooperate with the North for peace a 
futile one. Nonetheless more recently prevailing ideas have embraced almost all available 
measures, including negotiations with North Korea, in order to solve security issues such 
as the North's nuclear and missile threats (Lee Gi-taek, 1988; Kim Jae-han, 1995; Kim 
Yeong-hun, 1997; Hong Soon-young, 1999; Cha, 2000; Jeong Bong-hwa, 2000; Kang, 
2003; Lee Chung Min, 2004; Suh Dong-gu, 2014; Park Chang-gwon, 2014). For example, 
David Kang (2003) was interested in the causes of ‘not another war’ on the Korean 
Peninsula. He argued that scholars who employed theories on preventive war, pre-
emptive war, the madman hypothesis, and the desperation hypothesis, all incidentally 
made mistakes, particularly in applying assumptions and causal logic, and thus failing to 
predict the current state of peace on the Korean Peninsula. Kang maintained that, 
deterrence worked most of all, as North Korea ‘knew’ that it did not have sufficient 
capability to wage another war on the peninsula and, in that sense, dismissing the North's 
security fears by negotiations will be a solution to North Korean nuclear and missile 
problems. This article was a development of his earlier article in which he argued that 
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because the U.S. deterrent was clear and credible, there would be no war on the Korean 
Peninsula notwithstanding the nuclear threats from the North at that time (Kang, 1994). 
In response to North Korea-related security concerns, Kang concentrated his arguments 
on the military capability factor of North Korea, even though there was another important 
factor to wage war, namely one’s intentions which was much easier to change and more 
difficult to uncover and examine. Suh Dong-gu (2014) paid attention to the military 
strategy of North Korea, which has concentrated on asymmetric military capabilities such 
as nuclear weapons and long-range missiles to build up deterrence and bargaining power. 
He then advanced South Korea’s ‘nuclear’ dilemma and ‘alliance’ dilemma: South Korea 
cannot have nuclear weapons even in the face of a nuclear North Korea, and the United 
States can act against the national interest of South Korea. Suh, in accordance with his 
examinations, argued that South Korea's North Korean policy should be elaborated 
closely within the context of interconnected East Asian policies of Japan, China, and 
Russia, as well as the United States, to better escape such dilemmas. His study, instead of 
providing a substantial North Korean policy, highlighted a necessity for a creative policy 
in the face of the slow process of the Six-Party Talks. His clarifications of various 
dilemmas confronted by Seoul and the new international environment will be an 
important basis for such policy formulation. 
Theoretically speaking, most realists view inter-Korean relations from a security 
perspective. They taught South Korean policy makers to seek stability through military 
strength and to rely on an alliance with the United States. Even though other theories, 
such as liberalism and constructivism, were also utilised to explain security-related issues 
in inter-Korean relations,1 realism became a dominant theory in those issues because it 
                                                 
1 Liberalism has the democratic peace theory which posits that democratic countries are hesitant 
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is believed to offer a “manual for maximizing security in a hostile environment” (Keohane, 
1989: 36). Realist understanding of inter-Korean relations is particularly focused on 
power of ‘uncertain’ circumstances on the Korean peninsula.2 Hamm Taik-Young (1998), 
for example, took note of the security dilemma—a self-help attempt in the instance that 
a country does not know its opponent’s intentions—in analysing the defence expenditure 
of the two Koreas. In particular, while explaining the armament process of the two Koreas, 
he laid emphasis on the relationship between armaments and state power in both domestic 
and inter-Korean contexts. His analysis sought to evaluate the two Koreas by the same 
standard of military power, putting aside the differences of their systems in politics and 
the economy. His findings demonstrated that North Korea's security increase meant South 
Korea's security decrease, and thus there was little room for lasting peace if the two 
Koreas pursue a path of self-help within their respective security spheres, without 
attempts at reconciliation and cooperation between the two sides. Kim Taehyun (2000) 
explained the division of the Korean Peninsula as the result of power politics between the 
United States and the Soviet Union because they were uncertain about each other’s 
intentions. By the same token, Kim considered inter-Korean relations to be subject to 
                                                 
to engage in warfare with other democratic countries. This theory, however, postulates that South 
Korea and its allies diminish the possibility of armed conflicts through democratising the current 
North Korean government. Therefore, it is not a frequently used theory amongst liberals, 
particularly amongst South Korean liberals who support reconciliation and cooperation with the 
current North Korean government.  
2 How realists construe ‘uncertainty’ is of great significance because it is closely related to their 
assumption about the fundamental nature of international relations. Classical realists such as Hans 
Morgenthau (1955: 4) argues that certainty in international politics should be extracted from 
human nature which can be characterized as the endless drive for power. The power-seeking 
behavior of states is, therefore, a logical consequence which has its roots in the power-oriented 
nature of human beings. In contrast, neo-realists regard uncertainty as anarchy which defines the 
international structure. For example, Kenneth Waltz (1979: 111) maintains that the anarchical 
system leads states to have greater power because “self-help is necessarily the principle of action 
in an anarchic order”, while Joseph Grieco (1988: 487) argues that states, in a world of uncertainty, 
are more concerned with relative gains than absolute gains in cooperation with other states. 
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power politics between the two Koreas as well as amongst the four strong powers of the 
United States, Russia, China, and Japan. His analysis indicated that changed realities on 
the Korean Peninsula were not possible unless North Korea jettisoned its adherence to 
power politics. However, as Pyongyang would not give up this approach, any change of 
inter-Korean relations, or the reconciliation between the two Koreas, would be a 
temporary phenomenon, meaning inversely that inter-Korean relations can deteriorate 
into hostile ones at any time.  
If we extend the argument into newspaper and magazine articles, the security 
perspective was a major tone of South Korean conservative media outlets, such as Chosun 
Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo, and Dong-A Ilbo, the three biggest newspapers in South Korea. They 
were proficient in drawing most inter-Korean issues as security issues and claimed that 
negotiations with the North Korean government were not just useless, but actually 
dangerous to the security of South Korea. According to such accounts, as North Korea is 
the main enemy of South Korea, domestic social forces that collaborate with the North 
Korean government are also threats to national security either directly or indirectly. Their 
logic is correlated with internal hegemonic struggles, which will be discussed in detail 
later. 
The unification perspective deems the divided Korea a state to be overcome, 
whereby North Korea is a partner for cooperation to realise this. How can we accomplish 
national cooperation and, eventually, unification is the main question of this perspective. 
Peace is the ultimate goal of writings from a security perspective, but peace from a 
unification perspective is not just a goal but also an essential step toward unification. This 
perspective includes research which seeks to develop unification methods (Paik Nak-
chung, 2006; Im Hyug Baeg, 2010; Park Myeong-gyu, 2012; Lee Jong-seok, 2012). 
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Moreover, studies on unification cases such as the unifications of Germany and Yemen 
are utilised for comparative analyses (Kim Hak-seong, 2002; Yu Ji-ho, 2002; Jonsson, 
2006). This perspective largely deals with South Korea’s North Korean policy in relation 
to the reconciliation and unification of the two Koreas (Ahn Jeong-sik, 2007; Ju Bong-
ho, 2009; Jeon Il-wuk, 2010; Jang Yeong-gwon, 2011; Kim Keun-sik, 2011; Jo Seong-
ryeol, 2012; Kim Tae-wu, 2012; Byeon Jong-hyeon, 2014; Jo Han-beom, 2014). Many 
writings of this perspective consider those who support cooperation with Pyongyang as 
progressives and those who do not as conservatives, if not national traitors. Thus, a 
dominant view of this perspective sees strife over North Korean policy as a conflict 
between different political stances (Kang, Man-gil et al., 2001; Kang Jeong-gu, 2001b; 
Gwon Hyeok-beom et al., 2002; Yim Su-hwan, 2007; Han Gwan-su and Jang Yun-su, 
2012; Ju Bong-ho, 2012; Kim Haknoh and Kim Doohyun, 2013), even though some 
scholars such as Son Ho-cheol (2003) and Koo Kab-Woo (2010) have raised questions 
about the equation of progressiveness with being pro-North Korea and conservatism with 
being anti-North Korea. For example, Koo (2010: 76-77) argued that not a few 
progressives considered North Korea a non-socialist country and opposed reconciliation 
and cooperation with the North Korean government, so they were essentially anti-North 
Korea. Contrariwise, there were many conservatives who supported the inter-Korean 
reconciliation. This thesis also disagrees with the dichotomy considering the complexity 
of the issue. Amongst progressives, for instance, one of the main groups was the so-called 
PD group who led the labour movement and prioritised class issues over everything else. 
They were hostile to the North Korean government because it systematically and severely 
exploited labourers in the North. We therefore cannot regard the group as pro-North Korea. 
The case of the so-called NL group, another main progressive group in the South, was 
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rather extraordinary in the conventional sense because they advocated democracy in 
South Korea and sympathised with the non-democratic government in North Korea. The 
division amongst progressives over North Korean issues will be further explored in 
Chapter VI.    
Theoretically, liberals and constructivists display greater interest in this 
perspective than do realists and other theorists in general. Liberals have been particularly 
interested in inter-Korean exchanges, reconciliation, and peaceful coexistence as steps 
toward the integration of the two different political systems, or the unification of South 
and North Korea.3 For example, Koo Kab-Woo and Park Kun Young (2001) interpreted 
the Sunshine Policy of engagement as flexible reciprocity, a functionalist approach for 
unification, as the Kim Dae-jung administration understood special interests and policy 
priorities of the North Korean regime in severe hardship. In this respect, the June 15 Joint 
Declaration was the result of the South Korean government's efforts to facilitate 
humanitarian assistance and economic cooperation at the non-state level and to pursue 
peaceful coexistence at the state level. Their arguments postulated that North Korea 
would provide proportional responses to South Korea's favours, but the reality turned out 
to be quite different. Most of all, they presumed that the Sunshine Policy will achieve 
peace in the short-term and realise unification in the long-term. However, they witnessed 
                                                 
3  Liberals in the post-war period emphasize international institutions as concrete agents in 
promoting peace and cooperation in the international sphere. They have provided alternative ways 
of thinking about international relations by emphasizing new patterns of interaction, such as 
interdependence and integration, and focusing on new actors of interest groups, transnational 
corporations, and international non-governmental organizations. Neo-liberals, agreeing to the 
core assumptions of neo-realism such as anarchic international structure and the centrality of 
states, argue that international regimes and institutions can still facilitate cooperation amongst 
states by minimizing uncertainties and offering absolute gains (Lamy, 2005: 212-214). To neo-
liberals, in this sense, the greatest obstacle to cooperation is 'cheating' or non-compliance by other 
states. However, neo-realists such as Mearsheimer emphasize relative gains (Mearsheimer, 2001: 
21). 
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another bloody naval skirmish in 2002 that entailed the greatest number of military 
casualties after the Korean War. Liberals found it difficult to avoid the criticism that they 
had turned a blind eye to escalating military hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. Gabriel 
Jonsson (2006), after reviewing the unification process in Yemen and Germany in the 
1990s and inter-Korean relations since the Korean War, assessed the characteristics of 
inter-Korean socio-cultural exchanges and cooperation by employing the functionalist 
perspective. He argued that growing levels of exchanges and cooperation contributed to 
the unifications of Yemen and Germany and thus the reconciliation of the two Koreas 
would be a critical step toward unification. He, however, did not go into depth on the 
dissimilarity between the two cases of Yemen and Germany. The differences during the 
process of unification became the seeds of future conflict and, as a result, the unified 
Yemen suffered much higher political instability and a much worse off economic situation 
from what it had before unification. This indicates that unification resulting from high 
levels of exchanges and cooperation between two countries does not guarantee a 
successful unification. Unification is not a cure-all, and hasty unification can be a disaster. 
In contrast, constructivists were concerned with changes in interests and, 
especially, the identity of the Korean people who suffered the division in 1945 but were 
induced by their political leaders to cooperate for unification in the reconciliation process 
from 1998.4 For example, Chun Chaesung (2002) categorized the identities of the two 
Koreas as that of one nation identity, Cold War identity, and post-Cold War identity. He 
                                                 
4  Unlike realism and liberalism which provide substantive theories of international politics, 
constructivism is a social theory which depicts the world as collectively and intersubjectively 
meaningful structures and processes (Adler, 2003: 100-104). In order to make those substantive 
claims, realists and liberals have to delineate principal actors, particular interests and capacities, 
and contents of the normative structures. On the contrary, constructivists present how the 
underlying normative structures shape identities and interests and how shared ideas shape the 
organization of world politics (Barnett, 2005: 258-63). To constructivists, what are regarded as 
certain—such as identities and interests—are socially constructed.  
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argued that changes to the norms and identity of each Korea were subject to the identity 
politics of the following four levels: the world, Northeast Asian, inter-Korean, and 
domestic levels. Chun maintained that it would be premature for the South Korean 
government to prescribe the national interest based upon its own definition of identity and 
norms without incorporating the various identities at the national level and considering 
any identity changes in North Korea. His research, however, did not consider regionalism 
in South Korean politics, which was significantly related to peoples' attitudes on North 
Korea and inter-Korean relations. Using his terms, most people in the Jeolla Province 
have one nation identity and those in the Gyeongsang Province have Cold War identity. 
This situation indicates that identity change can be easier than expected if their political 
parties change the existing North Korean policy. Inter-Korean relations and North Korea 
issues are now over-politicised and they are one of the most controversial issues in South 
Korean politics. Owing to their distinctiveness, relevant identities are also too politicised 
in the present circumstances. Son Key-young (2006) focused on the identity shift in 
explaining the Sunshine Policy of engagement and its consequences at the state, inter-
state, and global levels. To this end, he analysed three major issues: Hyundai's business 
projects, the inter-Korean summit, and North Korea's nuclear ambitions. He argued that 
the Sunshine Policy contributed to South Koreans' shift in identities vis-a-vis North 
Koreans, which brought about changes both within South Korea and between the South 
and the North. His arguments suggest that identity change can be possible in the short 
period of time and that it can be induced by the state. Identity, particularly identity related 
to North Korea and inter-Korean relations, is not free from politics. The shift of identities 
on the issues shall not be the basis of hasty change in North Korean policy because policy 
makers need to calculate various considerations, such as political, economic, and 
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diplomatic factors. That is, identity change in itself is not the sole basis of policy change.  
This unification perspective was often to be found in newspapers and magazines, 
particularly in progressive media outlets such as Hankyoreh and Kyunghyang Shinmun. 
To them, the North Korean government was a partner to collaborate with in order to 
realise unification and, therefore, compared with conservative media outlets, they were 
less vocal in their criticism of human rights issues of North Korea as well as nuclear and 
other military issues. In the same vein, they were in general supportive of the engagement 
policy of the South Korean government during the presidency of Kim Dae-jung. 
The political economy perspective on inter-Korean relations is not a new 
perspective. For example, in analysing the causes of the Korean War, Cumings in 1981 
utilised this perspective by taking the war as a product of disputes between the ruling 
elites and rebellious farmers throughout the Peninsula (Cumings, 1981). However, active 
research into inter-Korean relations which have sought to take this perspective began in 
the 1990s, mostly by South Korean scholars in the post-Cold War circumstances, after the 
military dictatorship in the South was ended. Their scholarly interest extended from 
security and unification-related issues, into the sphere of the political economy. 
Specifically, they delved into understanding and explaining the correlation between the 
division of the two Koreas and each Korea’s social structures, which included the 
economic structures as well as the political structures. By contrast, the security 
perspective concentrated on the political arena through the lens of power, which leaves 
room for comprehensive explanations that extend to the level of the economy. The 
unification perspective did not explain the relations between inter-Korean relations and 
society or the social structure in an integrated manner, because in the case of liberals, they 
paid little attention to the relationship between inter-Korean relations and domestic 
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politics and, in the case of constructivists, they did not pay due recognition to the economy 
which is essential for analysing the social structure. 
Writings from the political economy perspective attributed the development of 
South and North Korea's distinctive social structures to the partition in 1945 and inter-
Korean tension thereafter. The uniqueness yielded both Korea's rapid industrialisation, 
dictatorships by Park Chung-hee in the South and Kim Il-sung in the North, and so on. 
Advocates of this perspective have argued that the division reinforced antagonism 
between South and North Korea, and that this antagonism strengthened the domestic 
stability of each Korea by reproducing the system of division (Paik Nak-chung, 1994 and 
1998; Choi Jang-Jip, 1996 and 2005; Park Myeong-lim, 1996; Kim Dong-chun, 1997; 
Cho Hee-yeon, 2007 and 2010).5  
Amongst the advocates of the political economy perspective, Paik Nak-chung 
has been the most important figure in developing and disseminating the perspective with 
his concept of ‘division system’. Paik (1994 and 1998) assumed the divided Korea as a 
sub-system of the Cold War system until 1990 and argued that this division system (or 
the Cold War system on the Korean Peninsula) continued even after the Cold War ended 
at the global level. He insisted that the division system was not only sustained by external 
conditions but also reproduced by division forces in each Korea with the help of anti-
communism in the South and Kim Il-sungism in the North. As the division system formed 
distinctive societies and regulated the everyday life of ordinary people in both South and 
                                                 
5  The political economy perspective is critical of the North Korean government, which is 
regarded as a partner to cooperate with for unification from the unification perspective. 
Progressive media outlets in the South, I argue, as a constituent of counter-hegemonic social 
forces, are more interested in the unification perspective that can damage the hegemonic group 
more effectively. Also, many journalists working for them were members of the NL group, the 
largest group in the student movement in the 1980s and 1990s in South Korea.  
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North Korea, the system itself was the key for analysing the two Koreas. Paik, however, 
was not a social scientist but a literary critic. In his works, Paik did not closely examine 
South and North Korea’s social systems or structures in accordance with social science 
methodology. Frequently, in his writings, Paik openly left the work of scientific analysis 
on the division system to social scientists. 
There had been a number of attempts to explain the distinctive structure due to 
the division, or the division system, in a scientific manner. Amongst them, one of the most 
notable researches was conducted by Cho Hee-yeon who used a Gramscian approach in 
examining South Korean society, particularly during the presidency of Park Chung-hee, 
whereby he argued that inter-Korean relations played a significant role in materialising 
Park’s ‘developmental dictatorship’ (Cho Hee-yeon, 2010). To him, the questions of 
‘who,’ ‘when,’ and ‘how’ were significant in discerning influences of inter-Korean 
relations upon South Korean society. He argued that the ruling elites in the South, ever 
since independence, had used inter-Korean relations to integrate the ruling bloc and win 
support from other groups. Cho, in the same vein, presented anti-communism and 
developmentalism as the ruling ideology. Park Chung-hee reconstructed the ruling 
ideology by adding developmentalism to anti-communism so as to mobilise people for 
his developmentalist economic policy, making South Korean society ‘the system of 
developmental mobilisation’. However, anti-communism, Cho argued, was the most 
efficient tool as it was always anti-communism that justified the physical suppression of 
his opponents. With regard to the inter-Korean reconciliation during the Kim Dae-jung 
era, Cho deemed Kim Dae-jung and his group as a constituent of the ruling bloc and 
considered the June 15 Declaration in 2000 a product of the bloc’s accommodation of the 
peoples’ nationalist demands. His argument, however, was incongruent because Kim Dae-
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jung had been one of the most seriously hurt victims of anti-communism in South Korea 
and, thus, cannot be a member of the ruling bloc that used anti-communism, the ruling 
ideology, to suppress its opponents.  
Why was Cho's research led to classify Kim Dae-jung as a member of the ruling 
group? It was, I argue, because he considered that counter-hegemonic social forces should 
be the forces that prioritised the interests of labour over those of capital and, in that sense, 
as Kim Dae-jung and his group represented the interests of the bourgeoisie, they were 
categorized as a constituent of the ruling bloc. The argument that counter-hegemonic 
social forces should be those who prioritised the interests of workers to those of capitalists 
is not improper. Such actors would be adequate counter-hegemonic social forces in the 
capitalist society of South Korea. Nonetheless, when we designate anti-communism as 
the ruling ideology, it would still be consistent in thinking that we should embrace those 
who try to overcome or get rid of anti-communism in South Korea, whether they are pro-
labour forces or not, as counter-hegemonic social forces.  
Cho’s argument was not unique. Choi Jang-Jip (2005), arguing that the Cold War 
wreaked havoc on the development of democracy in South Korea, maintained that the 
democratisation after the June 29 Declaration in 1987 was an instance of passive 
revolution, so that it was ultimately conservative democratisation that entailed a transfer 
of power within the existing ruling bloc. According to Choi, not just Kim Young-sam but 
also Kim Dae-jung was one of the ruling bloc members; yet, anti-communism was the 
ruling ideology in his Gramscian approach towards explaining South Korean society. 
Their logic was drawn from the fact that their analyses concentrated on rule by capital in 
general, instead of by a fraction of capital, in South Korea.  
This thesis argues that, in the case of South Korea, rule by large industrial capital, 
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or the Chaebol, rather than by capital in general, is critical in analysing South Korea’s 
economic structure. The historical task of counter-hegemonic social forces of South 
Korea, in that context, was to change the rule by the Chaebol, or the Chaebol-centered 
economic structure. A thorough reform of the Chaebol can be a measure for the purpose, 
and the Kim Dae-jung administration's initial attempts to reform the Chaebol was in line 
with it, even though they went awry in the end. It is also not contradictory when we 
understand that the South Korean economy has been ruled by the Chaebol, rather than by 
capital in general, particularly in terms of the relevance the economic structure has to the 
ruling ideology. Thus, identifying Kim Dae-jung and his group as a counter-hegemonic 
social force requires a more specific analysis of the economic structure of South Korea.  
Scholars who examined South Korean society using a Gramscian approach 
invariably took the political economy perspective on inter-Korean relations. This was 
logically congruent considering Gramsci's argument (1971a: 176) that international 
relations follow fundamental social relations, such as production relations. Their interest, 
however, was mainly to explain the role of inter-Korean relations in the South Korean 
political economy, not the role of South Korean political economy in inter-Korean 
relations — relationships in both directions matter greatly, as shall be explained in the 
next section. Moreover, their researches into the South Korean economy were not specific 
enough to elucidate the Chaebol-centered economic structure, which also resulted in the 
assertion that Kim Dae-jung was a member of the existing ruling bloc.  
Nevertheless, Gramscian writings by scholars such as Cho and Choi were 
pioneering works given their context, in that a theory by Gramsci (a Marxist) had not 
been actively explored in South Korea. In fact, not just Gramsci’s theory but also 
historical materialism itself, being criticized as economism, utilitarianism and 
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reductionism,  has rarely been employed to explain inter-Korean relations. Political and 
ideological concerns clearly also did matter. The Cold War atmosphere had hindered 
capitalist countries’ academia from utilizing the Marxist tradition vigorously or 
advantageously. This tendency has been severe in the case of South Korean academia 
because those who applied Marxist theories to their research were easily branded as reds, 
subject to criminal prosecution in some cases, even after the Cold War had ended on the 
global stage. Anti-communism, in that sense, has remained a very strong element in the 
academic world of South Korea. 
Whereas, let alone the relationship between the political economy of the North 
and inter-Korean relations, few scholars have applied Gramsci's theory as the main 
theoretical framework by which to explain North Korean political economy. There have 
been many researches which have applied Gramsci’s theory to analyse socialist countries 
but, if we confine literature to pre-reform socialist countries as in the case of North Korea, 
the number is reduced considerably. Such writings which have examined pre-reform 
socialist countries have mainly focused on the concepts of hegemony and explained the 
socialist countries with the coercion-consent analysis (Harrison, 1979; Hoffman, 1984). 
This attempt is attributable, among others, to the fact that Gramsci understood the state 
as “the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class 
not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of 
those over whom it rules” (Gramsci, 1971: 170) and the fact that he deemed this concept 
of the state as relevant to both the bourgeois state and the socialist state (Hoffman, 1984; 
130). It was also a response of Western academia’s interpretation of the popularity of 
Stalin in the Soviet Union, where people treated him as the symbol of the party. They 
tried to apply a new approach in understanding Stalinism through the concept of 
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hegemony. In particular, they paid attention to the mechanism of consent of the socialist 
state by attaching importance to the role of Stalin and the cadre in realising the 
dictatorship of the bureaucrats, rather than that of the proletariat (Harrison, 1979; 24-25) 
and the role of the party leadership in mobilising participation from below for political 
purposes (Hoffman, 1984; 142-143). The concept of hegemony allowed them to give 
prominence to the mechanism of consent in the socialist system, and this was meaningful 
in getting over the conventional Cold War preconception that people in socialist countries 
were all forced to follow their leaders without any agreement.  
This research also emphasizes the concept of hegemony in understanding North 
Korean political economy and contends that the mechanism of consent as well as that of 
coercion effectively worked. The concept of a historical bloc is, unlike the above-
mentioned researches into the Soviet Union, another key concept in this study, which 
assumes that the concept is of great help in revealing not only who the hegemonic group 
is, but also how hegemony is formulated and reinforced in a particular historical period. 
There have been many prejudgments against North Korea. One of them was that the North 
Korean regime ruled its people merely by force and that they lived like slaves, a view 
similar to the stereotyped perception of the Soviet Union during the Stalin era. There were 
a variety of coercive apparatuses in North Korea, such as the military, the Ministry of 
People's Security, the State Security Department, and so on that enabled and facilitated 
the mechanism of coercion. Nevertheless, the mechanism of consent was significantly 
effective in the North, and Gramsci's theory on the historical bloc will help us understand 
the process. Hegemonic rule, this thesis argues, was one of the main reasons why North 
Korea could survive in the midst of the collapse of other socialist countries in the early 
1990s.  
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This study, as stated above, seeks to develop the political economy perspective 
on inter-Korean relations with the help of Gramsci's theory. Gramsci did not produce a 
systematic work on international relations. Therefore, in order to analyse inter-Korean 
relations through a Gramscian approach, we need to formulate a theoretical framework. 
This thesis argues that the ideas and concepts of other scholars, particularly other Marxists 
such as Nicos Poulantzas, are of great help to render the framework more consistent and 
more solid. The following section will demonstrate the process in which I infer a 
methodological framework to explain inter-Korean relations from Gramsci and other 
scholars’ concepts and thoughts on the political economy and the relationship between 
the national and the international.    
 
1.3. Theoretical Framework 
 
The debate over ‘internationalising Gramsci’ has centred on the issue of whether or not 
neo-Gramscian perspectives have interpreted Gramsci's ideas properly (Burnham, 1991 
and 2006; German and Kenny, 1998; Budd, 2007; Glasius, 2012; Ives and Short, 2013). 
This debate, however, has contributed little to analysing empirical cases in international 
relations in accordance with Gramsci's thoughts. This is because most critics concentrated 
on playing down neo-Gramscian empirical studies with rigid theoretical standards—
although this was necessary and justifiable—rather than going so far as to make up for 
the weakness and extend the applicability of the perspectives. This has had an unintended 
consequence. The debate questioned the very utility of Gramsci’s concepts in explaining 
international affairs (Femia, 2005; Cutler, 2006; Saurin, 2008; Worth, 2009). Given that 
the most trenchant criticism came from Marxists, it was ironic because they kicked away 
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the ladder that could potentially lead a Marxist theory into becoming one of the 
mainstream theories of IR.6   
Neo-Gramscian perspectives, first of all, show that Gramsci’s ideas can 
contribute to the development of IR through Robert Cox’s seminal papers in 1981 and 
1983 and other scholars’ ensuing studies7–particularly in terms of their emphasis on 
politics and ideology such as neoliberalism, which are major focuses of the current IR 
theories.8 This was a novelty for most non-Marxists who had criticised economism or 
economic reductionism of Marxism (Van Apeldoorn, Overbeek, and Ryner, 2003: 32). To 
some Marxists, their researches provide concrete evidence that demonstrated the 
excellence of Marxism itself as well as the Gramscian conception. To other Marxists, 
however, they were objects of criticism in that, for example, they placed little stress on 
the accumulation of capital and neglected an analysis of the state which is itself a form of 
the class relation and a ‘moment of the process of reproduction’ (Burnham, 2006: 189-
191).  
The centerpiece of neo-Gramscians' contributions has been their ingenious 
interpretations and applications of Gramscian concepts for the analysis of international 
relations. They have widely employed the terms social forces, form of state, historic 
structure, hegemony, and so on. For instance, they have added to IR by specifying and 
emphasizing the role of social forces who share the same ideas or ideology, a distinct 
                                                 
6 Marx wrote much less about international relations issues than about domestic issues. 
However, he provided a lot of insights in his voluminous writings, including The German 
Ideology, Capital and the ‘Preface’ to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 
where his understanding of historical materialism can be drawn to explain international relations 
in general and also inter-Korean relations in particular (Smith, 1996: 203). 
7 Notable works include Van Der Pijl (1984), Gill (1990), Bieler (2000), Cafruny and Ryner 
(2003), and Morton (2007).  
8 Ideology can be defined as “any more or less coherent system of beliefs or views on politics 
and society” (Leach, 1996: 16). 
22 
 
actor from individuals or states as billiard balls. Neo-Gramscian perspectives turned out 
to be particularly useful in explaining major structural changes in the international arena, 
such as globalization and European integration (Gill, 1992; Bieler and Morton, 2001; 
Bieler, 2002). Their usage of the terms, however, has become subject to criticism by many 
scholars for their unclear specifications and explanations. For example, the above-
mentioned concept of social forces can be interpreted in various ways, which is helpful 
in the flexible application of Cox’s ideas but also became a source of criticism because of 
its ambiguity (Burnham, 1991: 78-79). 
In this respect, I argue that we need to clarify Gramscian concepts for theoretical 
precision in the first place, and that the reinvestigation of the concepts shall be in 
accordance with key premises of historical materialism which have the following four 
themes. The first is material determination, or determination by socio-economic factors. 
Here, I argue that we need to think of materialism in terms of determination by the 
economic ‘in the first instance’, rather than ‘in the last instance’.9 The second is historical 
determination or the emphasis on historical contexts. To understand contemporary society, 
one needs to see how it has originated and what the problems and tendencies conditioned 
by the past were. The third is the centrality of classes as actors in economic, political, and 
ideological struggles. In this regard, the state is not an independent entity, but is positioned 
in a particular socio-economic and class context. The fourth is the emphasis on conflict 
and, if needed, its culmination, crisis or revolution. Conflict is seen in a historical context 
and taken to be a major dynamic factor in history; or, in Marxist terms, the ‘locomotive 
                                                 
9 Hall (1986: 43) argues, "The paradigm of perfectly closed, perfectly predictable, systems of 
thought is religion or astrology, not science. In this sense, it would be preferable to think of the 
materialism of Marxist theory in terms of 'determination by the economic in the first instance,' 
rather than 'in the last instance.'" 
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of history’ (Halliday, 1994: 59-68).10  
The clarified concepts will allow us a better understanding of Gramsci’s thoughts 
on international relations, particularly his ideas on the relationship between the national 
and the international. Here, I give added attention to his notion of inter-connectivity 
between production relations, political relations, and international relations, and his 
remarks on structural changes at a national level and its consequences for international 
relations. These will be detailed later in this chapter.   
What’s more, within the broad field of IR, neo-Gramscian perspectives have so 
far mostly concentrated on the global and transnational scales, and yet I argue that it is of 
great significance to recast the validity of Gramsci’s analysis for studying the foreign 
policy of specific countries. In particular, Gramsci's ideas are instrumental in 
understanding major foreign policy changes of a country.  
A major change in foreign policy is directly related to domestic hegemonic 
struggles over capital accumulation, ideology, and so on. Foreign policy is launched by 
the government, or the ruling political group to put it concretely. According to Gramsci, 
for example, an organic crisis can lead a group of counter-hegemonic social forces to take 
political power.11 When the group no longer represents the existing hegemonic group’s 
interests, foreign policy will undergo a drastic change. Or, in a pre-emptive manner, the 
hegemonic group can change its foreign policy radically before the transfer of power as 
a measure to prevent the crisis of capital accumulation from developing into a political 
crisis.  
                                                 
10 In the same vein, War is ‘a great locomotive of history’ (Trotsky, 1922). 
11 An organic crisis can be referred to as the crisis that seriously disrupts the economic structure 
and the superstructures of the historical bloc. It ‘can’—not ‘will’—entail structural changes of 
the historical bloc. 
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Based upon the above-mentioned observation, we can infer from Gramsci’s ideas 
a theoretical framework for empirical research on major foreign policy changes. The first 
phase will be an analysis of the historical bloc in the domestic sphere. In the second phase, 
we need to investigate the organic crisis of the bloc and its implications for hegemonic 
struggles. The third phase will be an analysis of the relations between domestic 
hegemonic struggles and certain foreign policies. By doing so, this research is expected 
to add to existing studies the followings: to bring back the state and capital accumulation 
into the international, to show how organic crisis and hegemonic struggles form the basis 
of a source of foreign policy, and to provide, through foreign policy analyses, a fresh way 
into applying Gramsci to the wider confines of IR.   
To substantiate my arguments, this section is structured as follows. It begins with 
the re-investigation on key Gramscian concepts which contribute to an understanding of 
international relations. Next, it describes Gramsci’s thoughts on the relationship between 
the domestic and the international with special emphasis on the inter-connectivity. Then, 
I will corroborate the usefulness of Gramsci’s old but novel conception by elucidating his 
comments on the relationship between organic innovation and international relations with 
empirical examples. This will provide an explanation on the origins of world orders, 
different from Cox’s 1981 argument. It is followed by the analysis of an organic crisis, 
another case of structural change of the historical bloc, and its ramifications on hegemonic 
struggles. This is particularly crucial to understanding the relationship between a 
domestic structural change and a major foreign policy change, which will be argued 
thereafter. Afterwards, I will propose a Gramscian method for empirical research on a 
major foreign policy change which is directly connected to the structure of this thesis.  
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1.3.1. Key concepts for Gramscian understanding of international relations  
 
Social Classes and Social Forces  
 
Social classes are groups of social agents in which individuals are defined principally, but 
not exclusively, by their place in the production process (Poulantzas, 1973: 27). The 
distinction between relative levels of income—e.g. the division between the rich, the poor 
and the so-called middle class—is a consequence of production relations. Production 
relations refer to definite relations that people enter into in the production of goods and 
services, corresponding to a definite stage of development in the forces of production 
(Marx, 1971: 20). According to Poulantzas (1973: 28-29), the production relations 
involve two aspects: (1) possession or juridical ownership of the means of production, 
which is sanctioned by the law; (2) economic ownership, the real economic control of the 
means of production. In capitalist societies, it is capitalists who have juridical possession 
of the means of production and also have real economic control over it. However, in the 
‘real existing’ socialist countries, juridical ownership of the means of production belongs 
to the people’s state or direct workers, whereas economic ownership does not belong to 
workers but to state bureaucrats. 
The economic sphere plays a principal role in determining social classes but it is 
not sufficient. The political and ideological spheres also have important roles. This 
becomes clearer when we investigate the question of the reproduction of social classes 
(Poulantzas, 1978: 28; Marx and Engels, 2010: 44-45).12 A concrete society at any given 
                                                 
12 However, emphasising the importance of political and ideological relations in the 
determination of classes should not be led into the error of disregarding the principal role of the 
economic place of the social agents. The determination of classes fundamentally depends on the 
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moment in time consists of several modes of production. The dominant mode of 
production of any concrete society generates two fundamental classes (Marx, 1957: 348; 
Poulantzas, 1973: 33). In the capitalist mode of production, the fundamental class struggle 
occurs between the working class and the bourgeoisie. In the ‘real existing’ socialist 
countries, the struggle takes place between direct workers and state bureaucrats that have 
economic ownership. 
With regard to social grouping, historical materialism introduces the terms 
fractions, strata, and categories to designate particular social groups ‘within’ class 
divisions. They are not outside or alongside social classes. They are determined by the 
production relations and form part of the classes (Poulantzas, 1973: 38).13  
Fractions of the bourgeoisie class are located at the economic level–for example, 
landed, industrial, commercial, and financial capital. However, here as well, reference to 
political and ideological criteria is critical in defining fractions of any classes (Clarke, 
1978: 34-36; Poulantzas, 1973: 38).14 Whereas, class strata are classified by particular 
criteria in the production process.15 For example, with the criterion of skill, workers can 
                                                 
production relations which are directly linked to the social division of labour and political and 
ideological relations (Poulantzas, 1975: 21). 
13 Unionized workers (including labour bureaucrats) in advanced capitalist society are often 
classified as middle class. The Weberian approach differentiates the middle class from the broader 
working class by categorizing people into the upper class, the middle class, and the lower class. 
However, as I apply the Marixst approach here, I do not put much weight on the division and 'the 
middle class'. In Marxist conception, the central class division is between those who 'own and 
control' the means of production and those employed to 'use' those means of production—e.g., 
capitalists and workers in capitalist society. “Other positions within the class structure draw their 
specific character from their relationship to this basic division” (Wright, 2009: 108). 
14 For instance, at a certain conjuncture, a distinction is needed between the transnational 
bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie (Poulantzas, 1973: 39). This distinction can be critical 
as it is possible to form an alliance between the working class and the national bourgeoisie 
against the neoliberal globalization.  
15 There is a need for making a distinction between ‘class strata’ and just ‘strata’. The latter 
involves “a criterion or set of criteria in terms of which individuals may be ranked descriptively 
along a scale”, such as income strata (Giddens, 1973: 106).  
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be categorized as skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled labourers.16 In the determination of 
social categories, political and ideological criteria play a dominant role. According to 
Poulantzas (1973: 40-41), one’s social category indicates an “ensemble of agents whose 
principal role is its functioning in the state apparatuses and in ideology”. Social categories, 
as mentioned above, belong to classes but do not constitute classes because they have no 
specific role of their own in production. For example, as science is not a direct productive 
force, bearers of science—intellectuals—cannot constitute a distinct class. Social 
categories generally belong to various social classes and can be relatively autonomous. 
Most bureaucrats in capitalist societies—who do not have economic ownership, unlike 
those in socialist societies—may belong either to the bourgeoisie or to the petty 
bourgeoisie, but the ensemble of the bureaucracy would serve the interests of the 
bourgeoisie. 
Social classes, fractions, strata, and categories are ‘placed’ in relation to the social 
division of labour as a whole that includes political and ideological relations (Poulantzas, 
1975: 14). In a ‘conjuncture’, such as a major crisis, they become active and can position 
themselves as social forces (Connell, 1982: 131-132; Poulantzas, 1975: 14-15). That is, 
classes, fractions, strata, and categories can function as effective social forces in 
accordance with their own roles and interests at a given conjuncture. Despite their internal 
unity, breaks and contradictions within themselves would be manifested in the case of an 
organic crisis. In order to unveil those breaks and contradictions, the particular behavior 
of each social group at any given moment must be specified. For instance, the breaks are 
                                                 
16 Or, we can depend rather on political and ideological criteria beyond the simple technico-
economic approach. The labour aristocracy is a case in point. According to the simple criteria, 
this stratum consists of the most skilled and best paid workers, but it can be a stratum of the 
working class which is the basis of social democracy (Poulantzas, 1973: 35-36). 
28 
 
often a result of the different ideologies (Connell, 1982: 134-135).  
   Social forces are not considered to be rational and unitary actors. Rather they are 
considered to be institutional configurations within and through which different social 
groups attempt to realize their particular interests. The individuals in a given class ‘may 
or may not be wholly or partly conscious of their own identity and common interests as a 
class, and they may or may not feel antagonism towards members of other classes as 
such’. It is in this respect that it is possible to argue that social classes, fractions, strata, 
and categories form social forces without necessarily having developed class 
consciousness (De Ste Croix, 1981: 44; Bieler, 2000: 10-13). 
 
State and Form of State 
 
There have been copious theoretical debates on the question of the state, but the debates 
have largely been unproductive. Since they deployed “different concepts and conceptual 
systems and ask different questions and select different facts”, their arguments have not 
corresponded to one another (Halliday, 1994: 75). Hence, the question is how we 
understand the state and how we conceptualise it.   
Many scholars, especially realists, of IR give one specific definition which can 
be termed ‘the national-territorial totality’. According to this, the state is a conceptual 
form which can be marked on a political map—that is to say, “the country as a whole and 
all that is within it: territory, government, people, and society” (Halliday, 1994: 78). From 
the late 1970s, one alternative concept of the state in a sociological writing has been 
employed vigorously. Here, the state can be identified as “a set of administrative, 
publicizing and military organizations headed, and more or less well coordinated, by an 
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executive authority” (Skocpol, 1979: 29). For those proponents of this concept, the state 
has the longer-term strategic interests of society and has sufficient autonomy and power 
to pursue policies against the explicit wishes of much of society (Halliday, 1994: 79).  
While these concepts posit that the state exists irrespective of or ‘side by side’ 
with classes and the class struggle, Marxist theories consider the state as, to a greater or 
lesser degree, an expression of class interests. Production not only generates material 
capabilities but also creates social relations. The way in which the state is bound up with 
the production relations constitute its principal relations with social classes and the class 
struggles (Poulantzas, 1978: 13). The state functions to uphold the cohesion of a social 
formation that forms and reproduces the conditions of production by maintaining class 
domination (Poulantzas, 1969: 77). 
This notion raises questions about where to locate institutions which are formally 
independent but influenced significantly by the state and perform regulatory and 
reproductive functions under given social relations (Althusser, 2001: 96-123). Going 
beyond the initial Marxist view of the state as a mere instrument of the bourgeoisie and 
inspired by our reading of Gramsci’s works, we can generate an alternative concept of the 
state, in which the function of the state is to maintain class hegemony through 
administrative, coercive, ideological, and regulative apparatuses. This understanding does 
correspond to the Gramsci’s concept of the ‘integral state’ (Gramsci, 1971b: 267), in 
which the state is the “entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which 
the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the 
active consent of those over whom it rules” (Gramsci, 1971b: 244).  
The system of the state consists of several apparatuses which have various roles. 
Administrative apparatuses, such as the civil service bureaucracy, central banks, and 
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public corporations, are responsible for carrying out public policy (Barrow, 1993: 24). 
They directly influence the daily lives and activities of the people and are subject to 
organizational procedures guided ‘by Weberian-style bureaucratic rationality’ (Sater, 
2007: 12). Coercive or repressive apparatuses, such as the military, the police, and the 
court, “legally enforce discipline on those groups who do not consent either actively or 
passively. These apparatuses are, however, constituted for the whole of society in 
anticipation of moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent 
has failed” (Gramsci, 1971b, 12). Ideological apparatuses such as schools and mass media 
have the principal functions of ideological inculcation and transmission with greater 
autonomy from other state apparatuses (Althusser, 2001, 96-123; Poulantzas, 1969: 77-
78). These establishments belong to the realm of civil society where ideological struggles 
take place. However, when the hegemonic group takes the helm of the state—which is 
generally the case—its ideology is vigorously dictated by the state as most ideological 
apparatuses are under the heavey influence of the state. Regulative apparatuses such as 
the committee on labour-management relations and the Federal Reserve Board of the 
United States constrain or persuade private agents to improve the economic performance, 
for example, by shaping the labour process and intervening in the financial and foreign 
exchange markets (Lipietz, 1987: 32-33). In the current stage of historic development, 
regulative apparatuses of the state have been developed and expanded significantly, which 
is more directly linked to the production process, although all the activities of the state 
concern (the social relations of) production.  
Each particular form of the state is to be determined by the “modification of the 
whole system of the state apparatus and of its form of internal unity as such: a 
modification which is itself due to changes in the relations of production and to 
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developments in the class struggle” (Poulantzas, 1969: 75). In this regard, the change in 
the form of the state can be analysed by investigating modifications to the state’s 
administrative, coercive, ideological, and regulative apparatuses and, more importantly, 
by discerning the internal unity generated by economic, political, and ideological 
struggles. Historically, I argue, the first stage to change the form of the state was to replace 
the heads of the apparatuses with (new) faces who have the same ideology as the new 
leadership.  
 
Historical Bloc, Hegemony, and Hegemonic Project 
 
Cox used the concept of the historical structure as a framework for action in which three 
categories of forces interact with each other: material capabilities, ideas, and institutions 
(Cox, 1981: 136). This is one of the key concepts of neo-Gramscian perspectives and has 
been useful in analysing international relations. However, it is neither a reinterpretation 
nor a (minor) modification of Gramsci’s concept of the historical bloc, even though the 
wording is similar. For example, it does not accommodate the primary premise of material 
determination in the concept of the historical bloc (Budd, 2013: 24-26). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic Structure 
State &  
Civil Society 
Ideology 
Figure 1: Constituents of a historical bloc 
 
Superstructures 
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Gramsci’s historical bloc is, as in Figure 1, composed of the economic structure and the 
superstructures, in which “the complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of the 
superstructures is the reflection of the ensemble of the social relations of production” 
(Gramsci, 1988: 192). The economic structure is determined by the production process, 
which is composed of the unity between the labour process and the production relations. 
Within this unity, it is the production relations which have primacy over the labour process 
(Poulantzas, 1975: 20-21). Capitalism has undergone different stages of development 
throughout history, and so have its production relations and the ensemble of the 
production relations. For example, imperialism was a stage of capitalism at which the 
production relations created monopolies and their totality extended beyond territorial 
barriers (Lenin, 1916). 
In a capitalist society, direct producers are completely dispossessed of the object 
and means of their labour. That is, workers are separated from them in economic 
ownership as well as in juridical ownership. It is this very structure of production relations 
that makes a commodity of labour power itself. With regard to the relationship between 
the state and economy, this structure engenders the relative separation of the state and the 
economic sphere. The capitalist state’s relative separation from the production relations 
is the “basis of its organizational framework and already maps out the mode of its relation 
to social classes and the class struggle”. It must not be understood as a particular case but 
is rather a peculiar feature of the capitalist society. The distinctive autonomy of political 
space under capitalism is the result of separation from the relations of production which 
is specific to capitalism itself (Poulantzas, 1975: 18-26). On the contrary, in the ‘real-
existing’ socialist countries there has been little autonomy of economic space under the 
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socialist party-state system because economic ownership belongs, not to any entity in 
‘society’, but to bureaucrats of the ‘state’. This resulted in more cohesion between the 
economic structure and the superstructures in the socialist countries.  
As for the superstructures, Marx considered civil society as part of the realm of 
the economic structure (Carnoy, 1984: 67). However, civil society in Gramsci belongs to 
the superstructure which is critical in perpetuating class and class consciousness (Gramsci, 
1971b: 12). At a certain stage of development, the ensemble of production relations 
generates a civil society, which is the critical site for struggle over hegemony. Gramsci 
took Marx’s concept of bourgeois hegemony, as expressed in The German Ideology, 
which represents the ideological predominance of the dominant classes over the 
subordinate classes (Carnoy, 1984: 66). 
Gramsci’s originality lies in his argument that the system’s real strength is not 
based on coercion of the state apparatus or the violence of the dominant class. Rather it 
depends on active consent of the subordinate to a conception of the world that belongs to 
the rulers—a conception that is considered as common sense (Fiori, 1970: 238). 17 
Hegemony can mean economic, political, moral, cultural, and ideological leadership over 
subordinate groups.18 Amongst them, ‘ideological’ leadership is of primary importance 
because it is ideology that brings us to take something, such as a rule by the bourgeoisie, 
as common sense (Streeter, 2012). This is in accord with Marx's account of ideological 
predominance to explain bourgeois hegemony. 
Construction and preservation of the historical bloc is only possible through the 
                                                 
17 Gramsci’s rule by coercion and rule by consent are not mutually exclusive. See Sim (2006: 
148-149). 
18 Grmasci distinguished different forms of hegemony in accordance with “the different 
historical situations and the class actors involved" (Gramsci, 1988: 424). 
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exercise of hegemony. This involves the successful efforts of the dominant group to use 
its ideological leadership to shape the interests of the subordinate and to establish its view 
of the world as universal (Carnoy, 1984: 70). Consent by the subordinate is not 
spontaneous; it is a result of continuous deliberate efforts by the hegemonic group. 
Schools, churches, civic organisations, and mass media are major fields for that particular 
purpose. When they are successful, the hegemonic group’s ideology displaces rival views 
and becomes the common sense of the age.19 Consequently, the subordinate will interpret 
and define the interests of the hegemonic group as their own interests and consider them 
‘national interests’. As a result, the accumulation strategy in the interest of the hegemonic 
group is legitimated and even actively advocated by the subordinate.20 We can argue that 
the inequalities in power and wealth were closely connected to the historical bloc which 
was implemented and sustained by the exercise of hegemony. 
The reciprocity between the economic structure and the superstructures is the 
dialectical process and, hence, a change in the superstructures is not an immediate 
expression of the structure (Jessop, 1990: 190-193). When we explicate the 
superstructures as mechanical reflections of the economic structure, the autonomy of the 
superstructures only serves to legitimize the independent, self-sufficient and self-
reproductive economy. In this case, the state and ideology are in a relation of ‘exteriority’ 
which cannot provide a proper “representation of the articulation of social reality, nor 
therefore of that determining role itself” (Poulantzas, 1978: 16). In this regard, Gramsci 
refused the crude analysis of economism and attempted to reformulate principles of 
                                                 
19 The relation between common sense and ideology is assured by ‘politics’ (Gramsci, 1971b: 
331). 
20 An accumulation strategy “defines a specific economic ‘growth model’ complete with its 
various extra-economic preconditions and also outlines a general strategy for its realisation” 
(Jessop, 1990: 198-201). 
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historical materialism in such a way as to allow space for the influence of the state and 
ideology on history (Joll, 1978: 16). Gramsci, however, does not deny that the 
superstructures are intrinsically tied to production relations: “for though hegemony is 
ethical-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive 
function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity” 
(Gramsci, 1971b: 161).21  
Ideology, Gramsci emphasised, is critical in cementing the dialectical relations 
between the economic structure and the superstructures where “precisely material forces 
are the content and ideologies are the form” (Gramsci, 1971b: 377). Ideology functions 
to reproduce production relations, and also particular forms of state and other components 
of the superstructures, such as culture, arts, religion, are determined and maintained by 
the ideological unity. For instance, “the Army and the Police also function by ideology 
both to ensure their own cohesion and reproduction, and in the values they propound 
externally” (Althusser, 2001: 97-98). 
Not all ideas are ideology. Ideology has three elements: an interpretation of the 
existing world, a vision of the future, and a strategy—including an accumulation 
strategy—to realize the future (Leach, 1986: 23-24). Permeated at all levels of 
consciousness, like Christianity in the medieval West, ideology in the modern age 
structures what we think and how we act (Heywood, 1992: 16). Social relations have to 
be represented in language to obtain any meaning. Meaning is produced through the work 
of ideology; ideology gives one object in the real world many different meanings (Hall, 
1985: 98).  
                                                 
21  The importance of economic leadership has often been overlooked in many writings on 
hegemony. Hegemony is not only formulated but also produced. See Mark Rupert, Producing 
Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
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In forming a historical bloc, intellectuals—a social category that inculcates 
ideology—play an important role by giving it homogeneity and its members awareness 
on the ‘function of the particular structure’ (McLellan, 1995: 5). In a stable state of a 
historical bloc, the world view of the hegemonic group is so thoroughly spread by 
intellectuals as to become common sense of the whole of society. 
The historical bloc cannot exist without a hegemonic group. Where the 
hegemonic class, fraction, strata, or category predominates, it can preserve social order 
and maintain cohesion (Cox, 1983: 168). And yet, the failure to distinguish between the 
hegemonic group and the ruling political group makes it impossible to disclose the real 
hegemony lying underneath the appearance of the political sphere.22 The correspondence 
between the interests of the hegemonic group and state policy is not based upon any 
personal ties (Poulantzas, 1969: 74-75). For instance, the political sphere is not occupied 
by the hegemonic class or fraction of class but by an ‘ensemble of dominant classes or 
fractions’ which yields the contradictory relations between them in the form of power 
relations within the state apparatuses. It is in this sense that we can speak of relative 
autonomy (a) of the various apparatuses (and branches) vis-à-vis each other within the 
state system and (b) of the ensemble of the state vis-à-vis the hegemonic class or fraction 
of the class (Poulantzas, 1973: 47).  
The key to the exercise of hegemony is the development of a specific ‘hegemonic 
project’. The hegemonic project can be devised and implemented either by the existing 
ruling political group or the new ruling political group which originates from one or more 
groups of counter-hegemonic social forces. The former utilises the hegemonic project to 
                                                 
22 If a counter-hegemonic force or a group of counter-hegemonic forces gains political power 
but not hegemony, it can only constitute the ruling political group which will strive to attain 
hegemony from the hands of the hegemonic group.  
37 
 
maintain hegemony, and the latter will use it to attain hegemony.  
The hegemonic project is concerned principally with a ‘national-popular’ goal 
(Gramsci, 1988: 364-370, 426-427). The project is not identical to an accumulation 
strategy although “they may overlap partially and/or mutually condition each other” 
(Jessop, 1990: 208). While Lenin conceived hegemony mainly in terms of class relations, 
Gramsci emphasized an important dimension of non-class forces in securing hegemony 
with his concept of national-popular. National-popular objectives do not arise directly out 
of production relations and, therefore, do not have a class character per se—they “have 
their own specific qualities and cannot be reduced to class struggles even though they are 
related to them” (Simon, 1991: 24-25). People admire powerful ideas such as freedom, 
liberty, equality, democracy, independence, modernization, and nationalism which can, as 
Gramsci argues, have the force of ‘popular religions’. The hegemonic group is one which 
successfully combines these ideas with its own economic interests for national leadership. 
For example, the Chinese Communist Party gained hegemony by combining class 
revolution with the national struggle against Japanese invaders (Simon, 1991: 44). 
Nonetheless, a hegemonic project will prove most successful when it is “closely linked 
with an appropriate accumulation strategy” (Jessop, 1990: 211). 
 
1.3.2. Gramscian notion of international relations 
 
Although Gramsci understood local problems from a global standpoint (Ives and Short, 
2013: 621-642), he explicitly maintained that international relations follow domestic 
social relations. He stated:  
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Do international relations precede or follow (logically) fundamental social 
relations? There can be no doubt that they follow. Any organic innovation in the 
social structure modifies organically absolute and relative relations in the 
international field too. Even the geographical position of a nation state does not 
precede but follows (logically) structural changes, although it also reacts back 
upon them to a certain extent (to the extent precisely to which superstructures 
react upon the social structure, politics on economics, etc.) However, international 
relations react both passively and actively on political relations (of hegemony 
among the parties) (Gramsci, 1971a: 176). 
 
This describes that three relations—namely, production relations (fundamental social 
relations), political relations, and international relations—are closely interrelated. Hence, 
the study on international relations of a particular country requires us to grasp its 
production relations and political relations. This indicates that in order to explain the 
social origins of changes in international relations, we need to explicate changes in the 
economic structure (the ensemble of production relations) and the superstructures. The 
same applies also in the opposite direction as domestic hegemonic struggles are not 
isolated from international constraints. Therefore, we also need to be aware that changes 
in international relations will bring about changes in political relations and production 
relations to a greater or lesser extent.  
The above-mentioned notion is particularly relevant to the analysis of major 
changes in international relations. As Gramsci indicated, a fundamental social change that 
entails a change in the ensemble of production relations alters relations in the international 
sphere. More specifically, structural changes signifies changes of the economic structure, 
entails new struggles over hegemony in the superstructures, causes radical changes in 
foreign policy, and thus brings about major changes in international relations. Therefore, 
structural changes can be a good starting point to understanding major changes in 
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international relations; however, not every major change in international relations was the 
result of domestic structural changes. In a broad sense, structural changes, or organic 
changes, can be classified into two types: organic innovation and organic crisis.  
The relationship between an organic innovation and international relations 
detailed below is significant as it will disclose the origins of the world orders—the 
capitalist world order led by the United States and the socialist world order led by the 
Soviet Union—that conditioned the formation of the historical blocs in South and North 
Korea. The relationship between an organic crisis and hegemonic struggles explained 
afterwards is theoretically important for this thesis because from that relationship we can 
infer a methodological framework of the research.  
 
Organic Innovation, Forms of State, and World Orders 
 
An organic innovation in the historical bloc is provoked by an innovation in the 
production process that determines the economic structure (Poulantzas, 1975: 20-21). It 
can start with an innovation in the production process itself or a change in the 
superstructures which modifies the production process in an innovative way. In either 
case, it must include an innovation in the production process that will transform the 
economy into a better stage of development which forms the foundation for, or 
corresponds to, new superstructures. 
Concretely, in the capitalist society the Fordist production process in the early 
twentieth century was an organic innovation that allows us to grasp structural attributes 
of the capitalist development with regard to the relations between the structure and the 
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superstructures and between a particular historical bloc and its global repercussions.23 
Recognized by Gramsci as ‘an ultra-modern form of production and of working methods’ 
(Gramsci, 1988: 277), Fordism eventually modified the economic structure, ushered in 
the era of a welfare and interventionist state, and elevated the United States to a global 
hegemon. 
Fordism rests on the Taylorist reorganization of the labour process. Taylorism, 
based upon the separation of conception and execution in the labour process, resulted in 
a momentous intensification of exploitation, extensive deskilling processes, the 
destruction of traditional skilled workers’ power and the introduction of efficient 
managerial control and supervision (Braverman, 1974: 86-95). The Taylorist organisation 
of production enhanced productivity and made possible the mass production of standard 
and cheap consumption goods. Also, with high wages to workers offered by Henry Ford, 
workers became the mass consumers of industrial commodities. This Fordist model of 
production made possible a far-reaching increase and stabilisation of the profit margin 
and thus created the basis for prosperity for decades (Esser and Hirsh, 1994: 74-75). The 
new production process of Fordism was even hailed by many Marxists around the world, 
including Gramsci who interpreted the social change as ‘Americanism’ (Gramsci, 1988: 
275-299).  
The state during the F. D. Roosevelt administration played a critical role in the 
process. The U.S. state corporately integrated trade unions, which officially 
institutionalized new production relations that could facilitate the process of capital 
accumulation and enhance the welfare of labourers (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012: 325-
                                                 
23 Cox also took note of Fordism but it was not the major sphere for his analysis on the social 
relations of production, forms of states and world orders (Cox, 1996: 276-296). 
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326). Economic, political, and ideological struggles were integral to this process, but 
Fordist production relations could gain momentum by the productivity-oriented social 
consensus (Rupert, 1994: 2).24 And a particular form of state was established through the 
adjustment in the state apparatus and internal unity of the whole system. Thus, the 
establishment of the Fordist model at the state level with collective bargaining and trade-
unionism had essential consequences for the state form in which there developed a 
welfare and interventionist state (Hirsh, 1991: 19).25  
Institutionalized Fordism exerted much influence on international relations in 
these two aspects. Firstly, the production of an unprecedented volume of goods boosted 
the United States to the summit of the global division of labour, ensured victory in the 
Second World War, and reconstructed world order under American leadership (Rupert, 
1994: 59-103). Secondly, the Fordist production relations and the ensuing social, 
economic and political transformations were emulated in many developed and developing 
countries. In Western Europe, the generalization of the American-style production 
relations was spearheaded by its organized labour in the overall scheme of the Marshall 
Plan (Rupert, 1994: 167-207). Especially in West Germany and Japan where the US army 
was stationed, American military governments advised or more directly administered 
those countries to copy the US production relations. As they deemed US-style capitalism 
to guarantee high productivity, many capitalist countries in other parts of the world also 
tried to accept the Fordist model, even though the majority only imitated the Fordist 
labour process for mass production purposes. The two aspects were reciprocal since the 
                                                 
24 Later, in the early 1940s, the Second World War was also very helpful in consolidating the new 
production relations because the state and capital needed to seek cooperation from labour groups 
to win the war and meet the skyrocketing demand for war supplies. 
25 More frequently used term is a Keynesian welfare state (Jessop, 2003: 55-94). 
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world order was reinforced by the expansion of the US production relations at the global 
level, and the latter was supported by the former under the Cold War circumstances. 
As Harry Braverman pointed, the real-existing socialism changed the structure 
of ownership but the labour process was essentially the same as that of capitalism 
(Braverman, 1974: 10-14). Along with the unique attributes of socialism such as state 
ownership and central planning, one of the critical causes for dictatorships in socialist 
countries lay in the non-socialist aspects of the relations of production and social division 
of labour (Poulantzas, 1978: 24).26 Indeed, the examination of the production process in 
real-existing socialism is key to understanding the relationship between production 
relations and the socialist state. The socialist equivalent of Fordism, Soviet Fordism, was 
set up by Lenin when he enforced the scientific management over the movement of 
workers’ control of production in the early 1920s (Lenin, 1965b: 259). The Soviet Union 
came into existence in a hostile world and had to defend itself from the very beginning. 
To survive, it had to modernize its economy in a manner rapid enough to match its 
enemies. Integral to this course was the subordination of workers to new production, in 
which managers who were appointed by and answerable to the state bureaucrats 
controlled the production process (Cliff, 1974: 11-93). On the one hand, bureaucracy, the 
virtual agency of the new social forces’ collective self, transformed the nature of the state 
and led Stalin to come to power. On the other hand, over-bureaucratization, bred by Soviet 
Fordism, resulted in national crises of effectiveness and caused political leaders to rely 
on administrative strategies in the production process such as the Stakhanovite movement 
(Beissinger, 1988).27 
                                                 
26 Other causes for dictatorships in socialist countries include an aversion to markets, a preference 
for central planning, the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and so on. 
27 The Stakhanovite movement was the mass movement to enhance labour productivity began in 
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Compared with plentiful studies on the capitalist world order, there are far fewer 
studies dealing with the socialist world order. Critical to the analysis is the role of the 
Soviet Union in determining the production process and state formation in the course of 
constructing the socialist system. Right after the end of World War II, there were large-
scale movements for workers’ control of production in most of the newly-born socialist 
countries in Eastern Europe and Asia. However, they were curtailed as the Soviet 
influence expanded with its economic, military and ideological dominance (Kollo, 1995: 
282-318; Scalapino and Lee, 1972: 1195-1295). Consequently, the production process of 
the Soviet Union was internalized in those countries, and bureaucrats occupied leading 
roles within the socialist economies. Eventually, in the socialist world order, socialist 
countries accepted the Soviet-type social relations of production, oppressed the 
movement for workers’ control of production, witnessed how power was being 
concentrated in the hands of the communist bureaucracy at all levels, and adopted the 
state form similar to that of the Soviet Union.  
 
Organic Crisis and Hegemonic Struggles 
 
An organic crisis of a historical bloc is a crisis of hegemony in which the superstructures 
that have represented the general interests of the hegemonic class or fraction of a class 
are no longer recognized as its expression (Gramsci, 1988: 218). In Marx's logic, the 
organic crisis occurs when the superstructures, such as the form of state and ideology, 
become fetters to the economic development. The crisis can function to reconstruct the 
historical bloc in such a way that the process of capital accumulation can advance again 
                                                 
1935.  
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on a new social basis (Hirsch, 1991: 12-13). 
An organic crisis manifests itself in an economic crisis in the first instance. An 
economic crisis is, according to conventional Marxist explanations, ascribable to the law 
of the tendency of the profit rate to fall. That is, in the accumulation process the organic 
composition of capital rises and it leads to a fall in profit rate, overproduction of capital, 
stagnation, and crisis unless a number of countertendencies—such as “a rise in relative 
surplus value and a change in the composition of capital through technological 
development, and real falls in wages and intensification of labour exploitation”—remain 
ineffectual (Hirsch, 1991: 12).28 
Gramsci, however, did not believe the crisis of hegemony to be the direct result 
of economic crisis. 29  The existing hegemonic group’s failure in dealing with the 
economic crisis and mass consciousness for change are critical. For example, the 
hegemonic class or fraction of class can find a solution, say, by sacrificing inefficient 
elements in the historical bloc or the state can suspend its escalation into the crisis of the 
whole bloc by manoeuvres of various kinds, including violent repression. Nevertheless, 
the economic crisis generates the conditions for a crisis of hegemony by putting the 
hegemonic group in the position of committing mistakes in handling the economic crisis 
(Carnoy, 1984: 78).30 Most of all, for Gramsci, the economic crisis could trigger the 
                                                 
28 A variety of external conditions, such as legal and monetary systems, are also in need of 
investigation to understand the nature and dynamic of a particular economic crisis (Jessop, 1990: 
198). 
29 Gramsci argued that consequences will vary according to how the ruler copes with the 
economic crisis: “A company [of military officers] would be capable of going for days without 
food because it could see that it was physically impossible for supplies to get through; but it 
would mutiny if a single meal was missed as a result of neglect of bureaucratism” (Gramsci, 
1971b: 145). 
30 Interests and ideology limit its flexibility. The vested interests of the hegemonic group will 
prevent them from taking appropriate countermeasures, or the group could not elicit necessary 
countermeasures confined in the existing ideology. 
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reconstruction of the bloc only if mass consciousness is ready to go into action. It is the 
development of this consciousness that would produce structural changes, not just the 
declining profitability of the capital (Carnoy, 1984: 79). He believed that through 
ideological struggles, rather than just economic and political struggles, structural changes 
take place and, in this respect, he emphasized the role of intellectuals who can facilitate 
or impede social changes through inculcating ideology (Gramsci, 1988: 302).  
There are various indicators which can be employed to understand the nature of 
structural changes. One of them includes identification of the membership of the 
hegemonic group. In the case of a ‘social’ revolution in the modern period, the change 
can lead to altering the system of class rule by the bourgeoisie.31 In other cases, the 
capitalist class will maintain its power. Only a particular fraction of class will transfer its 
power to another fraction, say, from industrial capital to financial capital. Or, the fraction 
of class can maintain its hegemony by sacrificing its inefficient members. For example, 
in 2007-2008 the United States witnessed the worst financial crisis since the Great 
Depression. While and after overcoming the crisis, American society still relied heavily 
upon financial capital which had been the major agent for capital accumulation since the 
1980s Reagan years, even though it sacrificed a number of incompetent financial capitals. 
This was possible because the United States' accumulation strategy of neoliberalism had 
not changed. Indeed, the strategy was regarded as common sense in society, so it could 
not be changed. Therefore, the new ruling political group led by President Obama could 
not jettison the accumulation strategy and had to keep relying on financial capital to 
overcome the crisis. 
                                                 
31 Marx made a distinction between ‘political’ revolutions and ‘social’ revolutions. The first only 
changes the form of government, and the second alters the system of class rule (Halliday, 1994: 
65). 
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Despite its earlier internal unity, during the crisis, breaks and contradictions 
within social groups become explicit, and with different ideologies some social classes, 
fractions, strata, and categories position themselves as counter-hegemonic social forces 
in the conjuncture. If an ideology is considered to be a good replacement for the existing 
ruling ideology by the public, a group of counter-hegemonic social forces with that 
ideology can generate a ruling political group. However, if the new ruling political group 
is to attain and maintain hegemony, it is essential to decisively damage the ideological 
base of the existing hegemonic group. Or, in certain circumstances, a group from either 
counter-hegemonic forces or the hegemonic group can choose a violent option for 
political power such as a coup d’état. Nonetheless, it is essential to have their ideology 
achieve social consensus by the masses to legitimize and preserve political power and 
attain or maintain hegemony. As Gramsci argued, it is in the end through ideological 
struggles that structural changes occur. 
The most high-profile Gramsci-related work in IR by Cox in 1981 can be 
understood as connecting organic innovations with world orders—his method and 
emphasis were different from mine—which later became one of the main themes of the 
neo-Gramscian perspectives. In contrast, not many Gramscians took notice of the 
significance of organic crisis in respect of its implications for international relations. I 
contend that organic crisis should receive more attention as a crucial factor in 
international relations. It can be a subject from which we can infer a Gramscian method 
for empirical research for foreign policy analysis. This approach is particularly useful 
when we analyse the causes of major changes in international relations. This will be 
specified in the following section. 
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1.3.3. A Gramscian method for foreign policy analysis 
 
Changes in state policy results from the interplay of interests and ideology. The repeal of 
the Corn Laws in 1846—which ushered in the United Kingdom's embrace of free trade—
was a case in point. Bhagwati says:  
 
This historic transition was neither exclusively the result of interests nor entirely 
the product of a powerful ideology. Although Richard Cobden’s rhetoric and his 
vision were inspired by faith in the economic and political merits of free trade for 
Britain, and indeed for the trading world at large, his Anti-Corn Law League drew 
much of its support from the fact that cheap corn imports were seen as profitable 
for consumers and for industry (Bhagwati, 1989: 18). 
 
Interests and ideology are not separate, but closely interlinked. Historically, in the United 
Kingdom, conservatism has been related to the landed interests, liberalism to industrial 
and financial capital, and socialism to the industrial working class (Leach, 1986: 17). This 
reveals that, in analysing a state policy, identifying whose interests it serves and what 
ideology they pursue is critical. This will answer the question of ‘who’ and ‘why’ in 
policymaking.  
As for the question of ‘who’, all state policies, including foreign policy, are 
means for the ruling political group to gratify its interests. Numerous existing studies, 
such as The Power Elite, The State in Capitalist Society, and Who Rules America?, argued 
that the process of foreign policy making is under the tight control of “an inner circle of 
political, business, and intellectual elites,” or the hegemonic group (Robinson, 1996: 26). 
However, from a Gramscian perspective, foreign policy does not always represent the 
interests of the hegemonic group. Usually the foreign policy making process is controlled 
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by the hegemonic group who holds political power. However, in the case of an organic 
crisis of the historical bloc and the ensuing transfer of political power, foreign policy can 
be used by the new ruling political group to attain hegemony.  
More critically, for the question of ‘why’, in other words, ‘why states act as they 
do’, this thesis assumes that the association of hegemony with the concept of national 
interest provides a useful explanation, and ideology is critical in understanding the 
linkages between them. Policy makers perceive, discuss, and claim their goals in terms 
of the national interest (Rosenau, 1968: 34), and it thus forms an important basis for 
foreign policy.32 The formulation of national interests by the ruling political group and, 
more importantly, the subordinate's acceptance of them as their own interests are closely 
related to hegemony in society. As realists interpret behaviours of politicians in terms of 
power, Gramscians construe them in terms of hegemony. That is, the national interests 
the ruling political group claims signify the interests that contribute to its obtaining or 
maintaining hegemony. Hegemony is a matter of consent, rather than direct force or 
coercion, and it thus requires a successful ideological leadership which can form the 
interests of the subordinate and establish the interests of the ruling political group as the 
national interests.  
In most cases, each political group, representing the particular interests of certain 
social groups, has its own ideology distinct from rival political groups. In case of a change 
of government, foreign policy direction is also changed to represent better the ideology 
of the new ruling political group. When a country witnesses the transfer of political power, 
                                                 
32 Many political scientists, particularly realists, put stress on the national interest. For example, 
Morgenthau believes that “the association of power with the concept of national interest can 
provide a universal explanation of why states act as they do” (Smith, 1986: 15). However, most 
of them, except for constructivists, ignore the process of how the national interest is formulated. 
Amongst constructivist explanations of ‘how the national interest is constructed’, the works of 
Finnemore (1996) and Weldes (1996) are particularly noteworthy. 
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national interests will be re-defined by the ideology of the new political group, and the 
state’s foreign policy goals will be changed accordingly. As a result, the new ruling 
political group can designate a former enemy as an ally, or a former ally as an enemy 
according to its own interests and the national interests it claims. 
Foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy and it is not separate from 
domestic hegemonic struggles. For instance, during the crisis of the historical bloc, 
certain policies can be formulated and executed against all odds to attain or maintain 
hegemony. In that case, the particular policies can be considered hegemonic projects 
which are directly associated with competition for hegemony. Mikhail Gorbachev's 
Glasnost and Perestroika and Deng Xiaoping's Gaige Kaifang [Reforms and Openness] 
are examples undertaken by the new ruling political groups to overcome the organic crisis 
of society and also to obtain hegemony. Likewise, the existing ruling group can use it to 
surmount the crisis and maintain hegemony. It is from that perspective that we need to 
understand a major foreign policy shift of a particular country. That is, it must be 
understood as a hegemonic project; however, not every hegemonic project is related to 
foreign policy. The success or failure of the project will determine who takes hegemony. 
A major change in foreign policy is thus closely related to domestic struggles 
over hegemony, though not always vice versa. If the ruling political group represents the 
hegemonic group’s interests, its foreign policy will be used to maintain hegemony. If the 
group originates from counter-hegemonic social forces, its foreign policy can be utilised 
to attain hegemony from the hands of the existing hegemonic group. Then, who are the 
hegemonic group and counter-hegemonic forces, and what are their respective interests? 
To identify them and their interests in relation to domestic hegemonic struggles, we need 
to examine the historical bloc and its crack or break that generates the hegemonic group 
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and counter-hegemonic social forces.33  
From these findings, we can infer a methodological framework for an empirical 
analysis of major foreign policy changes as follows. The first phase shall be to scrutinize 
the historical bloc on a national level. It will not only provide a comprehensive 
understanding of a particular society—both political society and civil society—but also, 
as indicated above, identify the hegemonic group. The second phase is to demonstrate 
domestic struggles over hegemony. One method is to examine the origin and development 
of organic crisis and its consequences. An organic crisis takes place when the 
superstructures become fetters to the economic development and, therefore, it often 
reveals itself as an economic crisis. The crisis of the historical bloc can be caused by 
several reasons. War can be one of them. War could have a devastating impact on the bloc 
but, if it does not entail major changes in the economic structure, its effects would be 
limited and temporary. Meanwhile, an economic crisis that brought about major 
repercussions in the superstructures, such as political upheavals, is an organic crisis which 
reveals contradictions of the historical bloc and thus discloses and intensifies hegemonic 
struggles in society; however, not every economic crisis accompanies a major foreign 
policy change as not every organic crisis entails the transfer of political power. The third 
phase is to investigate the relations between hegemonic struggles and a particular foreign 
policy. Why the ruling political group conducts the policy and what implications the 
policy has to the hegemonic struggles shall be analysed here.  
 
                                                 
33 It does not mean that every major foreign policy change can be explained from this 
Gramscian approach. Nonetheless, this thesis argues that the approach is especially relevant to 
the case that a country witnesses a major foreign policy change as (or after) it undergoes an 
organic crisis. 
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1.4. The Structure of the Thesis 
 
Arguing that the inter-Korean reconciliation from 1998 to 2002 was hegemonic projects 
of the ruling groups of the two Koreas, this thesis is structured as follows in accordance 
with the above-mentioned theoretical framework. Firstly, it begins with the investigation 
of the respective historical blocs of the two Koreas in Part I. Although the modes of 
production of South and North Korea were different as capitalism and socialism, 
respectively, their production processes were all modifications of Fordism—South Korea 
adopted exportist Fordism and North Korea took autarkist Soviet Fordism—which played 
critical roles in the formation of the capitalist and the socialist economic structures.34 As 
for the superstructures, the thesis first analyses the ideology that, according to Gramsci, 
belongs to the superstructure and also connects it with the economic structure. In the case 
of South Korea, the ideology that built and strengthened the historical bloc was anti-
Communism and, in the case of North Korea, it was the Juche Ideology. Then, the state 
and civil society shall be analysed. South and North Korea’s forms of state in the historical 
blocs are suggested as the developmental state and the Stalinist state, respectively, in this 
thesis. The two Koreas' civil societies were not vibrant because both were extensively 
oppressed and controlled by the states. Afterwards, the thesis identifies the hegemonic 
groups in the South and the North in the conclusions of Chapter II and Chapter III, 
respectively. The historical blocs of South and North Korea were the results of the 
successful hegemonic projects by each hegemonic group in the realms of economy, 
                                                 
34 The concepts of exportist Fordism and autarkist Soviet Fordism are used here to explain the 
uniqueness of the South Korean capitalist economy and the North Korean socialist economy, 
different from other capitalist and socialist economy, respectively. For example, autarkist Soviet 
Fordism alone cannot explain the North Korean socialist system. This is a complement to the 
existing explanations of the socialist system, which was superbly explained by Kornai (1992). 
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ideology, and politics. The thesis is to explain the relationship between domestic 
hegemonic struggles and inter-Korean relations and, thus, it is important to grasp that who 
were the hegemonic groups and how they attained hegemony in the two Koreas. 
Part II analyses the economic crises of the two Koreas in the 1990s and their 
consequences for domestic hegemonic struggles. These crises were organic crises which 
demanded a new ensemble of production relations, a different form of state, and an 
alternative ideology. Both Koreas failed to meet the demands of the age, but the crises did 
change political relations. In South Korea, the economic crisis provoked a political crisis 
and allowed a counter-hegemonic force led by liberal nationalist Kim Dae-jung to take 
power. In North Korea, the economic crisis did not evolve into a political crisis but 
brought about noticeable changes in the power structure, in which the hegemonic group 
brought the Cabinet and the military to the forefront, instead of the Party. In the 
conclusions in Chapter IV and Chapter V, I will summarize changes to the economic 
structures and superstructures in the historic blocs of the two Koreas.  
In Part III, the thesis demonstrates how the organic crises of the two Koreas led 
to changes in inter-Korean relations and what implications the new relations had to the 
hegemonic struggles. In South Korea for Chapter VI, the economic crisis brought about 
the first peaceful transfer of political power, and the new ruling political group, led by 
liberal nationalists, pursued reconciliation with North Korea as a hegemonic project. 
Identifying who they were and what their interests were in relation to the inter-Korean 
reconciliation are critical to understanding the new North Korean policy as a hegemonic 
project. This chapter first briefly explains Seoul’s North Korean policy before 1998 which 
was closely connected to the hegemonic group’s strengthening and maintaining 
hegemony. In North Korea for Chapter VII, the existing hegemonic group preserved its 
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political power but the backbone of the system, or the indoctrination through the Party to 
legitimate the dictatorship of the Kim family, was severely damaged because of the 
economic crisis. Reconciliation with South Korea was an inevitable choice for the 
hegemonic group to weather the economic crisis without a thorough reform. This chapter 
begins with the brief explanation of Pyongyang's policy toward South Korea in the Kim 
Il-sung era because it is critical to point out that Kim Jong-il's view on inter-Korean 
relations was not particularly different from his father’s. In Section 3 of Chapter VI and 
VII, I will investigate the implications of the inter-Korean reconciliation for hegemonic 
struggles in Seoul and Pyongyang, respectively.  
The conclusion of the thesis will summarize the main arguments and the 
empirical findings and discuss both the empirical and theoretical implications of the 
research.  
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PART I. Historical Blocs of the Two Koreas 
 
Chapter II. Historical Bloc and the Hegemonic Group of the South 
 
This chapter proposes that the pre-crisis South Korea developed a particular historical 
bloc during 1961-1979 under the Park Chung-hee regime. Its base, or the economic 
structure, was determined by the production process of exportist Fordism. The 
superstructures include its education, culture, rituals, state, and ideologies. Amongst them, 
ideology and form of state are critical as the earlier chapter explains. This thesis contends 
that anti-Communism was the ruling ideology that upheld the bloc and form of state was 
the developmental state which buttressed Park’s dictatorship.  
The following section of this chapter will explain the economic structure of the 
historical bloc by presenting the historical development of exportist Fordism. The next 
section accounts for the superstructures of the bloc such as the ruling ideology and form 
of state. This chapter concludes with the identification of the hegemonic group that 
brought about rapid economic growth and supported dictatorship in the 1960s and the 
1970s. The hegemonic group's posture toward the communist North Korea was pivotal in 
its attaining hegemony as well as its maintaining and strengthening it, which will be 
detailed in Chapter VI. 
 
2.1. Economic Structure: Exportist Fordism as Determinant 
 
The incorporation of South Korea into the American hegemonic order in East Asia 
required the establishment of capitalist production relations. However, the production 
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relations in South Korea were not the American-style production relations because the 
balance in the relationship between capital and labour in the United States was not 
achieved in South Korea: the United States Army Military Government in Korea 
(USAMGIK) and the new South Korean state severely suppressed labour and socialist 
movements in workplaces through repressive labour laws and brutal force against labour 
activists, socialists, and communists (Gray, 2011: 309).  
Independence in August 1945 did not bring about noticeable progress in the 
production process. Rather, production itself stagnated or even halted as the newly-
independent Korea had few entrepreneurs with a sustainable level of managerial skills 
and few managers to undertake work-planning in the labour process. After skilled and 
semi-skilled Japanese workers had fled to their home country, Korean unskilled workers 
were neither efficiently controlled nor guided at their workplaces (Im Jong-chul, 1999: 
127-35). Whereas, the capitalists who had collaborated with Japanese before remained 
rich and powerful by colluding with the new South Korean government. They continued 
thriving as long as they offered sufficient amounts of bribes to the president and ruling 
party politicians. In addition, new capitalists were created among those who had 
connections with the politicians by taking state properties once owned by the Japanese 
for almost nothing (Lee Han-gu, 1999: 54-57). They were rich enough to give bribes to 
the politicians, which indicated that they had been pro-Japanese collaborators in the 
colonial period. Some of them grew to be a Chaebol, a South Korean form of business 
conglomerate owned by a single family.  
What President Rhee wanted was rich capitalists who could offer ample political 
funds to support the police and the military, the two main coercive means that could 
maintain political stability and bring electoral victories for him. The government 
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transferred government property and gave import licences to selected rich entrepreneurs, 
which became a proper means to become richer. To this end, Rhee preferred to have 
control over finance and refused to accept Washington’s advice on the liberalisation of 
finance (Woo Jung-en, 1991: 61; Kim Yun Tae, 2000: 110-112). Thus, a selective loan 
policy became a key vehicle to winning businessmen over to his side. By this time, the 
corruption link was set up between the state and the Chaebol, where the ruler secured 
material support to preserve his power and the Chaebol earned preferential treatment for 
business activities. Dictatorship became established and so did the Chaebol. 
The production relations were basically similar to those in the colonial period 
except that runaway workers were not arrested any more on charges of violating the law. 
The power of labour vis-à-vis capital was extremely weak for a number of reasons. First, 
South Korean workers had little power owing to low levels of skill. The colonial period 
and the Korean War provided ordinary citizens with limited education and job training 
opportunities to be skilled workers. Also, entrepreneurs had few motives and little 
necessity to train workers as politics and connections were the main factors in earning 
them lucrative profits. Second, the ideological confrontation between capitalism and 
socialism in the Cold War and the authorized anti-Communism gave legitimacy to the 
suppression of labour unions. Consequently, labour activists were branded as reds and 
labour movements were considered anti-capitalistic and rebellious. Moreover, most 
labour leaders were arrested or escaped to the North before and during the war. The result 
was low incomes and poor working conditions as were during the colonial days.  
The Rhee administration relied on American aid and had no concrete plans for 
self-sufficient economic development. With low levels of native technology and a handful 
of native technocrats, it appeared impossible for South Korea to become an industrial 
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country on its own. Besides, Seoul then received enough dollars from the United States. 
Seoul was one of the top recipients of U.S. foreign aid after the Second World War, and 
it was even scaled up during and after the Korean War (Im Jong-chul, 1999: 135-146). 
Instead of an independent development plan, President Rhee tried to extract as much 
money as possible from Washington. Accordingly, the currency was overvalued to 
maximize the volume of aid imports received (Ahn Cheol-hyeon, 2009b: 107-108). 
The system began to break down in 1957 when the United States decided to shift 
its aid policy from grants-in-aid to aid through the Development Loan Fund (DLF). The 
late 1950s saw a sagging U.S. economy and a dollar crisis because of the expansionist 
policy on a global scale to contain the Soviet influence and the rising competitiveness of 
Western Europe and Japan. Instead of the economy operated by the inexhaustible U.S. 
aid, Washington goaded Seoul to begin a stabilization programme. Consequently, a 
ceiling on the government deficit was set, an expansionary monetary policy was not 
allowed, most banks were privatized, and commercial banks were ordered to gain 
approval for loans more than 10 million won (Park Dong-cheol, 1994: 78-79). With 
dwindling U.S. aid, low investment and low growth were inevitable, and the South 
Korean economy was soon dragged into a deep recession. The South Korean government 
was incapable of accommodating itself to the new surroundings enforced by Washington. 
Thus, the system fell into a crisis and it was aggravated by a deepening discontent with 
the dictatorial governance. The April 19 Revolution following the fraudulent presidential 
election of 1960 was a fatal blow to the administration. Rhee Syngman went into exile in 
Hawaii, and the First Republic of South Korea collapsed. 
The Second Republic of South Korea was set up in July 1960 after an interim 
administration under acting president Heo Jeong. For fear of another dictatorship by a 
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president, this republic adopted a parliamentary cabinet system in which Yun Bo-seon 
was elected president and Chang Myon became prime minister and head of the 
government. However, the new system lasted only for eight months until it was 
overthrown by the military coup d’état headed by Park Chung-hee. During the Second 
Republic, people began to state their views much more freely, and the society appeared 
to be unstable. Park’s pretext for the coup on 16 May in 1961 was to restore social stability 
in the dire situation where the belligerent North Korean regime was on the alert for a 
chance to attack. The coup halted the economic ambition of the republic as well as the 
chance for democracy. The Second Republic formulated a five-year economic plan which 
was later adopted after a few changes by the following government (Nahm, 1996: 412). 
Park Chung-hee, from the outset, as an ex post facto legitimization for the coup, 
gave much weight to economic development (Woo Jung-en, 1991: 79). First of all, as a 
measure for greater control of the economy than his predecessors, Park set up the 
Economic Planning Board (EPB) in July 1961 in order to centralize economic decision-
making and manage the whole economy to his advantage. Then, he nationalized all 
commercial banks and lined up all financial institutions under the direction of the Ministry 
of Finance. Now, the purpose of banks and other financial institutions was to second and 
execute national macroeconomic goals (Park Dong-cheol, 1994: 82-83). 
Then, to boost Gross National Product (GNP) per capita—which became a 
political agenda—Park launched the first Five-Year Economic Development Plan in 
January 1962. However, the government had no money to spare for investment. In order 
to fund the plan, in June 1962, Park carried out the currency reform which made ten old 
hwan into one new won. This was followed by a freeze on all bank deposits, and the 
conversion was limited to 500 won, equivalent to less than four U.S. dollars. However, 
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the currency reform was abortive as idle money, instead of being absorbed into investment 
funds, provoked inflation as people hoarded goods with the cash which had been used in 
the underground economy (Im Jong-chul, 1999: 279). What is worse, the early 1960s 
pressured Park with a deterioration of the balance of payments (Kim In-yeong, 1998: 103).  
Amid the predicaments, businessmen first suggested an export-oriented policy to 
Park. On 8 January 1963, the Korean Businessmen's Association (KBA) invited Park and 
persuaded him to support export, arguing that they could increase export by more than 
ten times in a few years. Park was inspired by fine prospects and before long promised 
full-scale support (Suh Jae-jin, 1991: 81-84). The year 1963 was designated as 'the year 
of export', and all mass media publicized the export-oriented strategy. A lot of privileges 
in loan, tax, interest rate, and so on were bestowed. For instance, in August 1964, 17.7 
billion Korean Won was loaned to nine Chaebols for the promotion of export and it 
accounted for about 43 per cent of the total amount of money in circulation (Im Yeong-
tae, 1998: 392). Seoul’s export-oriented growth strategy was supported and also guided 
by the Kennedy administration that made policy changes in favour of export-oriented 
industrialisation (EOI) by adopting Rostow’s ideas on economic growth (Woo Jung-en, 
1991: 73-78; Gray, 2011: 310).  
After his inauguration in 1963, Park became more aggressive in his economic 
ambition and sought all possible means to realize it. He did not even mind diplomatic 
normalization with Japan despite a mountain of protests.35 For immediate economic gain, 
the Park administration made excessive concessions to reach an agreement with its 
                                                 
35 Aside from the people’s emotional antipathy for the harsh colonial rule in the past, some 
practical issues, such as reparations for colonial rule and setting a fishery zone, were very 
controversial for fourteen years since the first contact in 1951 (Ahn Cheol-hyeon, 2009a: 141-
145). 
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Japanese counterpart. Politically, it was to conciliate the United States—Washington was 
still skeptical about Park’s political line because of Park's participation in a communist 
cell within the army in the past—which planned to place Japan as a regional core in its 
postwar reconstruction policy in East Asia (Woo Jung-en, 1991: 52). Also, Park 
personally had little animosity against the Japanese and many Japanese friends in political 
circles because he had been an officer in the Imperial Japanese Army (Clifford, 1998: 35).  
The normalization process concluded in June 1965, and South Korea received 
war reparations from Japan mostly in the form of Overseas Development Assistant 
(ODA). The Japanese ODA loans opened up Japan’s exports of capital goods to South 
Korea (Lee Jae-Oh, 2011a: 179). It also indicated Japan’s ever-increasing clout in South 
Korean society. Already in 1966, Japanese capital accounted for more than half of the 
total foreign loans to South Korea (Woo Jung-en, 1991: 88). After the normalization, 
South Korea was re-integrated into a Japanese-dominated regional economy by importing 
Japan’s capital and intermediary goods and exporting complete products to other 
countries. The economic cooperation with Japan helped South Korea improve its position 
within the global division of labour. In the past South Korea had only produced labour-
intensive goods, but now it began to take note of high-value, capital-intensive goods. 
However, this locked South Korean companies into relations of technological dependence 
with Japanese partners (Pirie, 2007: 68). 
The 1964 decision of President Park to send troops to Vietnam was ascribable to 
reaping economic benefits as well as to strengthening the Seoul-Washington alliance and 
thus the legitimacy of Park Chung-hee. South Korea dispatched more than 300,000 
soldiers from 1965 to 1973, which was more men per capita than any country in the world, 
including the United States of America (Yoon Hye-dong, 2006: 435). Compensation from 
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Washington took the following four forms: first, Seoul received more than 1 billion USD 
from Washington (Pirie, 2007: 66); second, it boosted the United States’ military support 
that permitted the South Korea government to divert scarce resources to economic 
projects; third, Washington granted preferential access to its domestic market and, as a 
result, between 1964-1968 South Korea’s exports to the United States grew by 232 per 
cent (Pirie, 2007: 66); and fourth, the United States helped South Korea to export to South 
Vietnam, which opened up the possibility of overseas expansion for South Korean 
companies. This was the first opportunity for them to make inroads into foreign markets 
other than America. Hyundai, Hanjin and other South Korean Chaebols were bestowed 
with windfall payments while South Korean soldiers fought in the jungle of Vietnam (Lee 
Han-gu, 1999: 135-138; Woo Jung-en, 1991: 95-97).  
Back in the early 1960s, when the United States reduced economic aid sharply 
and the domestic savings amount was meagre, the South Korean government had no 
money to realize its economic strategy. The normalization with Japan and the dispatch of 
soldiers to Vietnam were of great help in facing a big funding shortage. The inequity of 
the accord and the sacrifice of lives were bearable to the regime as economic growth via 
export would provide enough legitimacy and political stability. As a result, they led South 
Korea to become integrated into regional and global economic systems. In the mid- to 
late-1960s, South Korea became a “serious producer of industrial goods, a major exporter 
of low-value-added goods to the US, and an integral part of the Japanese-dominated 
regional division of labour” (Pirie, 2007: 66). Likewise, export-oriented growth took root 
in the mid-1960s. This was consolidated in the 1970s when the established dictatorship 
of Park Chung-hee demanded more vigorous exports. 
In November 1972, the Fourth Republic was launched with the adoption of the 
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Yushin constitution which granted Park enormous power and lifelong dictatorship. In 
order to justify his rule by economic success, President Park soon intensified the exportist 
accumulation strategy, initiating the heavy chemical industry drive, and instituting the 
general trading company. The heavy chemical industry was considered important before 
and was included in the Second Five Year Economic Development Plan (1967-71). 
However, in the early 1970s, it was deemed urgent in the midst of the following four 
circumstances. First, the global recession and the shrinking U.S. market at that time. 
Second, security concerns after the withdrawal of 20,000 U.S. troops and calls for the 
development of the self-reliant defense industry. Third, slipping comparative advantages 
in light industry owing to intense competition with newly-rising developing countries in 
Asia. Fourth, the declining average annual growth rates of GNP from 15 per cent in 1969 
to 7.9 per cent in 1970 and 7.0 per cent in 1972 (Im Jong-chul, 1999: 288-309). 
The Blue House, or the South Korean presidential residence, summoned Chaebol 
owners and persuaded them to invest in the six fields of steel, petrochemicals, nonferrous 
metals, machinery, shipbuilding, and electronics. At first they were halfhearted, but after 
a series of carrots such as financial incentives, investment licences, a funding guarantee, 
and tax cuts, they accepted the offer. After a while Chaebols took active steps to seek 
profits (Kim In-yeong, 1998: 106-107). In 1978, about 79 per cent of the total investment 
was allocated for the heavy chemical industry sector (Lee Won Jong, 2004: 70). 
Also, the Park administration, encouraged by the success of Japan’s general 
trading companies, schemed out a new organization of the same function in 1975. It was 
to increase the amount of exports through selected entities to concentrate its capacities on 
exports. A number of preferences were guaranteed so almost all the trading companies 
yearned to be selected. For example, they could obtain a loan with an interest rate of 8 
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per cent, whereas the general interest rate was 20 per cent. In addition, National 
Investment Fund (NIF), tax reductions and exemptions, and import licences for raw 
materials were offered, to name a few. Large Chaebols’ trading subsidiaries were 
designated as the general trading companies from the outset because the government’s 
standard was the size and the past achievements of exports. 36  It turned out to be 
increasingly lucrative. The top nine general trading companies accounted for 33.9 per 
cent of total exports in 1979 and 51 per cent in 1984 (Lee Han-gu, 1999: 317). 
The heavy chemical industry drive and institution of the general trading company 
in the 1970s contributed to their successful entry into the lucrative, heavy chemical 
industry sector and multiplication of their subsidiaries. Before, Chaebols’ main business 
area was the labor-intensive, light industry but through the 1970s it changed into the 
capital-intensive, heavy chemical industry. Meanwhile, a lot of money was needed to 
pursue the heavy chemical industry drive. Domestic saving rates increased but this was 
insufficient. A massive infusion of foreign capital was crucial. Fortunately, in the 1970s, 
Western industrial countries’ domestic depression led investors to find alternative places 
in which to invest, and also the world was floating in petrodollars. Backed by the United 
States, South Korea was considered relatively safe from foreign investors’ perspectives. 
Consequently, the foreign investment made up about 70 per cent of the total (Lee Han-
gu, 1999: 316). However, large amounts of investment capital provoked inflation, along 
with the wage increases owing to labour shortages as a large number of South Korean 
workers participated in foreign projects such as the Middle East construction projects. 
The inflation led the government to adopt a tight-money policy as a 
                                                 
36 By the time of 1984, the amount of exports by nine general trading companies—all are 
Chaebols’ subsidiaries— accounted for 51 per cent of the total exports (Kim In-yeong, 1998:  
110). 
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countermeasure but the policy deteriorated the financial conditions of small and medium-
sized enterprises [SMEs]. As Chaebols amassed capital in this period from preferential 
treatment by the state, they vigorously bought financially crunched smaller companies. 
Also, many SMEs chose to become Chaebols’ subcontractors as Chaebols had a 
considerable advantage in overseas sales over them: the size of foreign markets was much 
bigger than that of domestic markets in the 1970s. Between 1974 and 1978, the number 
of Hyundai’s subsidiaries increased from 9 to 31, Samsung’s from 24 to 33, Daewoo’s 
from 10 to 35, LG’s from 17 to 43, Hyosung’s from 8 to 24 (Kim In-yeong, 1998: 111). 
On average, in 1972, the top ten Chaebols had 7.5 subsidiaries and 7.7 business areas but, 
in 1979, they had 25.4 subsidiaries and 17.6 business areas (Lee Han-gu, 1999: 315). 
Chaebols held a superior position as there was little legal support for a fair deal in favour 
of SMEs (Jang Ji-sang, 1994: 144-147).  
Amid the economic downturn and ensuing social unrest, President Park was 
assassinated by his security chief Kim Jae-kyu on 26 October 1979 over the use of force 
against demonstrators in Busan and Masan. His lengthy dictatorship of 1961-1979, 
however, witnessed dramatic economic growth. This was possible because the state and 
the Chaebol joined hands to realize export-oriented growth in a rapid manner. The 
production process was modified in the process.  
The modified production process can be termed as ‘exportist Fordism’. It was 
‘Fordism’ in that the labour process was Fordist: the labour process reduced complex 
tasks to repetitive actions by situating semi-skilled workers’ production on an assembly-
line, introduced efficient managerial control and supervision, and intensified labour 
exploitation. It was ‘exportist’ because the production relations were different from U.S. 
Fordism. The driving force behind the difference was its exportist accumulation strategy, 
65 
 
as shown in Table 1 which indicates South Korea’s increasing dependence upon export. 
The strategy modified the production relations between persons and other persons, 
particularly between labour and capital. As Table 2 shows, to promote exports through 
price competitiveness, capitalists under the aegis of the state maintained labour costs at a 
much lower level than productivity. There was little improvement in labour welfare 
through wage hikes as the power of labour vis-à-vis capital was very weak. 
 
Table 1. Change in the commodity export ratio in South Korea (%) 
Source: Kang Shin-jun (1985: 77). 
 
 
Table 2. Change in nominal and real wages and labour productivity in South Korea (%) 
 
Year Nominal Wages Real Wages Labour Productivity 
1962-1966 15.7 0.1 7.9 
1967-1971 21.3 9.7 16.2 
1972-1976 26.0 7.8 9.4 
1977-1981 27.9 8.4 13.5 
Source: Jeong Il-young (1994: 274). 
 
The new production process was an innovation for the following reasons. First, efficiency 
in the labour process was enhanced as the mass production system was established, which 
was shored up by mass consumption abroad. Second, productivity improved as the 
number of semi-skilled and skilled workers increased. It was possible after the Industrial 
Education Promotion Act in 1962 and other state measures to strengthen its industrial 
education programmes (Hangukminjokdaebaekgwa [Korean National Encyclopedia], 
Year 1960 1965 1970 1975 1977 1978 1979 
Ratio 16.8 25.5 41.4 69.7 75.0 75.7 70.9 
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n.d.). Third, managerial abilities were enhanced. Businessmen in the Rhee Syngman era 
amassed wealth basically through rent-seeking but, in the Park Chung-hee era, they 
earned money through profit-seeking by selling goods on the market even though 
collusive links with politicians continued (Jones and SaKong Il, 1980: 304). Fourth, the 
weakness of the management, particularly in investment and planning, was made up for 
by state bureaucrats—this will be detailed when I explain the developmental state below 
in this chapter. However, the relations between labour and capital did not undergo major 
changes. Reinforced anti-Communism played a great role here, which will be 
demonstrated in the next section. 
The production process of exportist Fordism characterized the economic 
structure of South Korea as follows. First, social resources were excessively concentrated 
on large industrial capital, the Chaebol. Considered as the only economic player to 
develop competitive power for exports, the Chaebol became the key beneficiary of the 
state’s aggressive export-oriented strategy. As long as they follow the directions of the 
state, a variety of preferences were offered to them such as financial incentives, tax 
reductions and exemptions, import licences for raw materials, discounts on electricity, gas 
and water costs, and so on.37 Consequently, Chaebols rapidly grew bigger and wealthier. 
Second, only ‘large’ industrial capital prospered. The more power Chaebols had, 
the less power small- and medium-sized companies had. As a result, they were soon 
forced to choose either to discontinue their businesses or to become subcontractors of 
Chaebols (or subcontractors of the subcontractors of Chaebols). Fair deals between 
Chaebols and their subcontractors were uncommon. The rights of Chaebols were overly 
protected, and the status of their subcontractors dropped (Kim In-yeong, 1998: 111-112). 
                                                 
37 For general understanding of Chaebols, See Haggard et al. (2010) and Chang Sea-Jin (2006).  
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As a result, the workers of subcontractors were doubly exploited: they were exploited by 
their employers who were exploited by their contractors (although the wage disparities 
between two sectors took off substantially from the late 1980s).  
Third, South Koreans not directly related to exports suffered. For example, a dual 
money market was established for export promotion. The official interest rate was very 
low but only a selected few—mostly, Chaebols—could borrow money with the low 
interest rate. As the market interest rate was high, the real interest rate was negative so 
those who could borrow money from banks earned money. With the money, Chaebols 
could invest in real estate which was later used as security for a loan, whilst ordinary 
people relied upon the private money market which had much higher interest rates. In the 
1970s, about 70 per cent of general households relied upon the private money market 
(Bae Yeong-mok, 1994: 222-227). 
Fourth, agriculture was sacrificed to maintain price competitiveness for exports 
in the manufacturing industry. To maintain low wages, the state had to reduce the cost of 
labour reproduction and hence it carried out low grain price policies. Besides, the state 
imported grain and wheat flour from abroad—mostly, they were agricultural surpluses of 
the United States. Farmers, particularly young people, left their lands for subsistence 
wages in the city. Subsequently, the agricultural population dropped from 72 per cent in 
1960 to 28 per cent in 1980 (Pirie, 2007: 74). 
Last but not least, the virtuous circle of production and consumption at the 
national level was not attained. The South Korean industries’ production was export-
oriented, not mainly targeted for the domestic market, so production was not organically 
linked to domestic consumption. For example, consumption reduction was manipulated 
by the state with its policy of real wage decreases. Between 1962-1966, the average real 
68 
 
wage was 2,127 won which was 7.8 per cent below the 1961 level. During the same period, 
wholesale prices were up 16.7 per cent on average which was higher than 15.7 per cent 
of the nominal wage-increase rate (Im Jong-chul, 1999: 53-54). 
 
2.2. Ideology: Anti-Communism  
  
Ideology, though a component of the superstructures, plays a critical role in cementing 
the dialectical relations between the economic structure and the superstructure. Ideology 
derives its power from information—unlike religion which derives its power from 
ignorance—and can bind people who may have little in common by replacing religion in 
providing interpretations of everyday life (Gouldner, 1976: 30). The sheer increase in 
information in the modern world raises the question of the processing and the 
interpretation of information. Therefore, the kind of information that will be provided to 
the mass and the kind of interpretation that will be given have become increasingly critical. 
The hegemonic group, which is in command of various vehicles such as schools, churches, 
and mass media, has the upper hand in processing information and giving interpretations 
of information; hence, its ideology can be easily considered objective and factual 
(Gouldner, 1976: 33). Thus, the ideology, to justify the exercise of power for its own 
interests, is diffused into the common sense of the age (Patnaik, 1988: 8).  
In South Korea, particularly since the Korean War, anti-Communism has been 
the ruling ideology, or the ideology of the hegemonic group. The origins of anti-
Communism date back to the colonial days. In 1925, Joseon Gongsan-dang [Communist 
Party of Korea] was established and, before long, Korean communists grew as one of the 
major groups in the anti-Japanese independence movement, which caused the Japanese 
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Government General of Korea to wage an exhaustive crackdown on them. Meanwhile, 
after the March 1st Movement in 1919—the biggest nation-wide Korean independence 
movement against Japanese colonial rule—Japan began to take appeasement measures 
under what was termed the ‘cultural policy’. The new move allowed selected Koreans to 
gain economic and political power. It was by this time that pro-Japanese collaborators 
were called into existence: they conceded and actively collaborated with the colonial rule 
of Japan on the condition that they were guaranteed economic and political gains (Institute 
of Historical Studies, 2004: 145-146). The collaborators also hated communists because, 
they considered communism to be a major threat to their interests and even their lives 
(Yoshinobu, 1989: 171-179).  
As the 24th Corps of the U.S. army which landed on 8 September 1945 was not 
prepared to manage South Korean society, the American army began to rely upon the 
Japanese to understand the circumstances of the peninsula. The Japanese colonial 
government reported that communists were culpable for the social disorder after 
independence. To deal with instability, the USAMGIK appointed Japanese officials as 
advisors who introduced pro-Japanese collaborators to the Americans. The USAMGIK 
had a liking for the collaborators as they had refined manners and a good command of 
English and, most of all, were anti-communist (Institute of Historical Studies, 2004:  
262-263; Yoshinobu, 1989: 182).  
In September 1945, the Korea Democratic Party (KDP) was formed by the 
collaborators—the majority were big landowners who had collaborated with the Japanese 
colonial government (Ahn Cheol-hyeon, 2009a: 85). The USAMGIK selected Korean 
advisors mostly from the KDP (Kim Yun Tae, 2000: 59-60). Also, when it reported the 
South Korean situation to Washington, it said the KDP was a major political party and 
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represented the majority of the South Korean people. The KDP supported Rhee Syngman 
to cope with Kim Gu, the most famous independence activist who had led military fights 
against Japanese imperialism, to secure their life and interests because Kim Gu had a 
great animosity against pro-Japanese collaborators. After his return to Korea on 16 
October 1945, Rhee showed interest in the Communist Party of Korea first but soon 
clearly displayed strong antipathy against communists (Yoshinobu, 1989: 184-187). 
In December 1945, the South Korean people were informed that, in the Moscow 
Conference of Foreign Ministers, the United States disagreed but the Soviet Union agreed 
to the trusteeship of South Korea of up to five years—in fact, they did not decide 
trusteeship, but just agreed to discuss matters of trusteeship later in the Soviet-American 
Joint Commission scheduled for the following year. It was this rumour that first provoked 
large-scale hostilities against the Soviet Union and communists in South Korea (Kim Jin-
guk, 2000: 25-26). In March 1946, the Soviet-American Joint Commission was held in 
Seoul. Moscow in 1945 had little intention to put Korea under trusteeship but in 1946 it 
changed its position. Now Moscow insisted upon trusteeship in the commission and also 
began to demand that Korean communists should support the position. Accordingly, Park 
Hun-Young, the head of the Communist Party of Korea, and other communists publicly 
supported trusteeship (Han Bae-ho, 2000: 105-108). The KDP denounced them saying 
that the Soviet Union intended to annex Korea and mobilized people to demonstrate 
against Moscow and communists (Yoshinobu, 1989: 189).  
In the spring of 1946, as Truman went into a full-out confrontation with Stalin, 
the USAMGIK no longer adhered to the negotiation with its Soviet counterpart and, soon, 
the police force under its direction began to launch an exhaustive crackdown on South 
Korean communists. On 14 May 1946, Rhee Syngman initiated his anti-communist 
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campaign nationwide. Rhee, in the speech on 3 June in Jeong-eup of North Jeolla 
Province, said that South Korea needed to establish an independent government on its 
own. It was an unexpected comment because this was the first time any renowned political 
figure had publically mentioned a ‘separate’, independent government excluding North 
Korea. This received favourable responses particularly from the USAMGIK (Jeon Jin-ho, 
1990: 149-151). Thus, he successfully connected anti-Communism to nation-building. 
Unlike Kim Gu who did not want anti-Communism at the expense of a separate 
government, Rhee Syngman hurried to set up a new, independent government even 
though it would be a separate one. Washington chose Rhee, and he became the first 
president of the Republic of Korea. Kim did not run in a presidential election as he was 
opposing the establishment of a separate government in South Korea and was soon 
assassinated by Ahn Doo-hee on 26 June 1949.38 Rhee eventually placed and maintained 
anti-Communism as a source of legitimacy, and the Korean War facilitated the process.   
The Korean War had South Koreans internalize anti-Communism through 
experiences of cruelty and terror. Nearly one million South Koreans were killed in a 
population of around 20 million, and 25 per cent of the population became refugees. The 
warfare swept up and down almost the entire peninsula except the Pusan perimeter in the 
southeast. Seoul was one of the worst hit places as it changed hands four times during the 
war. The war eradicated the left in South Korea by killing even those suspected of 
collaboration with North Korea—one report suggests that 29,000 were killed in Seoul 
alone—and forcing leftists to flee to the north (Choi Jang-Jip and Lee Seong-hyeong, 
                                                 
38 Ahn insisted that he acted alone, but it is generally regarded that he did it incited by the KDP 
or Rhee himself. Ahn was sentenced to a term of life in prison first, but soon it was commuted 
to a term of 15 years by President Rhee. During the Korean War, he was released and re-instated 
as a military officer. He was a colonel when discharged in 1953. See more about Ahn in Kwon 
Jung-hi (1987).  
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1991: 214-215). 
The war against communists destroyed the foundations of a progressive or even 
a moderate course in political thoughts. The war also allowed the South Korean 
government to suppress freedom of speech, democracy, and human rights under the 
pretext of security (Heo Jae-yeong, 1987: 22). As a result, anti-Communism was deeply 
rooted in South Korean society, and the division system on the Korean peninsula has been 
fixed. Anti-Communism became the ideological base of the divided nation, and the 
National Security Law (NSL) which institutionalized anti-Communism became the most 
important law—even more important than the constitution (Choi Jang-Jip, 2005: 78). 
During the process, the state, if needed, wielded a coercive force without reserve to 
prevent other ideologies such as Marxism from spreading throughout the nation.39 
Especially during the 1961-1979 period of military rule, the state effectively 
maximized its interests through anti-Communism. The ruling ideology, on the one hand, 
contributed to rapid capital accumulation by lowering labour costs as the state punished 
labour activists by branding them as communists and menaces to national security. On 
the other hand, the ideology alienated most of the South Korean people from the fruits of 
economic growth by smothering up calls for the equitable distribution of wealth and 
promotion of the people’s welfare.   
Until the 1960s, as major organizations and activists were eradicated before and 
during the war, the labour movement did not noticeably develop. However, it was 
reignited in 1970 when a 22-year-old male worker, Jeon Tae-il burned himself to death in 
protest. During the 1970s, the labour movement became noteworthy in intensity and 
frequency, and the state did not hesitate to use force, condemning protestors as 
                                                 
39 For example, possessing a Marxist book was illegal. 
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communists (Lee Jae-Oh, 2011b: 306-308). One well-known example was the YH 
Incident in 1979. Two hundred women employees of the YH Trading Company, a 
needlework business specializing in wig-making, demonstrated against the company’s 
closure of business and in favour of a settlement of back-pay. As the owner brought the 
police into the company, they moved their protest to the headquarters of the opposition 
New Democratic Party (NDP) on 9 August. Two days later, as the NDP refused to 
cooperate with the government, about 1,000 policemen raided the building. One of the 
workers died, numerous people were injured, and 172 workers and 26 NDP members 
were arrested (Han Sang-cheol, 2011: 190-191). The state later argued that communists 
had controlled the women employees as their puppets (Cho Hee-Yeon, 2007: 208). 
Anti-Communism stemmed from ‘fear’ which is one of the most powerful 
emotions of human beings.40 North Korea strengthened the fear of communism and 
communists amongst South Koreans by, e.g., sending armed guerrillas several times, 
provoking the 1976 Axe Murder incident and, above all, waging the Korean War. 
Nonetheless, it is also noteworthy that anti-Communism was reinforced and from time to 
time manipulated through the media, education, and so forth by the hegemonic group for 
its own interests. Consequently, more and more people thought that the dictatorship of 
Park Chung-hee was better than another war on the Korean peninsula and the 
communisation by the North. From a Hobbesian logic, for fear of war and communisation, 
individuals alienated their rights to the dictator to protect themselves. 
Anti-Communism in South Korea was different from that of Western Europe in 
that the ideology forbade all forms of leftist, rebellious, and disobedient thoughts: it 
                                                 
40 Fear “needs no definition. It is a primal, and so to speak, subpolitical emotion” (Aron, 1968: 
20-21). 
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compelled ideological uniformity in society. In particular, leftist views were interpreted 
as the extension of communism, and leftists were considered as subversives or even spies. 
Furthermore, it was often the case that any criticisms against the established order were 
deemed pro-communist. Communists, socialists, and leftists were easily branded as reds 
in South Korea. This strain reinforced the internalisation of anti-Communism within 
individual minds so that people were reluctant to raise ideas which could be regarded as 
leftist and thus pro-communist. It coerced individuals into adopting conformist attitudes 
and thus constrained them from criticizing inequalities and contradictions of the existing 
system. Hence, anti-Communism imposed invisible restrictions on the liberties and rights 
of the citizens even though it was originally designed to protect them from communists 
(Kwon Hyeok-beom, 1998: 20-38). 
According to Choi and Lee, developmentalism was vigorously accommodated 
by the third republic and concretized through the government’s economic development 
plans. Developmentalism had functional complementarity with military authoritarianism 
which took discipline and obedience as core values and, therefore, the state’s goal of 
economic development and military dictatorship were linked together smoothly (Choi 
Jang-Jip and Lee Seong-hyeong, 1991: 218-219). In the 1960s and 1970s, anti-
Communism and developmentalism were closely integrated. However, between the two, 
anti-Communism was the primary ideology by providing the raison d'etre for the 
hegemonic rule by the ruling group, while developmentalism justified the economic 
policies of the group. When we center on the state’s accumulation strategy, 
developmentalism for the developmental state shall be the ruling ideology. However, 
when we put hegemony at the center of our discussion, developmentalism was of 
secondary importance as the hegemonic group did replace developmentalism with 
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neoliberalism when the group deemed it necessary. As explained later in Chapter VI, 
developmentalism was supplanted by neoliberalism after the death of Park Chung-hee, 
but anti-Communism was sustained or even reinforced by the hegemonic group thereafter. 
Furthermore, anti-Communism was a source not only of consent, but also of coercion 
through the NSL which institutionalized it legally. In that regard, this thesis argues that 
anti-Communism, bolstered by developmentalism, was the ideology of the historical bloc. 
 
2.3. The State and Civil Society 
 
2.3.1. Form of state: the developmental state 
 
The concept of the developmental state originated with the economist Friedrich List, but 
its current dominant usage is attributable to Chalmers Johnson who offered an account of 
Japan’s rise to economic power and the state’s role in the process. (Sinha, 2003: 459). 
This concept in general encompasses the view that the state leads the industrialization 
drive itself by taking on developmental functions. 41  With sufficient autonomy and 
capability, this particular form of state intervenes directly in the economy to achieve its 
development goals (Sinha, 2003: 459). Private sectors are guided and even dictated by 
state elites such as politicians and bureaucrats. The state decides which industries should 
be developed and who should go into the industries, and policy instruments of various 
kinds are used to promote and protect the industries (Wu Yongping, 2004: 92).  
The South Korean state, from the beginning, had a high degree of autonomy. 
                                                 
41 For general understanding of the concept of the developmental state, see Johnson (1982) and 
Woo-Cumings (1999). 
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Before independence, Japanese colonial rule established the bourgeois state for capitalist 
development which was ‘over-developed’ in relation to the economic structure. The 
colonial state was “equipped with a powerful bureaucratic military apparatus and 
mechanisms of government which enable it through its routine operations to subordinate 
the native social classes” (Alavi, 1972: 61). The Japanese colonial state wielded an 
exceptionally extensive and inordinately intensive form of control against Koreans. While 
it took highly interventionist financial and industrial policies, the state built pervasive 
security networks to facilitate the state-led accumulation (Pirie, 2007: 60-61). For 
instance, in 1937, to rule 21 million Koreans, 246,000 Japanese and 63,000 Koreans were 
employed in the civil service including more than 60,000 policemen. In the same year, 
13,696 Frenchmen and Vietnamese were employed to rule 17 million Vietnamese 
(Cumings, 1981: 34-36).  
The South Korean state, after independence, continued the colonial legacy by 
absorbing the overdeveloped apparatuses of the state such as the bureaucracy, the 
judiciary, the police, and the military. The new state inherited members of the apparatuses 
from the colonial government because they were well trained and thus efficient in their 
jobs and, above all, they were pro-Japanese collaborators like those in command of state 
power. Consequently, high-ranking officials and judges, instruments of colonial power, 
could maintain their power. Policemen and soldiers, who had arrested and killed fighters 
for national independence in the colonial period, now arrested and killed communists or 
those people who were branded as communists by the state.42 For example, more than 80 
per cent of senior police officers in the Rhee administration were ex-officers in the 
                                                 
42 From August 1948 to October 1962, there were 26 Home Ministers who commanded the 
police force. Out of them, 15 ministers had collaborated with the Japanese colonial government 
(Suh Jung-seok, 1999: 37).  
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Japanese police or Japanese army.43 Also, the commanders of all nine regiments under 
the USAMGIK were ex-officers in the Japanese army (Kang Jeong-gu, 2001a: 107). Later, 
those who had served in the Japanese army as officers became the dominant faction in the 
military (Alagappa, 2001: 123). Of the state apparatuses, the military was the most 
efficient and well organized at that time. Trained by the Japanese government to fight 
against the Chinese and the Koreans in Manchuria, the military was the best organized 
force in the colonial period. After independence, the United States shaped the military’s 
institutional structure and systematically trained South Korean soldiers. The Korean War 
expanded and reinforced their power even more. Before the war, the number of South 
Korean military forces was 105,000. It skyrocketed to 700,000 during the war and 
remained 600,000 after the war (Suh Jung-seok, 2007: 42). Sharing the ideology of anti-
Communism, they enjoyed full support from Washington and ruling politicians in Seoul.  
The South Korean state had no rival social classes, particularly after the Korean 
War. In the colonial period, the Japanese government removed the status of Yangban, the 
traditional ruling class since the Joseon dynasty. After independence, the economic base 
of the class was eliminated by a series of land reforms which culminated in the land 
reform in 1950 where a three-jungbo limit (about 7.35 acres) of farmland was decreed to 
each farming household.44 The 1950 land reform was politically devised by President 
Rhee to weaken the KDP whose majority was made up of big land owners, after he parted 
company with the KDP. From that moment, the KDP became a vociferous opponent of 
the regime (Choi Jang-Jip, 2005: 130-131). During the Korean War, even cultural clout 
                                                 
43 Even as of 1960, 15 years after the independence, policemen in the Japanese colonial period 
accounted for about 70 per cent of all chief superintendents and about 40 per cent of all 
superintendents in South Korea (Im Dae-shik, 1995: 36). 
44 The land reform divested large landowners of their land with compensation, and some of them 
went to cities and turned into industrial capitalists. The remaining small farmers could not raise 
opposing voices under the authoritarian rule (Choi Jang-Jip, 2005: 130). 
78 
 
of the landed class disappeared in South Korean society.   
All notable industrial capitalists in the colonial period were collaborators to the 
colonial state as they knew it was very profitable to collude with politicians and 
bureaucrats. Rich businessmen, after independence, remained as collaborators with the 
state. They offered funds to support the police and the military which contributed to the 
dictatorship and, in return, they were given preferential treatment. The pattern continued 
in the Park administration. Immediately after the coup, Park Chung-hee waged an anti-
corruption campaign which arrested those people who illegally accumulated wealth. It 
was applicable to almost all Chaebols who obtained wealth in the Rhee Syngman era. 
However, the richest of them were ruled out because Park needed people of wealth to 
financially support his ambition. He called ten major Chaebol owners and made a deal 
with them. In exchange for exempting them from criminal prosecution and preserving 
their properties, whether well- or ill-gotten, they had to fund industrial projects and donate 
shares to the government (Woo Jung-en, 1991: 83-84).45  
The working class was powerless, posing little threat to the state. The South 
Korean state appeased or threatened capitalists according to the circumstances, but 
persistently used force towards labourers. Right after independence, the Jeonpyeong 
[National Council of Labour Unions], built in close association with the Communist Party 
of Korea, claimed 574,475 members. In autumn 1946, a large-scale peasant riot and a 
general strike were held in which more than a million peasants and workers were involved. 
The USAMGIK and the South Korean police put them down with brutal force. More than 
1,000 people were killed and as many as 30,000 people were arrested. The leadership fled 
                                                 
45 Cozy relations between politics and business were also overt until the early 1990s. Chaebols 
participated in the financial committee of the ruling party and donated a great deal of political 
funds openly to the ruling politicians (Kim Yun-tae, 2000: 212). 
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to the north and all radical peasant organizations and labour unions were dissolved (Minns, 
2001: 1029). During the Korean War, the remaining radicals or leftists were killed or 
escaped to North Korea. After the war, the South Korean state showed no mercy in 
suppressing labour movements, which was possible by denouncing labour movements as 
pro-communist activists masterminded by Pyongyang.  
The bureaucracy was developed and reinforced by ruling politicians, particularly 
in the Park Chung-hee era. One of the main differences between the Japanese 
developmental state and the South Korean developmental state in the Park era was that in 
the South Korean case decisions made by the president were conclusive, and the 
bureaucracy was a means to implement the decisions. In other words, the political logic 
gained ascendency over the expertise of economic bureaucrats. President Park set 
ambitious goals and mobilized all social resources to achieve them. The South Korean 
bureaucracy was expanded to realize his goals (Choi Jang-Jip, 2005: 94-98). Before long, 
South Korea had a remarkable administrative capability, as Pirie noted: “In terms of levels 
of education, admission standards and general all-round competence, the South Koran 
bureaucracy compares favourably to the majority of its counterparts not only in the 
underdeveloped world but also in the core capitalist world” (Pirie, 2007: 64). In addition, 
the state bureaucrats were imbued with the idea of modernizing their fatherland, 
considering themselves to have a ‘historic mission’ to transform South Korea into an 
advanced country (Pirie, 2007: 65, emphasis in the original). Through the presidency of 
Park, the state bureaucrats built their strength and, by the late 1970s, they became a 
powerful force in society.  
The developmental state in South Korea, most of all, fostered the growth of the 
Chaebol. After the state decided to assume an exportist accumulation strategy, it appeared 
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to be necessary for South Korea to concentrate its limited resources on a few designated 
entities for exports. Chaebols were chosen and acted as proxy for the state. Even the roles 
of Chaebols were specified in the five-year plans for economic growth. In the process, 
the Chaebol became the ruling class of South Korea where the landed class—the ruling 
class in pre-modern times—had disintegrated. The bourgeoisie in South Korea was not a 
pro-democracy force. It was created and nurtured by the authoritarian state and functioned 
as a partner of the state (Choi Jang-Jip, 2005: 101-102).  
The developmental state, with a high degree of autonomy and capability, 
intervened in the production process directly and indirectly as follows. First, the export-
oriented strategy and a series of agreements with Japan and the United States enabled 
Chaebols to make money through the mass production system for exports. Second, 
strengthening the industrial education programmes helped to enhance productivity in the 
labour process by increasing the number of skilled and semi-skilled workers. Third, the 
state bureaucrats made up for weak managerial skills of the private sector by taking over 
some tasks of the management such as investment and planning. Fourth, the state 
suppressed labour movements harshly and cracked down on labour activists. This 
strengthened the power of capital. Although the primary relations in production are the 
relations between labour and capital, the developmental state was thus another important 
actor by getting involved in the production relations. The success of the developmental 
state was brought about by changes in the production relations. 
The South Korean developmental state had anti-Communism bolstered by 
developmentalism as the ruling ideology. The state's administrative, coercive, ideological, 
and regulative apparatuses were determined and maintained by the ideological unity. 
Indeed, anti-Communism, along with developmentalism, was a key factor in the South 
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Korean developmental trajectory. For example, another main difference between the 
Japanese developmental state and the South Korean developmental state was that 
workers' rights in South Korea had been much less protected than those in Japan, and 
anti-Communism played a significant role in the process. One result was an economic 
miracle with few middle-class people in South Korea while Japan was referred to as ‘a 
middle-class society’. 
 
2.3.2. Civil society 
 
The moment of hegemony is only made possible by the intentional efforts of the 
hegemonic group. The main spheres where hegemonic struggles take place include 
churches, schools, civic organizations, and the media. 46  These are the spheres that 
Gramsci's concept of civil society signifies. Through civil society, the ideology of the 
hegemonic group becomes the common sense of the age and the interests of the group 
become the national interests (Gramsci, 1971b: 331).  
Specifically speaking, to begin with, South Korean churches were a great help in 
consolidating hegemony, but not always. The Protestant Church in general was an active 
supporter in favour of the hegemonic rule.47 During the colonial period, Pyongyang was 
the center of the Protestant Church in Korea. As the communist regime persecuted 
                                                 
46 According to Althusser (2001: 142-146), schools, churches, mass media are ideological state 
apparatuses while the police and the military are repressive state apparatuses. This thesis argue 
that these are the main constituents of civil society. That is, they can be ideological state 
apparatuses but not always. When the power of the hegemonic group is absolute, all the relevant 
institutions in civil society will act as ideological state apparatuses. Otherwise, hegemonic 
struggles will take place in civil society, and some of the institutions will stand against the 
hegemonic group. 
47 There were also progressive Protestant churches which opposed the dictatorships, but they 
were small in number (Gray, 2013: 95-96). 
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religion after 1945, many Protestants came to the South seeking freedom of religion, and 
they became staunch proponents of anti-Communism. 48  They were also strong 
supporters of the dictatorships by President Rhee and President Park who officially 
advocated anti-Communism (Yu Yong-Ik, 2002: 239-252).49 Under the auspices of the 
state, the Protestant Church expanded its congregation drastically, accounting for about 
20 per cent of the population in 1980 from about 3 per cent directly after independence.50 
On the contrary, the Catholic Church was not that cooperative to those dictators, often 
providing shelters to dissidents against their rules. Furthermore, the Catholic Priests 
Association for Justice, established in 1974, publicly reproached and condemned the 
suppression of human rights by the Park regime, which resulted in the imprisonment of a 
number of priests (Suh Jung-seok, 2007: 136-137).  
The autonomy of civic organizations was severely constrained under dictatorship 
and strong anti-Communism, and none of them could exist if they voiced opposition to 
the dictators. Meanwhile, pro-government business organizations and interest groups 
expanded rapidly under the tutelage of the developmental state. The Federation of the 
Korean Industries, the Korea Employers Federation, the Federation of Korean Trade 
Unions, the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, and the Korean Federation of 
Teachers' Associations were notable examples. They were utilized to achieve goals set by 
the state. Moreover, they could maximize the members’ private interests in return for 
accepting the state's control (Choi Jang-Jip, 2005: 226-227). 
                                                 
48 As for the relations between the Protestant Church and anti-communism, see Kang In-cheol 
(2007). 
49 Conservative pastors even expressed their concern over civilian governments from the 1990s 
onward by saying that it indicated South Korea had moved sharply to the left and emphasizing 
the necessity of strengthening anti-Communism (IGOOD News, 3 September 2010).  
50 As of 1980, Catholics and Buddhists accounted for about 8 per cent and 22 per cent, 
respectively (Dong-A Ilbo, 15 June 2006). 
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Schools were the places where the state could inculcate people with the ruling 
ideology directly and effectively. President Park reinforced anti-communist education and 
hence even elementary school students had to learn about anti-Communism. For example, 
the textbook titled Seunggong [Defeating Communism] for second-year elementary 
school students in 1965 described North Korean people as barbarians. In particular, the 
tale of Lee Soong-bok who was killed by North Korean guerillas in 1968 was included in 
the textbook of morals in the 1970s and the 1980s. He was allegedly murdered for crying 
“I don't like the Communist Party!” in front of the guerillas, and the title of the chapter 
was also ‘I don't like the Communist Party!’ With fear and hostility, elementary school 
students learnt the cruel and tragic story with anti-Communism internalized in their minds 
(Kang Jin Woong, 2012: 692-693). 
Mass media played an important role in strengthening and reproducing the ruling 
ideology in South Korea. The state’s control of the media has a long history. In post-
liberation Korea, the leftist media were dominant (Jeong Jin-seok, 2001). However, the 
situation was reversed by the USAMGIK and the Rhee administration and, from then on, 
the rightist media prevailed. Directly after taking power, Rhee in 1948 gagged the media 
by forbidding the publication of supportive writings for communism, North Korea’s 
policies, anti-government protests, and so on (Jo Maeng-gi, 1997: 216-220). The 
tendency became even more explicit after the Korean War. The state included phrases of 
the press control in the NSL and ceased publication of Kyunghyang Shinmun for its 
frequent anti-government articles (Jo Maeng-gi, 1997: 226-229). However, compared 
with those in Park Chung-hee era, journalists in the Rhee Syngman era enjoyed 
considerable autonomy from the state, loudly speaking of people's desire for democracy. 
The April Revolution succeeded as student movements came under the spotlight of the 
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media (Choi Jang-Jip, 2005: 115).  
Park Chung-hee and his colleagues were aggressive in media control at the outset. 
The military group’s first decree was pre-censorship of the press and it reduced 912 media 
to only 82. Then, in 1962, after Park was elected president, the government took a carrot 
and stick approach. President Park offered media owners tax reductions and cheap loans, 
while arresting critical journalists who were against his dictatorship. The approach was 
successful as journalists who were against the government were discharged by the owners. 
As a result, all mass media condoned a constitutional amendment allowing his third 
presidential term in 1969 (Lee Hyo-sung, 1996: 86-90). In the 1970s, the media in general 
had a close cooperation with the state and played a crucial role in inculcating the people 
with the ruling ideology.  
Of particular importance amongst the media companies of South Korea were 
Chosun Ilbo, Joongang Ilbo, and Dong-A Ilbo which altogether accounted for more than 
50 per cent of the market share since the 1960s (Lee Hyo-sung, 1996: 56-66). Their 
owners had been all famous pro-Japanese collaborators in the colonial period (Kim 
Yeong-myeong, 2008: 58). In the 1960s and 1970s, on the one hand, they were 
cooperating with the regime by indoctrinating the people with anti-Communism and, on 
the other hand, they considered themselves advocates of the ruling ideology because it 
was conducive to their own personal interests.  
 
2.4. Conclusion: Who was the Hegemonic Group? 
 
The historical bloc, constructed in the 1960s and 1970s, produced an economic miracle 
in which GNP per capita skyrocketed from 60 USD in 1960 to 1,533 USD in 1980 (Kim 
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Byoung-Lo, 1992: 67). The economic structure that brought about the astonishing 
achievement was determined by the production process of exportist Fordism, which was 
induced and forced by the developmental state with the help of the ruling ideology of 
anti-Communism. We can understand that the long-lasting historical bloc in the Park 
Chung-hee era was the successful outcome of a hegemonic project by the hegemonic 
group. In this process, the dictatorship under the mask of ‘freedom and democracy’, or 
anti-Communism, was closely linked with exportist accumulation strategy. 
Then, who was the hegemonic group that built and maintained the bloc in that 
period? To summarise what I described above, it was composed of four social forces in 
the main. First of all, ruling party politicians, particularly ex-military politicians such as 
Park Chung-hee and his henchmen, played a leading role by changing the existing 
economic structure and form of state. Second, large industrial capital, the Chaebol, 
became the ruling class in society. They were created by Rhee Syngman but rapidly grew 
in the Park era as a partner for the export oriented economic policy. Third, the 
conservative media were a key member of the group by disseminating anti-Communism 
and justifying dictatorship. Fourth, state bureaucrats were one of the main constituents. 
The South Korean developmental state nurtured and reinforced state bureaucrats who 
eventually became the bulwark for the bloc. From a Marxist perspective, we can say that 
the hegemonic group was made up of several social categories and one fraction of the 
capitalist class—large industrial capital.  
It is noteworthy that most of the members shared a common background as pro-
Japanese collaborators during the colonial period. They were protected by the USAMGIK 
directly after independence, favoured by Rhee Syngman in the power struggle with 
communists and nationalists, and consolidated by Park Chung-hee as a hegemonic group. 
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However, being an anti-communist was more important. Not every one of them had been 
pro-Japanese collaborators, but all of them were anti-communists. Anti-Communism thus 
was grounds for justifying their raison d'etre and a tool to realize their interests.  
With anti-Communism as the link that connected domestic and foreign policy, 
the South Korean state exhibited great hostility toward North Korea. The anti-Communist 
group at the helm of the state should not have a close tie with communists in the North 
while it framed opposition forces and labour activists in the South as reds and oppressed 
them. However, in reality, whenever necessary for its hegemonic rule, the group tried to 
reconcile with communists in North Korea. The detailed explanations about the 
relationship between domestic hegemonic struggles and the group’s North Korean policy 
will be given in the first section of Chapter VI. 
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Chapter III. Historical Bloc and the Hegemonic Group of the North  
 
This chapter will analyse the northern part of the Korean peninsula using the same 
Gramscian concepts that were applied to the southern counterpart. In contrast to the case 
of South Korea, North Korea has not undergone a regime change since 1945 and thus has 
generated strong unity in the leadership. In late 1950s, a unique historical bloc was formed 
by the existing leadership to confront dissidents who were heavily affected by 
Khrushchev's attack of the late Stalin. The bloc’s economic structure was determined by 
the production process of autarkist Soviet Fordism, and the superstructures were mainly 
constructed by the ideology of Juche [independent stand or spirit of self-reliance] and the 
Stalinist state.  
The following sections will explain how the economic structure and the 
superstructures were formed, elucidate how they interacted with each other, and show 
who constituted the hegemonic group. The historical bloc, on the one hand, achieved great 
economic success until the 1960s and paved the way for the maintenance of the regime 
in the midst of the collapse of the Western communist states. However, on the other hand, 
it led millions of North Koreans to starve to death in the mid-1990s during the economic 
crisis, which will be demonstrated in Chapter V.    
 
3.1. Economic Structure: Autarkist Soviet Fordism as Determinant 
 
Newly born socialist countries in Europe and Asia witnessed Soviet Fordism being 
established as the new production process. There were other types of production processes 
under experiment, such as workers’ control of production, right after the end of the Second 
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World War. They were all dismissed by the Soviet Union and crushed by the police and 
other repressive forces. As a result, all socialist countries that should have acted on behalf 
of the proletariat adopted Soviet Fordism which required managers and state bureaucrats 
to control the production process and suppressed even basic labour rights such as forming 
labour unions (Kollo, 1995: 282-318). This also applied to the case of North Korea. 
The Soviet troops in North Korea in 1945 first regarded factory equipment, 
power generators, and raw materials as war booty and took them to their home country 
without any compensation. This made the already impoverished North Korea in a worse 
economic situation. As the ill feeling of North Koreans was reported to Moscow, the 
Soviet government halted it and, from August of 1946, transferred ownership of 
properties to the North Korean Provisional People’s Committee, the provisional 
government ruling the northern part of the Korean Peninsula from February 1946 (Jeon 
Hyeon-su, 1999: 89-95). The committee had successfully undertaken a land reform in 
March 1946 by distributing about three acres of land to each peasant on average and 
writing off all debts with no compensation paid for the land confiscated (Scalapino and 
Lee, 1972: 1018). From August of the same year, with the first stage of industrial 
nationalization, agricultural productivity enhanced rapidly as farmers were supported 
with modern agricultural production facilities such as litigation facilities, electricity, 
farming equipment, chemical fertilizers, and so on (Jeong Eun-mi, 2007: 48-49). As more 
than 70 per cent of the population was primarily engaged in farming, the reform, though 
planned by and conducted under the tutelage of Moscow, brought Kim Il-sung, the head 
of the committee, a solid reputation as a capable leader (Suh Dong-man, 2005: 327-371).  
In December 1945, Kim Il-sung gained a practical victory over indigenous 
communists in the North after a series of public disputes with them. Amongst them, Kim's 
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successful debate with Oh Ki-seop was critical over the issue of the party’s relationship 
with labour unions. Oh argued that labour unions and the party should be equal with each 
other, but Kim claimed that the party must direct the labour unions. Oh was a well-known 
labour movement activist who had led Wonsan Strike of 1929, the biggest strike in the 
colonial period (Lee Ju-cheol, 2009: 231-236).  
North Korea officially confirmed the party’s control of labour unions at the 
inaugural conference of the Workers’ Party of North Korea in June 1946. The party was 
formed through a merger of the Communist Party of North Korea and the New 
Democratic Party. Kim Du-bong, former head of the New Democratic Party, became a 
chairperson but Kim Il-sung was the de facto leader of the new party. The party claimed 
that as most factories and enterprises had been nationalized, workers should not fight 
against national institutions. In 1947, ahead of the implementation of the first national 
economic plan whose outcomes could affect the very existence of the regime, North 
Korea had very little room for controversy over this issue which could lead to disastrous 
results if labour unions refused the party’s guidance (Kim Chang-soon, 1961: 108-109). 
The party’s role in industrial production, however, was relatively limited in this period as 
it followed the then model of the Soviet Union. The department of industry in the 
provisional committee controlled a related provincial bureau which appointed a factory 
manager who was solely responsible for the operations of the factory. The party’s task 
was to draft macroscopic economic policies and give political guidance, not managerial 
and technical guidance, in production (Cha Mun-seok, 2001: 195-196).  
The industrial sector showed marked progress in nationalization, unlike the 
agricultural sector whose nationalization was delayed until the mid-1950s. 
Approximately 72 per cent of industrial assets were under state control in 1946 and this 
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reached about 90 per cent in 1949. For central economic planning, the provisional 
committee in December 1946 re-organized planning entities systematically from the 
planning department in the committee to the planning section in the company (Jeon 
Hyeon-su, 1999: 97). During this period, though planning levels were crude, North 
Korea’s planned socialist economy grew rapidly, recording an average annual growth rate 
of about 52 per cent, owing to the successful restoration of the production facilities which 
had been worn away or destroyed under Japanese control (Jeon Hyeon-su, 1999: 105).  
North Korea launched an invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950. The Korean 
War which lasted until 27 July 1953 wreaked havoc on the North Korean economy. In 
particular, the three-year war destroyed most heavy industries in the North. By the time 
the war ended, there were no chemical fertilizers produced and no iron mined. Also, 
electrical power, cement, and coal were in awfully low supply (Scalapino and Lee, 1972: 
1211). During the war years, however, the North Korean government constructed a 
wartime mobilisation system to effectively mobilise human and material resources for the 
conduct of the war, and transformed society into a central command system. In the process, 
the state banned the freedom of movement and residence of factory workers and made 
the labour mobilisation of farmers mandatory. The consolidated command system was 
helpful in rehabilitating the economy after the war (Kim Yeon-chul, 2001: 80-82).  
The postwar restoration was carried out in the direction of reconstructing society 
into a full-scale socialist system and rapid industrialization. As of 1953, the portion of the 
gross value of socialist industrial production was 96.1 per cent, and that of socialist 
agricultural production was a mere 8.0 per cent. While it accelerated industrial 
nationalization, the state launched a country-wide agrarian collectivization campaign 
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from April 1954, after a brief preliminary stage from late 1953.51 As North Korean 
farmers lacked animals, seeds, and fertilizers after the war, it was opportune for the state 
to promote all-out collectivization in this particular period. Consequently, North Korea 
could claim that 98 per cent of the total economy was socialist in 1956.52 
In this period, the typical socialist production process was established. Koreans 
who had come from the Soviet Union as well as Soviet bureaucrats and engineers played 
a pivotal role in designing the North Korea economy anew. Naturally, the production 
process of North Korea emulated that of the Soviet Union. The socialist economy's innate 
obsession over quantitative expansion expedited the establishment of the mass production 
system in North Korea (Kornai, 1992: 280-282). Also, emphasis on industrial education 
was helpful. Concretely, the North Korean leadership sought to enhance the skill level of 
workers by setting up higher education institutions such as Kim Il-sung University and 
Pyongyang Technical College, 55 professional schools, and technical schools within each 
factory and company. In addition, it sent thousands of students to the Soviet Union, China, 
and other socialist countries to acquire advanced technologies (Jo Jeong-A, 2005: 26-29). 
In the production process, the manager with a high level of expertise was responsible for 
all operations in a factory or company and party bureaucrats played a supportive role.  
The 1953 August Plenum of the Central Committee was an important meeting in 
North Korean politics and economy. In the meeting, the party decided upon a Three-Year 
Plan with heavy industry taking priority over light industry and agriculture to regain pre-
war production levels at a rapid pace. It was pushed ahead by Kim Il-sung and his so-
                                                 
51 In 1949, the proportion of socialist agricultural production was 3.2 per cent (Scalapino and 
Lee, 1972: 1057). 
52 North Korea claimed that complete socialization of the economy was established in 1958 
(Soh Chi-hyeong et al., 1999: 54).  
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called Partisan Faction amid considerable controversy with groups of opposing views that 
emphasized balance between heavy industry, light industry, and agriculture. 53  The 
balance was critical to the welfare of the people, as the propensity for heavy industry 
meant very rapid industrialization in exchange for the sacrifice of ordinary citizens as 
well as squeezing the surplus from the farming sector. The Three-Year Plan appeared to 
be performed smoothly largely owing to ample foreign assistance from the Soviet Union, 
China, and other socialist countries but, over the years, it revealed serious problems such 
as widespread starvation in rural areas as the assistance was mainly allocated to heavy 
industry, and investment on agriculture was greatly reduced (Han Yong-won, 1998: 191).  
Voices that opposed the ‘heavy industry first’ policy at the August Plenum in 
1953 mostly came from Soviet-Koreans and returnees from China who were later referred 
to as the Soviet Faction and the Yenan Faction, respectively. They generally received 
better education than those in the Partisan Faction and were trained for years as party 
members or officials in the Soviet Union and China and, thus, had close connections with 
communists in those countries. At that time, they were inspired by Malenkov's campaign 
for expanding consumer goods production in the Soviet Union. They were also concerned 
about Kim Il-sung’s rising cult of personality after Kim purged all rival figures, such as 
Park Hon-yong and Huh Ga-i, during the Korean War (Suh Dong-man, 2005: 379-397). 
The Third Party Congress in April 1956 resulted in reinforcing Kim's dictatorship. 
However, it was during this time that detailed accounts were delivered to North Korea by 
foreign guests such as Brezhnev, the future general secretary, that Khrushchev denounced 
the ‘crimes’ of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the 
                                                 
53 The Partisan Faction was made up of those people who fought the Japanese army with Kim 
Il-sung in northeastern China (Han Yong-won, 1998: 54).  
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Soviet Union in February 1956. Encouraged by the news, Choi Chang-ik (Deputy Prime 
Minister), Yoon Gong-heum (Minister of Commerce), Suh Hwi (Chairman of the General 
Federation of Korean Trade Unions) of the Yenan Faction, Park Chang-ok (Deputy Prime 
Minister) and Rhee Sang-jo (North Korean Ambassador to the Soviet Union) of the Soviet 
Faction, and other key figures of the two factions plotted together to publicly attack Kim's 
policies and the growing personality cult (Suh Dong-man, 2005: 553-566).  
In June 1956, Kim Il-sung left North Korea for about a month to secure aid from 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. During the period, the dissidents in Pyongyang and 
Moscow drew up more meticulous plans to attack him. On 30 August 1956 at the Plenum, 
Choi made a speech criticizing the Party's economic policy that ignored prevalent 
starvation among the people and condemning Kim Il-sung for concentrating all power in 
his hands. Also, Yoon Gong-heum criticized Kim for attempting to make a police state 
out of North Korea. Kim's supporters rebuked and heckled the speakers, making them 
almost inaudible, and accused them of dividing the Party with sectarianism. Kim 
allegedly obtained intelligence of the plot a few days before and successfully neutralized 
the attacks in the so-called August Faction Incident (Lee Jong-seok, 1995a: 277-278). 
Directly after the Plenum, Kim Il-sung and the KWP expelled Choi Chang-ik and 
Park Chang-ok from the Central Committee. Feeling threats to their own safety, others 
such as Yoon Gong-heum and Suh Hwi crossed the Yalu River to seek refuge in China. 
At the urgent requests of Rhee Sang-jo, the Soviet Union and China intervened and sent 
a joint Soviet-Chinese delegation including Mikoyan, First Deputy Premier of the Soviet 
Union and the second most powerful figure next to Khrushchev at that time, and Peng 
Dehuai, former commander of the Chinese troops during the Korean War, to stop any 
purge and reinstate the opposition forces. The high-profile figures from Moscow and 
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Beijing attended the next plenum, held at the request of the delegation on 23 September 
1956, which pardoned and rehabilitated the dissidents (Goh Tae-wu, 2000: 37-38).  
The purge, however, resumed in 1957 as Mao Zedong, amid conflict with 
Khrushchev, tried to win over Kim Il-sung to his side and thus sought the restoration of 
amicable relations with Kim. Within a year those party members who had opposed Kim’s 
policies were all purged (Lee Jong-seok, 1995a: 280-284). By the time all purges were 
finished, Kim Il-sung had become an unquestionable dictator. 
The cost of Kim Il-sung’s dictatorship was grave to the North Korean economy. 
For fear of another foreign interference against Kim’s leadership, the regime took a self-
supporting path for economic development in order to be less vulnerable to outside 
pressure. Then, impressive economic performances were needed to legitimize his rule. 
However, with insufficient natural resources and shrinking foreign aid, Kim Il-sung had 
to rely on labour mobilisation. The Chollima Movement was thus initiated as Kim Il-
sung’s dictatorship was consolidated in the North in late 1956.  
Kim Il-sung suggested the slogan ‘Let us run as if we ride on Chollima—the 
horse that can run one-thousand-li (about 244 miles) a day’, in the 1956 December 
Plenum which resolved to launch a production competition movement. Subsequently, 
Pyongnam coalmine youth storm troopers, Ganggye power plant youth storm troopers, 
and railroad construction youth storm troopers were designated as exemplary production 
innovators. The National Production Innovator Congress, held in September 1958, 
provided momentum for a nation-wide labour mobilisation movement after the model of 
the above-mentioned storm troopers. In March 1959, a person named Jin Ung-won in the 
Gangseon Steelmaking Plant initiated the Chollima Work Team Movement which spread 
into other factories, farms, schools, and so on (Kim Yeon-chul, 2001: 222-226). 
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The Chollima Movement, which formalized the Chollima Work Team Movement 
on a national level, was different from earlier labour mobilisation movements. It was a 
campaign not merely for economic development but also for indoctrinating people in 
communism. The underlying principle of the Chollima Movement was the mass line of 
Mao Zedong in which party bureaucrats joined the masses, closely cooperated with them, 
united them through ideological indoctrination, and finally improved their productivity. 
For the success of the mass line, the Party’s role was crucial as ‘the right advice of the 
Party preceded the correct voice of the masses’ (Scalapino and Lee, 1972: 1100). Hence, 
the Party inculcated the masses with its ideology on the pretext of properly developing 
workers’ political consciousness. 
The Chollima Movement was successful as the first Five Year Plan, launched in 
1956, finished in 1959—one year earlier than originally scheduled. Inspired by the 
success, North Korea decided to establish the movement as a permanent method for 
productivity enhancement. Setting 1960 as a buffer period for economic restructuring, 
Pyongyang overhauled the state of the economy (Park Sun-seong, 2004: 122). Kim Il-
sung’s decision was to internalize the movement into the general production process, first 
in agriculture and later in industry. Furthermore, Kim took this as an opportunity to 
strengthen his dictatorship. It seemed a magical solution to him.  
The agricultural production process was called the Cheongsanri Method. This 
method was developed by Kim Il-sung during his on-the-spot guidance of fifteen days in 
a collective farm named Cheongsanri in February 1960. It was designed to improve 
agricultural productivity through the mass line: party bureaucrats join the masses, 
cooperate with them, learn from them and also educate them, and finally enhance 
agricultural productivity. The new process was formalized by the Cabinet in December 
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1961 (Scalapino and Lee, 1972: 1103). According to the resolution of the Cabinet, the 
party secretary of the Kun (County) Agricultural Cooperatives Management Committees 
was responsible for both managerial and political guidance. The committee organized and 
managed entire businesses in rural society such as agricultural production, the welfare of 
farmers, and political indoctrination (Bu Gyeong-sang, 2001: 38-39).  
Kim Il-sung applied the method to factory management and called it the Daean 
Management System. In December 1961, he visited the Daean Electric Factory, located 
in the Daean area of Nampo city, where he proposed a new management system for 
industrial production. In the new system, the management of a factory was decided by the 
Factory Management Committee which was presided over by the party secretary. 54 
Before the new system was implemented, factories were operated by the Sole Manager 
Management System which followed the Soviet model in which the manager was 
responsible for all the daily management activities (Cha Mun-seok, 2001: 195-198). Now 
in North Korea, major decisions were decided through collective discussions in the 
factory committee, and the secretary was responsible for satisfying production targets as 
well as carrying out all political and ideological activities. 
The management committees in the agricultural and industrial sectors 
concretized the mass line in production and effectively helped mobilize local human and 
material resources for production. As a result, North Korea could continue rapid 
economic growth even though it was afflicted with a deficiency of capital and technology 
owing to the self-supporting policy. Furthermore, by emphasizing politics and ideology 
                                                 
54 The committee was composed of about twenty-five to thirty-five people elected from the 
ranks of workers, engineers, mangers, and leaders of the labour union. An executive committee, 
responsible for daily operations of the factory, was made up of the committee secretary, the 
factory manager, and the chief engineer (Suh Dong-man, 2005: 868-874). 
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to enhance productivity, the new production process served as great momentum for Kim 
Il-sung to extend his clout to the daily lives of ordinary North Koreans (Kim Il-sung, 1983: 
485-486). This was helped by reducing the role of the manager who was under the 
significant influence by Soviet Koreans who had introduced managerial expertise to 
North Korea. Instead, he increased the role of the party secretary who was loyal to Kim 
Il-sung. This was possible because of the nationwide purge in the 1950s in which Kim Il-
sung deposed all possible dissidents from the state bureaucracy and filled up the vacancies 
with young people who explicitly showed great respect to him (Choi Jinwook, 2005: 22).  
In 1961, North Korea launched the first Seven Year Plan which included large 
amounts of new investments in light industry in compensation for people’s hard work and 
devotion to socialism (Park Sun-seong, 2004: 124). Society, immediately after 
completion of the large-scale purge, seemed to presage a bright future for ordinary people 
as the regime promised to implement economic policies to satisfy their consumption 
demands. However, it lasted only for a brief time.  
The December Plenum in 1962 decided to take the parallel policy for defence 
and the economy, considering tense international circumstances. However, the policy was 
actually a defence-oriented policy attaching greater importance to heavy industry in order 
to strengthen the national defence, despite the possible negative effects on the lives of the 
people. Kim Il-sung proclaimed the ‘Four Great Military Lines’ which included fortifying 
the entire land, arming the whole population, making every soldier into a cadre, and 
modernizing the military amid growing threats from outside (Jeon Yeong-ho, 2006: 22). 
The Kennedy administration of the United States frustrated the Soviet Union's plan of 
installing nuclear weapons in Cuba a few months previously and also increased its 
military assistance to South Vietnam. The Sino-Soviet split since 1956 had deepened—
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the Communist Party of China denounced the leadership of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union as a 'revisionist traitor' in 1961 (Jeon Yeong-jin, 1994: 307). In South Korea, 
Park Chung-hee toppled the civilian government through a coup in 1961 and publicly 
declared to build up its military power.  
The defence-oriented policy imposed a heavy burden on North Korea’s economic 
development, and ordinary people had to make sacrifices again. In October 1966, Kim Il-
sung admitted the Seven Year Plan could not be executed as it was originally devised. He 
said, “Over the last five to six years, we had to adjust our Seven Year Plan to the new 
need of strengthening our national defence to guard ourselves against possible enemy 
attack” (Kim Il-sung, 1982: 418). Kim Il-sung, however, did not give up the policy but 
rather reinforced its military build-up all the more on the pretext of unfavorable 
circumstances abroad: the United States entered the Vietnam War, and South Korea 
normalised diplomatic relations with Japan and participated in the US-led war. The 
defence budget on average increased from 19.8 per cent of the total budget in 1961-1966 
to 30.9 per cent in 1967-1971 (Hamm Taik-Young, 2004: 214). Accordingly, as Table 3 
shows, the ratio of light industry was reduced sharply from the mid-1960s. 
 
Table 3. The ratio of investment between heavy and light industries in North Korea, 1954-
1976 (%) 
 
Source: Korea Institute for National Unification (1991: 194).  
Year 1954-1956 1957-1961 1961-1964 1965-1969 1971-1976 
Heavy 
Industry 
82.0 76.0 59.9 84.1 83.0 
Light  
Industry 
18.0 24.0 40.1 15.9 17.0 
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The rapid build-up of its military strength was not unanimously supported by all party 
bureaucrats. A group of high-ranking officials opposed it such as Park Geum-cheol (Vice 
Chairman of the Party Central Committee), Lee Hyo-sun (Director of the Party's Division 
for Southern Intelligence), and Kim Do-man (Director of the Party's Division for 
Propaganda). The group was later called the Kapsan Faction as it was made up of those 
people who had helped Kim Il-sung as guerillas in the peninsula's northeast area of 
Kapsan during the colonial period. They insisted that the Party had to halt excessive 
investment in the military and to prioritize light industry to enhance the living standards 
of the people. Furthermore, they claimed to minimize the Party's interference in economic 
decisions by reducing the roles of party bureaucrats and by empowering managers in the 
production process (Kim Se-keun, 2006: 95-96). This signified that the inner circle in 
Pyongyang recognized the limits of the new production process even as early as in the 
late 1960s. They had no intention of challenging the leadership of Kim Il-sung, but by 
this time opposing Kim Il-sung’s policies was a grave crime. In the May Plenum of the 
Central Committee in 1967, they were chided and soon purged for having 'revisionist' 
views and, most of all, having formed a faction (Kang Tae-wuk, 2009: 151). Kim Il-sung’s 
rule was entering another phase of dictatorship in the late 1960s, and this was overlapped 
in time with the rise of Kim Jong-il on the center stage of North Korean politics as he 
played a leading part in purging the Kapsan Faction (Choi Jinwook, 2005: 30).  
In attacking the Kapsan Faction for its insistence on reducing military spending, 
a number of hardliners in the military helped Kim Il-sung, including Kim Chang-bong 
(Minister of National Security), Huh Bong-hak (Chief of the Division for Southern 
Intelligence) and Lee Yeong-ho (Commander-in-chief of the DPRK Navy). They 
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increased their voices in politics and soon urged greater expansion of armaments and 
more hostile measures against the United States and South Korea (Shin Il-cheol, 2004: 
147). Encouraged by North Vietnam’s successful guerilla fights against South Vietnam 
and the United States, Kim Il-sung and the hawks took a number of provocative actions 
such as infiltrating 31 guerillas to raid the South Korean presidential residence in January 
1968, sending 120 guerillas to the Kangwon Province of the South in October 1968, and 
seizing the U.S. intelligence gathering ship Pueblo in January 1968. However, they ended 
in failure with the growth of negative perceptions overseas of North Korea. Kim Il-sung, 
blaming them as leftist adventurers, purged them (Lee Jong-seok, 1995a: 317-318). 
The early 1970s saw the East-West détente and commencement of the inter-
Korean dialogue. During the Fifth Party Congress in November 1970, Kim Il-sung stated 
that North Korea's strong national defence had been achieved at the cost of its economy 
and that spending on armaments was a great burden to the people (Kim Yeon-chul, 2001: 
76). He asserted that economic development in the North had been hampered in order to 
fulfill military ambitions of the hawkish soldiers, and soon his regime, as Table 4 shows, 
curtailed the defence budget to around 17 per cent of the total budget.   
 
Table 4. The ratio of defence spending to gross national product, 1955-1973 (%) 
 
Year Ratio Year Ratio 
1955 6.2 1967 30.4 
1956 5.9 1968 32.4 
1958 5.3 1969 31.0 
1959 4.8 1970 31.0 
1960 3.7 1971 31.1 
1961 3.1 1972 17.1 
1962 2.5 1973 15.0 
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Source: Lee Sang-man (2005: 58).  
 
The Seven Year Plan ended in 1970, three years later than originally planned, mainly 
because of the defence-oriented policy. In 1971, North Korea launched the Six Year Plan 
whose growth targets were scaled down considerably as some of the targets in the 
previous economic plan had not been achieved even by 1970. The new plan aimed at 
solidifying the material and technical foundations of the economy, modernizing industrial 
facilities, and promoting a technological revolution (Lee Sang-man, 2005: 59). To achieve 
these, North Korea relied upon another labour mobilisation movement. Kim Il-sung, at 
the Fifth Party Congress in November 1970, advanced the necessity of pushing ahead 
more vigorously with the three revolutions—ideological, technical, and cultural—for the 
complete victory of socialism. Soon Kim Jong-il published the slogan 'Let us meet the 
requirements of Juche in ideology, technology and culture' and transformed his father's 
ideas into a concrete labour mobilisation movement to enhance productivity by infusing 
the Juche Ideology with every worker in North Korea (Choi Jinwook, 2005: 37). 
Kim Il-sung officially initiated the Three Revolutions Movement in February 
1973, but a few months later Kim Jong-il took charge of it. For an ideological revolution, 
workers had to memorize all writings of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il; for a technical 
revolution, they had to make one or more inventions in a year; for a cultural revolution, 
they had to play at least one musical instrument. Under the scheme, the Three Revolutions 
teams, composed of 20-30 university students and young people of technical expertise, 
were sent by Kim Jong-il to factories, enterprises, and farms. Their missions were to 
provide technical aid and on-the-spot guidance to break from the convention in close 
consultation with local personnel (Lee Jong-seok, 1995a: 328). Moreover, Kim Jong-il in 
December 1975 launched the Three Revolutions Red Flag Movement, adding a 
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production competition attribute to the Three Revolutions Movement. The new 
movement in particular required the participation of every institution of the Party, the 
state, and the military as well as every factory, enterprise, and farm. Through these 
movements, Kim Jong-il’s influence spread throughout the country rapidly (Choi 
Jinwook, 2005: 45-46). 
In 1972, North Korea promulgated a new constitution which stipulated the 
monolithic leadership by Kim Il-sung who became the Suryeong [Great Leader] (Kim Se-
keun, 2006: 14). It was particularly a result of the intense efforts of Kim Jong-il who had 
strengthened his father’s personality cult since the late 1960s. Now, the authority of Kim 
Il-sung became absolute, and anything related to Kim Il-sung was valued above 
everything else. Before long, the so-called Number One Plan or Plan for Suryeong 
Economy appeared in the North. It was a separate economic plan to empower Kim Il-
sung’s monolithic control. The plan was originally devised not to impede the smooth 
implementation of the general state plan. For example, on a construction site, when Kim 
Il-sung spontaneously asked for more bulldozers, this would upset the annual balance of 
production and supply of bulldozers. To prevent such cases, North Korea let every factory 
and enterprise have separate resources for the Number One Plan. The problem was the 
Number One Plan took precedence over other plans by far. Eventually, there were two 
(later multiple) economic plans in one country which wreaked havoc on the entire 
socialist system of North Korea. Additionally, in the late 1970s, the Party Economy that 
demanded the allocation of resources for activities of the Party came into existence, 
followed by the Second Economy which meant the economy for the military. They were 
all prioritized over the general national economy (Jeong Gwang-min, 2005: 17-19).  
It is noteworthy that in the early 1970s, North Korea turned its eyes to 
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international trade in order to overcome its lack of raw materials, technology, and capital. 
The impressive attainments of South Korea and Eastern Europe emboldened the North 
Korean leadership: the former made rapid economic growth in the 1960s by taking 
advantage of foreign loans and trade and, in the case of the latter, even though eastern 
European countries made economic gains through foreign trade with capitalist countries 
after the détente, the leaders could maintain their power. That is, Kim Il-sung and Kim 
Jong-il did not want to see the North Korean economy lag behind its southern counterpart 
in economic growth and also they recognized a socialist country could benefit from 
international trade while keeping its leadership intact. From 1972, North Korea carried 
forward a policy of acquiring large loans from abroad, manufacturing light industry 
products, and exporting those products to developing countries. However, North Korea 
had difficulty in finding a place to sell its low-quality products and, most of all, the global 
recession from the mid-1970s thwarted the ambitious scheme. North Korea could not 
repay its foreign debts and had to return to its self-sufficiency in the economy(Yang 
Moon-Soo, 1999: 246-247).55  
The scheme, though it was frustrated, indicated North Korea’s self-supporting 
economic policies could be waived at any time when the leadership considered an open-
door policy to be advantageous to its rule. In the same vein, North Korea could return to 
its self-sufficient mode whenever the regime deemed it necessary. Pyongyang claimed 
that the Six Year Plan was successfully fulfilled by the end of August 1975, one-and-a-
half years earlier than originally scheduled. Large loans from abroad must have been very 
helpful. However, the success was exaggerated. The next economic plan started in 1978, 
two-and-a-half years later, which indicated that the Six Year Plan in reality was not 
                                                 
55 North Korea officially defaulted on its loans in 1984 (Han Yong-won, 1998: 198).  
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accomplished as claimed (Lee Sang-man, 2005: 60-61). The Six Year Plan had to be 
hailed as a great success because it was the first economic plan after Kim Il-sung became 
the ‘Great Leader’ and Kim Jong-il became the successor to his father.  
After an ‘official’ buffer period of one year in 1977, from 1978 North Korea 
launched the Second Seven Year Plan which emphasized self-sufficiency, modernization, 
and science.56 To fulfill the plan, North Korea stressed Kim Jong-il’s slogan of ‘Speed 
Battle’ which was devised to guarantee the highest quality at the fastest speed utilizing all 
available resources. Kim Jong-il played a leading role in the plan, and large-scale labour 
mobilisations were performed with his Three Revolution teams at the forefront. However, 
the Second Seven Year Plan was a fiasco. North Korea insisted that during the plan the 
economy had grown at an annual rate of 8.8 per cent, but many foreign experts pointed 
out that it had grown only at an annual rate of 2 to 3 per cent (Park Sun-seong, 2004: 125-
126). In September 1983, North Korea ‘for the first time’ admitted the failure of the 
economic plan and, as a scapegoat, removed Lee Jong-ok from the post of prime minster 
(Lee Wu-tae, 2000: 52). There was no new economic plan until 1987, which indicated the 
severity of the economic conditions. However, amid the poor economic situation, North 
Korea constructed various unproductive, grand-scale architecture such as the 270-metre-
high Juche Tower and the 60-metre-high Arch of Triumph in commemoration of Kim Il-
sung's 70th birthday in 1982. 
 
Table 5. Economic Growth Rates of North Korea, 1953-1990 (%) 
 
Year Economic Growth Rates  
                                                 
56 The de facto default made Pyongyang to re-emphasize self-sufficiency (Lee Sang-man, 2005: 
61). 
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1953-1956 30 
1957-1960 20.9 
1961-1965 9.8 
1966-1970 5.5 
1971-1975 10.4 
1976-1980 4.1 
1981-1985 3.7 
1986-1990 1.4 
Source) Kim Young Jin (1998: 223).  
*Economic growth rates from 1953 to 1980 are estimated from North Korea’s official figures 
(NMP), and those from 1981 to 1990 are estimated from South Korean ministry of 
unification’s figures (GNP). 
 
Table 5 shows changes in the annual economic growth rates of North Korea from 1953 to 
1990. The upsurge of economic growth between 1971 and 1975 was just a one-time 
prosperity, ascribable to large foreign loans, which signified that the downward tendency 
of the economy was only reversible by large-scale foreign borrowing. All socialist 
countries suffered an economic depression because of the socialist system’s innate defects 
(Kornai, 1992: 33-379; Chavance, 1994: 9-34). However, in the case of North Korea, the 
word ‘depression’ was not an appropriate word to express the severity of the economic 
downturn as the country could not sustain its economy without foreign help. This thesis 
argues that the main reason of the rapid economic downturn was the excessive 
subordination of the economy to politics. The subordination was enforced through its 
unique production process more than anything else. 
The modified production process from the late 1950s onwards can be referred to 
as ‘autarkist Soviet Fordism’. We can add ‘autarkist’ to Soviet Fordism because the 
production relations were different and the driving force of the difference was its autarkist 
106 
 
accumulation strategy.57 It followed the production process of Soviet Fordism in most 
parts, but the party management committee replaced the role of the manager to facilitate 
labour mobilisation more effectively. North Korea took an autarkist path in capital 
accumulation to maintain and strengthen the dictatorship of Kim Il-sung. To compensate 
for shrinking foreign aid North Korea, at low levels of technology and capital, had to rely 
more on labour mobilisation. This made the party committee take the role of the manager, 
a move intended to help workers to make collective decisions to meet industrial and 
agricultural production targets (Kim Yeon-chul, 2001: 272-275).  
Productivity enhancement through labour mobilisation was, however, myopic. 
The intensive uses of limited human and material resources in a short period of time led 
to chronic disruptions to work in normal times. North Korea's new production process 
which perpetuated the socialist labour mobilisation eventually diminished productivity to 
a significant extent. Furthermore, the production process raised the role of the party 
secretary in production and reduced that of the manager. As all power in the workplace 
was concentrated into the hands of the party secretary rather than the manager who had 
expertise in production, productivity suffered. In addition, after the Three Revolutions 
team intervened in the production process, the manager virtually had two superiors in the 
party secretary and the Three Revolutions team, as shown in Figure 2. This worsened 
productivity even more.  
 
Figure 2. Production organization of North Korean factories 
                                                 
57 Socialist countries in general took autarkist accumulation strategy compared with capitalist 
countries. Nonetheless, North Korea's emphasis on economic self-sufficiency led to a relatively 
more autarkist path compared with other socialist countries. For example, despite the Soviet 
Union's continual pressure, North Korea did not join the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (COMECON) for political independence (Jeon Yeong-ho, 2006: 56). 
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Source: Korea Institute for National Unification (1992: 140).  
 
The production process of autarkist Soviet Fordism characterized the economic structure 
of North Korea as follows. First, the North Korean economy was subordinated to politics. 
Key decisions in production were made by the party secretary who chaired the 
management committee in accordance with political necessities, not economic efficiency 
and rationality. Thus, the economy was systematically subordinated to politics. In that 
context, the economic structure was more directly connected to the superstructures in 
North Korea, compared with other socialist countries’ cases. 
Second, the production process increased the role of party bureaucrats in the 
economy. According to Tony Cliff (1974), state bureaucrats in socialist countries fall into 
the category of the ruling class because they control the process of accumulation. North 
Korean state bureaucrats also functioned as the ruling class. One thing that set North 
Korea apart from other socialist countries was that the party bureaucrats controlled 
production directly and thus they played a central role in realm of economic management 
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as well as in the realm of politics. As large industrial capital was the most crucial fraction 
in the South Korean capitalist class, the party bureaucracy was the most important fraction 
in the North Korean state bureaucracy.   
Third, the production process worked as a vehicle to strengthen the dictatorship 
of Kim Il-sung. As the Party was masterminded by Kim Il-sung, production in the North 
was above everything exploited to realize his will and reinforce his absolute rule. If 
needed, Kim Il-sung did not hesitate to distort the existing production process, such as 
adding the Three Revolutions team to the decision-making process in the workplace. 
However, attachment to short-term outcomes to display the ‘greatness’ of Kim Il-sung 
hampered sophisticated efforts to control the production process in an efficient and 
systematic way. 
Fourth, the production process conflicted with the norms of scientific 
management gravely, and the resulting deterioration of productivity led to the economic 
downturn in the long run. All socialist economies without drastic economic reforms sank 
into recession after a short period of rapid growth. For example, state-owned enterprises 
in the socialist country had soft budget constraints.58 That is, as they were not allowed to 
go bankrupt, they were always bailed out with subsidies or other instruments and, thus, 
there was little incentive for mangers to be innovative. The deficiency of the innovation 
mechanism in the production process of Soviet Fordism was a key cause of the widening 
gap in productivity between the Soviet Union and the United States. In the case of North 
Korea, the excessive subordination of the economy to politics made the degree of 
productivity decline so severe that it eventually could not stand alone without outside 
                                                 
58 As for more detailed explanation of the concept of soft budget constraint, see Kornai (1992: 
140-144). 
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help. 
Fifth, the autarkist policy for political purposes deepened the North’s propensity 
for heavy industry over light industry. Emphasis on heavy industry was common to all 
the socialist countries particularly at their early stages of economic development, but 
North Korea heightened the propensity to have a self-supporting economic structure for 
the political purpose of avoiding pressure from the socialist giants. Subsequently, North 
Korean people suffered a serious shortage in light industry goods, which later led Kim 
Jong-il to order each factory to set up a special unit to produce consumer goods with extra 
and unused resources on 3 August 1984.59 
Autarkist Soviet Fordism had double-edged consequences. The new production 
process was at first hailed by the North Korean leadership as a great innovation but, in 
fact, it significantly debilitated the economic structure in the long run. Also, it rather 
reinforced the superstructures of ideology and the state, which made the North Korean 
system weaken but in the end survive when the Soviet Union and eastern European 
socialist countries collapsed. After the Cold War, the weakened historical bloc had to find 
another external helping hand to persist. Apart from its reliance on China, Pyongyang 
also looked southwards for help. This will be detailed in Part III.   
 
3.2. Ideology: Juche Ideology  
 
The term ‘Juche’ was not used by Kim Il-sung until the 1952 December Plenum of the 
Central Committee because it had been monopolized by the Domestic Faction in order to 
                                                 
59 The light-industry goods produced by the direction of Kim Jong-il are called ‘8.3 goods’ (Oh 
Il-hwan, 2000: 289).  
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criticize the Soviet Faction, the Yenan Faction, and the Partisan Faction that had the 
backing of foreign forces such as the Soviet Union and China. After the plenum where all 
key Domestic Faction members such as Park Hun-young were ousted, Kim Il-sung began 
to use the term to hold his rivals, such as the members of the Soviet Faction and the Yenan 
Faction, in check (Yang Jae-in et al., 1990: 130).  
It was from 1955 that Kim Il-sung actively used Juche to legitimize his absolute 
rule and secure his dictatorship from internal and external pressure. In December 1955 
Kim Il-sung said, “Once I visited a recreation center for the army in which there was a 
painting of the Siberian steppe. Russians might like the landscape, but Korean people like 
the mountains and water of our own country … In a primary school, all the portraits on 
the walls were foreigners like Mayakovski and Pushkin. There was no Korean … When 
Pravda gave the title of ‘A Day in Our Homeland’ to an article, several days later in 
Rodong Shinmun we could see the same title translated in Korean” (Kim Il-sung, 1960: 
318-319). Kim Il-sung deplored the toadyish trend which was prevalent at that time and 
criticized it as dogmatism. He added, “Some support the Soviet way and others the 
Chinese, but it is high time to work out our own … We are not engaged in any other 
country’s revolution, but in the Korean revolution” (Kim Il-sung, 1960: 315-316). To 
heighten the nationalist sentiment, Kim Il-sung stressed North Korean people’s Juche. 
This was owing to the fact that (possible) dissenters were closely connected to the Soviet 
Union and China. He utilized the concept of Juche to criticize them.   
After the August Faction Incident in 1956, emphasis on Juche was intensified. 
The direct interference of Moscow and Beijing in domestic affairs of Pyongyang led Kim 
Il-sung to consider the establishment of Juche as a matter of life and death. From the late 
1956, education on Juche was extended across the nation to strengthen his position and 
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concentrate power in his hands (Lee Jong-seok, 1995a: 72-73). The education particularly 
highlighted his anti-Japanese guerrilla fights which were referred to as ‘anti-Japanese 
revolutionary tradition’.60 The North Korean leadership tried to justify the rule of the 
Partisan Faction by convincing the people that Kim Il-sung and his partisan comrades, 
not the Soviet Union or China, had been the most active and important entities in the 
history of independence movements during the colonial period. Many writings that 
emphasized the anti-Japanese revolutionary tradition were published, and all the 
education began to underline it (Kim Yeong-su, 2001: 97-98). 
In the early 1960s, Juche was expanded to the dimension of foreign policy amid 
the fiercely unfolding Sino-Soviet disputes. Under the circumstances, Kim Il-sung took 
advantage of Juche in order to attain independence and make some practical gains 
between the socialist great powers. After Kim Il-sung obtained ‘official’ apologies from 
the two countries for their intervention in the domestic affairs of North Korea in 1956, 
Pyongyang received a lot of economic and military aid from those countries, which was 
accompanied by the Soviet-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty 
and the Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, 
both in July 1961 (Yoon Gi-gwan, 2004: 101). Moreover, the split between the two 
socialist giants reassured Pyongyang that the application of Marxism-Leninism could 
differ in concrete cases. This stimulated him to develop the idea of Juche into a systematic 
ideology. The term ‘Juche Ideology’ first appeared in an editorial in Rodong Shinmun in 
December 1962 and, approximately from that time on, the concept was systematically 
developed as an ideology (Kim Keun-sik, 2004a: 196). 
                                                 
60 For example, North Korea re-wrote its past with Kim Il-sung as the most important historical 
figure in the modern Korean history (Jeong Du-hui, 2002: 226-244). 
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In April 1965 Kim Il-sung made a speech at the Ali Archam Social Science 
Academy in Indonesia. Kim explained North Korea's efforts to establish Juche and, as 
key lines to realize Juche concretely, he promulgated Juche in ideology, autonomy in 
politics, self-sufficiency in the economy, and self-defence in national defence (Kim Se-
keun, 2006: 50). Kim Il-sung, on 12 August 1966, claimed the ideology of Juche as a 
guiding principle of the Party in an editorial in Rodong Shinmun (Lee Jong-seok, 1995a: 
83). In December 1967 at the Supreme People's Assembly, Kim declared that North Korea 
would implement the lines of autonomy, self-sufficiency, and self-defence to strengthen 
the political independence of the country, to build up an independent national economy 
strong enough to unify the Korean Peninsula, and to increase its defence capabilities to 
safeguard the North by its own force through embodying the Party's Juche Ideology in all 
fields of state activities (Soh Chi-hyeong et al., 1999: 89).  
In the early 1970s, Juche Ideology was elevated to the status of a universal 
ideology to uphold Kim Il-sung's autocracy and his personality cult. In 1970, during the 
Fifth Congress of the Party, the ideology was officially confirmed as one of the core tenets 
of the Party together with the existing ideology of Marxism-Leninism (Oh Il-hwan, 2000: 
46). On 17 September 1972, during an interview with journalists from the Japanese 
newspaper Mainichi Shimbun, Kim Il-sung said, “Establishing Juche means, in brief, 
being the master of revolution and construction. The people's masses are the masters of 
revolution and construction and they have enough power to implement those.” He added, 
“The essence of the Juche Ideology is that a man is the master of everything and he 
decides everything” (Kim Keun-sik, 2004a: 198). In December of the same year the Juche 
Ideology which ‘creatively applies Marxism-Leninism’ replaced Marxism-Leninism 
itself to be the official state ideology in the revised Constitution under which Kim Il-sung 
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became President of North Korea, the practical dictator of the newly-established political 
system (Kim Keun-sik, 2004a: 199).  
The originality of the Juche Ideology was emphasized more vigorously in 1974 
when, on Kim Jong-il’s initiative, North Korea promulgated ‘Kim Il-sungism’, the 
ideological and theoretical system of Kim Il-sung. The Juche Ideology was the essence 
of Kim Il-sungism. Kim Jong-il claimed that in the past Kim Il-sung's ideas were referred 
to as 'Marxism-Leninism in our time' but now they could be called Kim Il-sungism 
because his ideas had enough originality that was distinctive and different from Marxism-
Leninism (Choi Jinwook, 2005: 44-45). In February 1974, insisting 'the entire society 
should be Kim Il-sungist', Kim Jong-il declared that Kim Il-sungism was 'the sole 
scientific Marxism-Leninism that represents the present age and the future of 
Communism' (Kim Jong-il, 1994: 8-9). In April 1974, in his article 'Concerning A 
Number of Questions in Understanding Juche Philosophy', Kim Jong-il aggressively 
emphasized the originality of the Juche Ideology by contending that his father’s ideology 
suggested fundamental questions of philosophy and explicated new problems that 
Marxism-Leninism could not solve (Kim Jong-il, 1991: 62). This period was when it was 
decided that Kim Jong-il would be the official successor to his father, and North Korea's 
presidential system was in a consolidative stage. It signified that the developing process 
of Juche as an original ideology to replace Marxism-Leninism was accompanied by the 
process of Kim Il-sung's absolute dictatorship and Kim Jong-il's succession to his father's 
position. 
In the Sixth Congress of the Party in 1980, the revised Party charter stipulated 
that the Juche Ideology of the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung was the only ideological 
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tenet of the Party (Kim Keun-sik, 2004a: 199).61 The Juche Ideology became the official 
ruling ideology of North Korea. All books, textbooks, newspapers, and other mass media 
removed traces of Marxism-Leninism as the ruling ideology and were aggressively 
mobilized to disseminate the Juche Ideology throughout the whole society. 
The Juche Ideology was now a universal ideology that had philosophical, socio-
historical, and guiding principles. This was detailed in the article ‘Concerning the Juche 
Ideology’ written by Kim Jong-il in 1982. According to the article, the philosophical 
principle is itself made up of the following two: first, man is the master of everything and 
decides everything such as his own destiny; second, man is a social being with 
independence, creativity, and consciousness. The socio-historical principle explains that 
the masses are the subject of social history, the masters of revolution and construction, 
and the decisive factor in developing society. For that goal, the masses and guidance by 
Kim Il-sung need to be combined because the masses can take an independent stand and 
play due roles in developing social history only when they are correctly guided by the 
‘Great Leader’. The guiding principle consists of three parts. First, in order to remain 
independent, Juche in ideology, autonomy in politics, self-sufficiency in economy, and 
self-defence in national defence must be realized. Second, to embody creativity, 
everything must be reliant on the masses and needs to be implemented in accordance with 
concrete circumstances. Third, in revolution and construction, consciousness plays a 
decisive role in the revolutionary struggle and, for that reason, ideological reform and 
political activities must come first (Kim Jong-il, 1991: 71-119).  
Kim Il-sung, during the interview with Mainichi Shimbun journalists in 1972, 
                                                 
61 In the congress, Kim Jong-il was declared as an official successor of Kim Il-sung. Also he 
became a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and the Central Committee and a vice 
chairman of the Central Military Commission (Choi Jinwook, 2005: 29). 
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said that the “human being has a physical life and also social and political integrity. The 
physical life is what keeps him alive as a biological organism; social and political integrity 
is what keeps him alive as a social being” (Kim Il-sung, 1960: 318-319). Kim Jong-il 
developed the ideas as the Theory of Socialist Life in his 1986 article. In a nutshell, the 
theory claimed that man has a physical life and also a political life. When men are actively 
involved in the activities of the Party and other Party-related political organizations, they 
enter into blood relations with the Great Leader and thus receive a political life. The Great 
Leader, the Party, and the masses are closely connected to one another as blood relations 
(Kim Jong-il, 1991: 321-322), which was analogous to the concept of organicism in 
fascism (Gasman, 2006: 487-488). 
In 1985, as the ten-volume collective works of the Great Juche Ideology were 
published, the Juche Ideology was firmly established as a unique ideological system 
superior to Marxism-Leninism. From that time on, all areas of North Korea were 
incorporated into the system of the Juche Ideology. When a North Korean mentioned any 
theory, line, principle, or method, a modifier of Juche always needed to accompany it, 
such as ‘socialist political economy of Juche,’ ‘economic management of Juche,’ ‘Juche 
art,’ and ‘Juche culture’. Thus, the Juche Ideology's place in North Korean society became 
fixed in the mid-1980s (Kim Keun-sik 2004a: 201). 
In a comparative context, the Juche Ideology of North Korea, since its initial 
stages of development, has been closely connected to nationalism as were the cases in 
other socialist countries such as Poland's 'nationalistic patriotism' and Rumania's 
'communist nationalism’. In that sense, the most influential concept was 'socialist 
patriotism'. Lenin and Stalin officially opposed nationalism as a bourgeois ideology 
which would set workers against each other and thus be contrary to the interests of the 
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proletariat class who should unite for communist revolution (White, 2011: 220). However, 
Lenin differentiated socialist patriotism from nationalism and argued that the right of all 
nations to self-determination should be promoted (Read, 2006: 115). Stalin developed 
Lenin's ideas on socialist patriotism. Stalin's policies of Socialism in One Country, despite 
a multitude of justifications, conflicted with proletarian internationalism and his emphasis 
on Soviet patriotism to effectively mobilise Russian people and resources during the 
Second World War had Russian nationalist overtones (Motyl, 2001: 501). At the 
Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party in 1956, Khrushchev acknowledged, 
though limited, the autonomy of other socialist countries by saying that the combination 
of socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism was the ideological base to 
strengthen a brotherly alliance ‘between nations’ (Read, 2006: 115). His speech, along 
with a series of the relaxation of iron-fisted interferences in the domestic affairs of other 
socialist countries, led individual communist parties to advocate their autonomy. Kim Il-
sung, particularly after the August Faction Incident, also used the term of socialist 
patriotism widely and developed the idea of Juche based on the internationally accepted 
concept. By the time of the mid-1960s, North Korea argued that the Juche Ideology was 
the most perfect example of socialist patriotism (Choi Sung-wuk, 1966: 36-41). 
The Juche Ideology shared its essence with socialist patriotism and it was none 
other than nationalism. In lieu of nationalism which could not be advocated publicly at 
that time, the two ideas were actively utilised as the instruments for autonomy against 
foreign influence, legitimacy of the ruling political groups, and effective mobilisation of 
people and resources to build up national defense and promote the development of self-
supporting economy. 62  From the 1970s, the Juche Ideology's nationalistic character 
                                                 
62 From the mid-1960s, socialist patriotism was less frequently used and subordinated to the 
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became more and more accentuated while its status was raised to a universal ideology. In 
the mid-1980s, the concept of nation was reestablished in accordance with the Juche 
Ideology. In 1985, North Korea argued, “There is no class without nation” and even 
prioritised the liberation of nation to that of class (Kim Chang-ha, 1985: 48-49). Kim 
Jong-il later contended that the Juche Ideology was the ideology not only for people in 
general but also for the Korean nation and, through the Juche Ideology, socialism and 
nation were combined into one destiny (Kim Jong-il, 2000: 306-333). 
Juche was closely associated with nationalism from its inception and vigorously 
employed by Kim Il-sung to attack dissidents and seek political independence from 
foreign pressure, particularly from the Soviet Union and China. As time went on, Juche 
took on an ideological character and the Juche Ideology ultimately replaced Marxism-
Leninism in 1980. Meanwhile, the Juche Ideology’s nationalist characteristics was so 
distorted that the ideology claimed that the Korean nation was ‘the Kim Il-sung nation’ 
(Hwang Jang-yop, 2006: 48). Along with the developments, the North Korea's system 
was transformed into a unique case distinct and different from other socialist countries. 
The ideology of Juche was an effective tool for the absolute rule and the personality cult 
of Kim Il-sung and later for justification of the hereditary succession. In this process, the 
construction of the so-called Monolithic Ideological System played a crucial role, which 
will be detailed in the next section.  
 
3.3. The State and Civil Society 
 
                                                 
Juche Ideology as the status of the latter was elevated as the ruling ideology of the Party (Song 
Gi-ho, 2003: 50). 
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3.3.1. Form of state: the Stalinist state 
 
‘Real-existing’ socialist countries generally took the party-state system in which the 
single communist party with legislative, judiciary, and executive functions commanded 
and controlled all organizations and institutions including labour unions, the military, and 
even the government. It was in the Stalinist state that one ruler destroyed the 
independence of the communist party and used the party to rule society (Rogovin, 2009: 
182). This thesis hypothesizes the North Korean state before the economic crisis in the 
1990s was a Stalinist state and, to support this hypothesis, I will demonstrate that Kim Il-
sung also ruled North Korean society through the communist party after making the party 
a rubber-stamping institution. 
The North Korean Provisional People’s Committee, established in February 1946, 
was the predecessor of the government of the Democratic People`s Republic of Korea 
which was set up in September 1948. Both emulated the Soviet party-state system with 
the communist party taking charge of state affairs (Gi Gwang-seo, 2004: 73-77). At that 
time, Kim Il-sung's hold on the Party was limited because he was a former military man, 
not proficient in party affairs, and also the Soviet Faction members who worked as party 
officials in the Soviet Union occupied high positions in the Party (Lee Jong-seok, 1995a: 
163-165). 
The Korean War was Kim Il-sung’s first opportunity to strengthen his power in 
the Party by imputing the failure of the war to his major political rivals: Park Hon-young 
and Huh Ga-i. Park was the most famous communist on the Korean Peninsula from the 
colonial period and Huh, the de facto leader of the Soviet Faction, often showed deference 
to Park for his theoretical richness on communism. Kim Il-sung, in March 1953, arrested 
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Park and other key communist leaders from South Korea under suspicion of espionage. 
He claimed that they were American spies trying to overthrow North Korea (Suh Dong-
man, 2005: 497-528). Huh was first criticized in the November Plenum of the Central 
Committee in 1951 for the arbitrary management of the Party. This blame was possible 
owing to the intervention of Chinese People's Volunteers in the war which reduced the 
clout of Moscow. In March 1953, as he was about to be purged on a charge of fomenting 
factionalism with Park, Huh shot himself dead (Lee Jong-seok, 1995a: 245-247). 
Kim Il-sung successfully turned the August Faction Incident in 1956 into a great 
chance to reinforce his control of the Party. After the incident, Kim Il-sung finally 
eradicated the Soviet Faction and the Yenan Faction. They were major obstacles that kept 
Kim Il-sung and his Partisan Faction from wielding absolute power over the Party, as the 
two faction members under the aegis of Moscow and Beijing were generally more 
educated and experienced in party affairs. In addition, it resulted in the discontinuation of 
influence of the Soviet Union and China over the internal affairs of North Korea. After 
1956, there was no challenger capable of threatening his leadership in the Party. 
Furthermore, after the incident and ensuing round-up of those who were against him, Kim 
Il-sung launched a nationwide purge against possible dissidents, starting with re-issuing 
the certificates of party membership of all KWP members in late 1956. From December 
1958 to the end of 1960 the Party expelled 4,000 party members, and across the country 
more than 30,000 people were arrested and punished for fostering factionalism (Baek Jun-
gi, 1999: 10). Consequently, not only most returnees from the Soviet Union and China 
but also those party members who did not show ardent loyalty to Kim Il-sung were 
expelled from the Party. In September 1961, the Fourth Party Congress claimed that all 
factions were removed (Choi Jinwook, 2005: 22). This meant that Kim Il-sung 
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successfully eradicated all possible dissident groups against his dictatorship, paving the 
way for the future monolithic rule. 
Kim Il-sung's control of society through the medium of the Party was accelerated 
with the classification process from December 1958. The process, called the Central Party 
Intensive Guidance, was to identify those who were presumed to be loyal or disloyal to 
him. It classified all citizens into three groups: the loyal ‘core’, the ordinary ‘basic’, and 
the politically unreliable ‘complex’ groups. The core group, accounted for about 30 per 
cent, consisted of those families whose members were killed during the Korean War or 
were perceived as particularly faithful to Kim Il-sung; the basic group, about 50 per cent, 
was composed of those families whose members were soldiers or wounded during the 
war; the complex group, about 20 per cent, was made up of those families whose members 
fled to South Korea. That is, they were by and large classified by the extent of the damage 
during the Korea War. From their personal experiences during the war, core and basic 
groups were hostile to Americans and those South Koreans that had collaborated with the 
United States (Kim Byoung-Lo, 2004: 148-149). This grouping determines every facet of 
a person's life in North Korea such as their place of residence, education, job, and so on. 
The classification process lasted until the late 1960s at which time people were further 
classified into 51 subgroups. The screening process provoked insecurity and fear amongst 
the North Korean people (Park Wan-sin, 2001: 110). 
The Cultural Revolution of China and other unfavourable international 
conditions in the late 1960s served as a momentum for Kim Il-sung to control the Party 
more directly. After the Red Guards in China in 1966 publicly branded Kim Il-sung as a 
revisionist, Kim Il-sung, while criticizing both the Soviet Union for rightist revisionism 
and China for leftist adventurism, accentuated the necessity of maintaining and 
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strengthening Juche (Goh Tae-wu, 2000: 49). The then unfavourable international 
circumstances as well, including South Korea's diplomatic normalization with Japan and 
participation in the Vietnam War, were instrumental in bringing about the reorganization 
of the Party set-ups in the October Plenum of the Central Committee in 1966. The head 
of the Central Committee was now titled General Secretary, not Chairman, and a 
permanent Secretary Bureau was newly established with multiple departments under it 
(Oh Il-hwan, 2000: 70). This change allowed Kim Il-sung to have substantial power to 
administer the Party more directly as he could make important decisions on his own 
without holding formal party meetings.  
In 1967, Kim Il-sung purged the so-called Kapsan Faction in the May Plenum of 
the Central Committee. The apparent reason was that the faction members opposed his 
economic policy. This meant that, by this time, a different opinion in the Party was not 
tolerated. This intolerance was extended to society with Kim’s ‘5.25 Instructions’.63 The 
instructions provoked a nationwide purge against the intelligentsia and the destructions 
of their works. Moreover, under the name of the Book Clean-up Work, all North Koreans 
were forced to burn their books written by foreigners. For example, literary works by 
Shakespeare, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and Gorky as well as books of Greek Philosophy, 
Classical Chinese Philosophy, and Classical German Philosophy were all burned to ashes. 
Some books were donated to libraries, but it became very difficult for ordinary people to 
read them. Eventually, even books written by Marx or Lenin were accessible with great 
                                                 
63 In 1966, Hwang Jang-yop emphasized the special and significant role of the intelligentsia in 
North Korean society. Kim Young-ju and his supporters criticized his ideas and stood opposed 
to Kim Jong-il who sided with Hwang Jang-yop and some Kim Il-sung University philosophy 
professors (Hwang Jang-yop, 2006: 145-146). On 5 May 1967, Kim Il-sung ostensibly criticized 
both and advanced Juche but actually asserted revolutionizing the intelligentsia (Hwang Jang-
yop, 2010: 187). 
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difficulty: North Koreans could read their books only in the library by permission. It was 
from this time that Marx's materialistic dialectic disappeared in North Korean society. 
The only ideas left were Kim Il-sung's. Ordinary North Korean people had to read only 
works written by the ‘Great Leader’ and his legitimate successor Kim Jong-il. In that 
sense, it was natural that before long the Juche Ideology replaced Marxism-Leninism as 
the official state ideology from 1972 (Hwang Jang-yop, 2010: 174-186).  
The new constitution in 1972 expressly stipulated the status of Kim Il-sung who 
stood at the head of the new system of North Korea—the party-state system under the 
command of Suryeong, or the Suryeong System (Oh Il-hwan, 2000: 69). Before long, 
Kim Il-sung’s absolute control of the Party expanded to the everyday lives of the North 
Korean people. In this regard, the following ‘Ten Principles for the Establishment of the 
Party's Monolithic Ideological System’ played a critical role. It was generated in the 
course of the competition between Kim Jong-il and his uncle: Kim Young-ju made a draft 
for it in 1967, but Kim Jong-il developed and officially announced it on the eve of Kim 
Il-sung's birthday in 1974 (Kim Se-keun, 2006: 57). 
 
Article 1. We must persist in our struggles to unify the entire society with the 
revolutionary ideology of the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung. 
Article 2. We must pay great deference and loyalty to the Great Leader comrade 
Kim Il-sung. 
Article 3. We must make absolute the authority of the Great Leader comrade Kim 
Il-sung. 
Article 4. We must take in the revolutionary ideology of the Great Leader comrade 
Kim Il-sung as our faith and his instructions as our creed. 
Article 5. We must adhere strictly to the principle of unconditional obedience in 
conducting the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung's instructions. 
Article 6. We must strengthen ideological unification and unity, centering on the 
Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung. 
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Article 7. We must learn from the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung to follow 
his communist look, revolutionary work methods, and people-oriented work 
style. 
Article 8. We must value the political life given by the Great Leader comrade Kim 
Il-sung and repay his great political trust and thoughtfulness with heightened 
political awareness and loyalty.  
Article 9. We must establish rigid organizational disciplines so that the entire party, 
military, and nation move as one under the monolithic leadership of the Great 
Leader comrade Kim Il-sung. 
Article 10. We must pass down the great achievement of the revolution by the 
Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung for generations to inherit and complete it to 
the end (Hong Jin-pyo, 2004: 14). 
 
The Three Revolutions Red Flag Movement from 1975 was instrumental in disseminating 
the principles throughout society. In every factory, company, and farm, people had to 
study the writings of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il and had to attend self-criticism and 
mutual criticism sessions to evaluate if they had been living up to the ten principles. Soon, 
those sessions became permanent by the title of Saenghwal Chonghwa [Review Meeting 
on Everyday Life] and all institutions in North Korea had the Review Meeting at least 
once a week.64 The Ten Principles in practice took precedence over the Party charter and 
even the Constitution, and thus governed every institution’s decision-making and the 
individual’s public and private activities (Lee Jong-seok, 1995a: 135). 
In most socialist countries, the party congress was the most important policy-
making entity, but in North Korea the Party congress has not been held since 1980. This 
indicated that Kim Il-sung from the 1980s literally disregarded the communist party in 
North Korea. Furthermore, in those countries, their leaders’ ideologies were treated as 
                                                 
64 Mostly the review meeting is held once a week, usually every Saturday morning, but there 
are many exceptions. For example, in the case of the institutions whose members meet 
foreigners often hold the review meeting every other day (Kim Byoung-Lo, 2004: 155-156). 
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subordinate to Marxism-Leninism, and privatization of the communist party was a 
deviation from the proper course (Ryoo Kihl-Jae, 2004: 175-181). However, they were 
legal and legitimate in North Korea according to the Constitution. There were no 
institutional impediments to the ‘Great Leader’ in North Korea.65 
The North Korean Stalinist state had a number of unique features, different from 
the Stalinist state in the Soviet Union. Amongst them, this thesis re-emphasizes the 
significance of the following two characteristics: the important role of the ruling Juche 
Ideology and the over-development of the Party. Firs, as North Korea calls its system the 
‘Party's Monolithic Ideological System’, it made the biggest use of ideology to control 
society. All the state’s apparatuses were determined and maintained by the ideological 
unity, and the ideology was not Marxism-Leninism but the Juche Ideology whose sole 
purpose was to consolidate the dictatorship of Kim Il-sung. Second, the communist party 
in North Korea was over-developed and it interfered excessively in the economy and in 
people's everyday lives. In the Soviet Union, Gosplan, the central committee responsible 
for economic planning, was the most important organization to run the planned economy 
(Kornai, 1992: 110-130). Only when Moscow launched a mass labour movement, such 
as the Stakhanovite movement, did the Party play a decisive role in the economy. In North 
Korea, the production process internalised the mass labour movement and the Party 
played a conclusive role perpetually. The Party's control of North Koreans' everyday lives 
is explained above and will be reaffirmed in the next section. These two characteristics 
worked in an inter-connected manner as the key ‘consent’ mechanism—albeit the 
                                                 
65 For example, in deciding on a foreign policy, Kim Il-sung (and later Kim Jong-il) made direct 
phone calls or visits to relevant officials often with no prior notice. His destination did not have 
to be the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Department on Foreign Affairs under the 
Secretary Bureau. Anyone he thought was appropriate would be called upon. Also, it was not 
unusual that the head of the institution did not know Kim Il-sung's communication with a lower 
ranking official (Kim Sung-chul, 2001: 6-7). 
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mechanism was established by the state and protected and supported by the armour of 
coercion—to realize and reinforce dictatorhip in North Korea.  
  
3.3.2. Civil society? 
 
In the post-independence period, North Korea had a variety of social forces. However, 
they were all brutally cracked down on as Kim Il-sung strengthened his dictatorship. 
Particularly, after the Juche Ideology replaced Marxism-Leninism and the Stalinist state 
took firm root in the 1970s, there was little room for society to express different voices. 
It is controversial whether these could be regarded as constituents of civil society or not 
as they were strictly controlled by the state. Nevertheless, by examining the following 
areas, we can demonstrate how the state controlled each key sphere of society in the North. 
To begin with, as for churches, suppressing religion was relatively easy because 
Korea, as of 1945, was not a religious country. The pre-modern Joseon Dynasty embraced 
Confucianism which was rather an ideology than a religion. Buddhism was suppressed 
from the day the dynasty was established in 1392 so that, by the time Kim Il-sung became 
the leader of North Korea, its power was very weak. On the contrary, Christianity was 
disseminated widely in the colonial period but Christians were still small in number. 
Moreover, the communisation process after independence scared most faithful Christians 
away to South Korea. By the time the Korean War ended, there was officially no church 
or temple in North Korea. Until 1991, the Constitution stipulated that North Korea did 
not allow freedom of religion.66 
                                                 
66 In 1991 North Korea changed relevant clauses in the Constitution to soften hardline policies 
against Pyongyang. However, it did not mean North Korea permitted freedom of religion (Uh 
Jung, 1996: 168-170). 
126 
 
In the party-state system, the Party commands and controls all governmental and 
non-governmental organizations. Therefore, non-governmental organizations in North 
Korea are not private or civic organizations: they are the Party’s quasi-governmental 
organizations. Typical socialist countries emphasize the role of such organizations as a 
‘transmission belt’ between the Party and the masses. In the case of North Korea, one key 
entity is added. That is, they functioned as a transmission belt between the Great Leader, 
the Party, and the masses and, amongst them, the Great Leader is of first and foremost 
importance. Concretely, North Korea made it a duty for every North Korean above 14 
years old to join more than one of the following four major organizations: the Kim Il-
sung Socialist Youth League, the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea, the Union 
of Agricultural Workers of Korea, and the Democratic Women’s Union of Korea (Park 
Wan-sin, 2001: 117). As members of the organizations had to participate in the Review 
Meeting, they played an important role in reinforcing the dictatorship of Kim Il-sung. 
Schools played a pivotal role in the dictatorship of Kim Il-sung. Basically, North 
Korean textbooks were written to make North Korean people more loyal to Kim Il-sung, 
just as textbooks in the Stalin era were made to reinforce Stalin's dictatorship. Particularly 
after the August Faction Incident, North Korea used education in order to create more 
actively the cult of personality of Kim Il-sung, and started to distort the whole Korean 
history in favour of the Kim family. For example, according to the new textbooks, Kim 
Il-sung's grandfather Kim Ung-woo attacked and burned the United States’ merchant ship 
General Sherman in 1866, and Kim Il-sung's father Kim Hyung-jik played a leading role 
in the March 1st Movement in 1919. They were all groundless (Kang Jun-man, 2007: 104). 
After Kim Jong-il became the successor, he took the cult of personality to a new level 
and, in the process, distortions of history were intensified to legitimise the hereditary 
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succession. The glorification of the Partisan Faction followed the personality cult of Kim 
Il-sung because those who were loyal to Kim Il-sung should be heroes as well (Hwang 
Jang-yop, 2006: 37-39). 
Regarding the media, Kim Jong-il's role was critical. Kim Jong-il made the 
utmost effort to idolize Kim Il-sung, which was closely connected with strengthening his 
position as the next leader. In the process, he took advantage of the media aggressively. 
For example, on 7 May 1974, Kim Jong-il proclaimed three duties of the media as follows: 
to make the entire society Kim Il-sungist, to remodel society to achieve material affluence 
as demanded by Kim Il-sung, and to contribute actively to revolution in South Korea, the 
unification of the two Koreas, and the revolution of the world. The so-called ‘5.7 
Documents’ have been rigidly obeyed by the media since 1974 (Kim Yeong-ju and Lee 
Beomsu, 1994: 393-396). 
Last but not least, the North Korean state's control of society culminated in the 
notorious ‘five-household guidance system’. In July 1958, Kim Il-sung ordered that one 
paid party official should guide a group of five households for the successful achievement 
of educational and economic tasks. From 1974, the system was modified and reinforced 
to cover 15 to 20 households with more than four party officials involved in each group 
titled ‘People's Unit’. Twice a month, the unit members should participate in the Review 
Meeting on Everyday Life which included a mutual criticism session between neighbours 
(Hamm In-hee, 2004: 284). Consequently, an ordinary North Korean's life was controlled 
and watched over by the state and fellow citizens in the workplace, the quasi-
governmental organizations, and the neighbourhood.  
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3.4. Conclusion: Who was the Hegemonic Group? 
 
The historical bloc took shape from the mid-1950s when Kim Il-sung actively sought 
independence from the pressures of the Soviet Union and China. The economic structure 
of the bloc was determined by autarkist Soviet Fordism which was consolidated by its 
unique superstructures such as the Juche Ideology and the Stalinist state. During that time, 
the Party Management Committee replaced the role of the manager in production, 
Marxism-Leninism was erased in North Korea, and Kim Il-sung made the Party as a 
rubber-stamping institution. We can also understand the enduring historical bloc as the 
successful result of a hegemonic project by the hegemonic group. In this process, the 
dictatorship under the mask of independence stand, or Juche, was closely linked with 
autarkist accumulation strategy. 
Then who were the members of the hegemonic group? As afore-mentioned, in 
the state bureaucracy, the party bureaucracy was the most powerful fraction. Individually 
speaking, high-ranking party officials, military generals, high-ranking government 
officials, and (bereaved) families of the so-called ‘revolutionary fighters’ can be regarded 
as the constituents of the group.67 Amongst those people, the core member was the 
Partisan Faction who had been loyal to Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. By the Soviets and 
Kim Il-sung, Korean indigenous communists were expelled from major posts at the initial 
stages of establishing a new government in North Korea. Almost all members of the 
Soviet Faction, the Yenan Faction, and the Kapsan Faction were removed one-by-one as 
Kim Il-sung stepped up his autocratic rule. Even within the Partisan Faction, those who 
                                                 
67 Revolutionary fighters included those who fought with Kim Il-sung against the Japanese 
colonial army (the Partisan Faction) and those who had distinguished military achievements 
during the Korean War (Jeong Gwang-min, 2005: 78). 
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showed tepid loyalty to Kim Il-sung were purged without reserve. In that sense, the 
faction can also be referred to as the Kim Il-sung Faction. 
The Partisan Faction was not only a key collaborator of Kim Il-sung but also a 
strong supporter of the cult of personality because its members were also depicted as 
heroes in the process of distorting history. Kim Jong-il became the successor to his father 
by active support of the faction as well. Thus, as the faction had been closely connected 
to the fate of the Kim family and one of the greatest beneficiaries of the North Korean 
system, it remained a faithful defender of the dictatorship in the North.  
Inter-Korean relations worked as a key instrument for the hegemonic group to 
strengthen and maintain its rule from the outset. By setting unification, or revolution on 
a national scale, as the ultimate goal of the Party, the group could successfully get rid of 
its rivals and establish the Juche Ideology and dictatorship. Inter-Koreans were the crucial 
link that connected the ideology and the hegemonic Partisan Faction's interests and, thus, 
aggressively led by the North. North Korea, on the one hand, actively proposed 
unification formulae and, on the other hand, conducted a number of provocations to place 
the whole Korean Peninsula under communism—and under the Juche Ideology later. This 
will be detailed in the first section of Chapter VII. 
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PART II. Organic Crises of South and North Korea   
 
Chapter IV. Organic Crisis of South Korea 
 
The historical bloc in the Park era faced a crisis in the economic and political spheres, as 
manifested by the economic stagnation in the late 1970s and a series of large-scale 
demonstrations in 1979 followed by the assassination of Park Chung-hee. The end of the 
Park era slowly led to a change in the existing historical bloc where the neoliberal state 
began to replace the developmental state but exportist Fordism remained. In the process, 
the Chaebol gained autonomy from the state and, eventually, the state could not control 
large industrial capital’s excessive foreign borrowing. The result of Chaebol-friendly 
exportist Fordism in the early stages of neoliberalisation was the economic crisis in 1997. 
It was not the democratisation but the economic crisis that brought about the 
transfer of political power. In the middle of the organic crisis, people chose an alternative 
social force led by Kim Dae-jung who had been the most noted opponent of authoritarian 
rules and collusion between government and businesses. The new ruling political group 
implemented a series of drastic neoliberal reform measures particularly in the financial, 
corporate, labour, and public sectors to complete neoliberalisation in South Korea. 
However, as the United States’ dot-com bubble burst in the spring of 2000 dampened 
South Korea's economic growth, the ruling political group gave up the reform of the 
corporate sectors. For the victory of the presidential election in December 2002, the group 
needed help from the Chaebol to achieve a high-degree of economic growth through 
exports. The export-oriented accumulation strategy was regarded as common sense even 
to the counter-hegemonic group. The economic achievements through decades of the 
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export-oriented accumulation strategy were so magnificent that most people, including 
members of the opposition parties, believed that the strategy was the only viable method 
for rapid economic growth to South Korea which is poor in natural resources. Thus, 
exportist Fordism as the production process continued and a number of amicable 
measures were taken toward Chaebols that had competitiveness in exports. The 
consequences of the Chaebol-friendly neoliberalisation included the increasing power of 
the Chaebol and the widening income gap between the rich and the poor. The negative 
ramifications were one of the reasons why the ruling liberal nationalists hastened to 
reconcile with North Korea in hopes of political gain.68  
The neoliberalisation by the new ruling political group strengthened the Chaebol-
centered economic structure. Kim Dae-jung was an opponent of developmentalist policies 
by Park Chung-hee but a proponent of neoliberalism which had begun in the 1980s. Hence, 
the hegemonic struggles in the late 1990s between the existing hegemonic group and the 
new ruling political group were 'not' fought over the accumulation strategy and the 
economic policy. They were fought over the approach toward Pyongyang and North 
Korean policy, which will be detailed later in Chapter VI. 
The following section will give an account of liberalisation policies in the 1980s 
and 1990s and then show how the economic crisis was developing. Neoliberal reforms 
by the new ruling political group will be explained below with reasons why the reform of 
the Chaebol was halted. Then, it will demonstrate post-crisis changes that strengthened 
the Chaebol’s power and widened income inequality. This chapter ends with an 
investigation of changes in the historical bloc. 
                                                 
68 However, it is noteworthy that the new North Korean policy was ‘not’ initiated to make up 
for the negative consequences of neoliberalisation. The new policy toward North Korea began 
with the inauguration of the new government.  
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4.1. Liberalisation in the 1980s  
 
The introduction of neoliberal policies in South Korea dates back to the early 1980s. In 
the late 1970s, as the heavy chemical industry drive caused large-scale overlapping 
investments and ensuing inflation, the government abruptly adopted a retrenchment 
policy without policy coordination for a soft landing. This brought on a recession that 
recorded negative economic growth for the first time in 1980. On the one hand, as a 
countermeasure to the economic downturn, and on the other hand, under mounting 
pressure from abroad—particularly from the United States—for opening the market, the 
state implemented a series of neoliberal policies in the early 1980s. It was the first attempt 
to rectify developmentalist policies in South Korea. 
The first departure from developmentalism was driven by young bureaucrats who 
had studied monetarism at US universities in the 1970s (Kim Yun Tae, 1999: 445). 
Amongst them, Kim Jae-ik played a key role: he was a personal economics tutor of Chun 
Doo-hwan who had seized power in a coup on 12 December 1979. Chun Doo-hwan 
appointed Kim presidential secretary for the economy and left everything related to the 
economy to him by saying: “You are the President on economy” (Nam Deok-wu, 2009: 
254).  
Kim Jae-ik took the initiative in setting up and implementing policies that gave 
the private sector greater freedom by reducing the state's direct intervention in the 
economy. The bureaucratic group led by Kim emphasized ‘stabilization, opening, and 
self-regulation’ as the core principles in economic management in order to subdue the 
side effects of developmentalist policies in the Park era. Kim asserted that those excessive 
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export-oriented economic policies in the previous administration had obstructed the 
efficient distribution of resources and weakened national competitiveness (Kang In-su et 
al., 2005: 117). By the same token, Kim was critical of Chaebol-friendly policies and thus 
reduced policy loans, tax privileges, and discriminating duties which had benefited 
Chaebols before (Nam Deok-wu, 2003: 110). It was noteworthy that the EPB which had 
been the key institution for developmental policies in the Park era played a central role in 
the neoliberal policies of the Chun era (Kim Yun Tae, 1999: 445). 
Concretely, the state bureaucrats carried out a policy of austerity for price 
stabilization, opened the market through the liberalisation of imports, and introduced a 
managed floating exchange rate regime of the multiple currency basket peg system. In 
particular, the group pushed forward with financial liberalisation such as the privatization 
of state-owned banks and the relaxation of entry restrictions to the banking sector. In 1981 
all five commercial banks were privatized even though they remained subject to tight 
regulation. In 1982 two new commercial banks—Shinhan Bank and KorAm Bank—were 
set up along with one investment and trust company, 12 short-term finance companies, 
and 58 mutual savings and finance companies (Nam Deok-wu, 2003: 110). 
The new economic policies to liberalise the economy, break political-business 
collusion, and reform the Chaebol-centered economy not only helped South Korea to get 
over the economic slump, but also contributed a lot to economic growth and the 
distribution of wealth. Table 6 shows that the Growth Domestic Production (GDP) growth 
rate between 1981 and 1985 recorded 7.84 per cent on average from minus 1.5 per cent 
in 1980. In 1980, the poorest 40 per cent owned 16.1 per cent of national wealth but, in 
1984, the number increased to 18.9 per cent, while the richest 20 per cent owned 45.4 per 
cent in 1980 but the number decreased to 42.3 per cent in 1984 (Ji Joo-hyung, 2011: 113-
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Table 6. GDP growth rates of South Korea in the 1980s (%) 
 
Source: Bank of Korea Economic Statistics Bureau (2005: 66). 
 
Between 1986-1988 the South Korean economy registered unprecedented rates of 
economic growth of about 12 per cent each year, owing to the favourable international 
environment of the so-called ‘Three Lows’: low world interest rates, low oil prices, and 
the low value of the South Korean currency, the won. In particular, the sharp appreciation 
of the Japanese yen after the Plaza agreement in 1985 was decisive in enhancing the price 
competitiveness of South Korean products in overseas markets (Hong Soon-young et al., 
2006: 74). During the period, trade surpluses amounted to 4 to 8 per cent of GDP, and this 
was the first time in history that South Korea enjoyed a current account surplus. The 
unemployment rate also dropped from about 4 per cent in 1985 to about 2 per cent in 
1988 (You Jong-Il and Lee Ju-Ho, 2000: 10). 
In the past, Chaebols' fortunes depended upon the state’s will so they tried to 
maintain cozy relationships with the President and his political circle. The ‘Three Lows 
Prosperity’ had Chaebols accumulate enough riches to enable them to seek independence 
from the state. Liberalisation policies in the 1980s became channels to strengthen their 
power vis-à-vis the state. Soon, they made inroads into the financial sector to free 
themselves from the state's control through financial institutions. At that time, as the law 
forbade Chaebols from owning banks, they raced to purchase or establish non-bank 
financial institutions such as security companies, insurance companies, and investment 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
-1.5 6.2 7.3 10.8 8.1 6.8 10.6 11.1 10.6 6.7 
135 
 
and trust companies. With money earned largely from export success, they also bought 
large amounts of real estate all over the country for speculative purposes and also as 
collaterals for future loans (Kim Hyeong-gi and Suh Ik-jin, 2006: 156). 
In this situation, the 1987 June Democracy Movement, which erupted when Chun 
Doo-hwan announced that his close confidant, Roh Tae-woo, would succeed him as 
president, became a watershed in the contemporary history of South Korea by mobilising 
millions of protestors made up of university students, religious leaders, blue-collar and 
white-collar workers, and so on. The majority of people and opposition parties had 
demanded a democratic political system including direct presidential elections, but the 
Chun Doo-hwan regime oppressed them forcefully. As Yonsei University student Lee 
Han-yeol was fatally injured by a tear gas grenade during a street demonstration on 9 June 
1987 which was staged to call for a probe into the exact cause of death of Seoul National 
University student Park Jong-chul who had died during a police investigation, sporadic 
demonstrations developed into nationwide protests against the dictatorship. While the 
regime hesitated in using violent force just one year before the 1988 Olympic Games and 
the United States had reluctance to support its bloody suppression of demonstrators in the 
midst of the relaxation of the Cold War, the protests rapidly expanded on a massive scale. 
On 26 June, the Great National March of Peace was held where more than one million 
people participated in 33 cities and 4 districts. At last, particularly under pressure from 
Washington, Roh Tae Woo issued the June 29 Declaration which promised to amend the 
Constitution to provide for direct presidential elections (Suh Jung-seok, 2007: 193-205; 
Gray, 2013: 88-89). According to Choi Jang-Jip, the democratisation after the June 29 
Declaration was an instance of passive revolution in which a new political formation came 
to power but for a fundamental change of social relations because the democratisation 
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was performed by political elites in the ruling party and the opposition parties to the 
exclusion of the masses (Choi Jang-Jip, 2005: 112). 
South Korea, immediately after the June Democracy Movement until the end of 
1987, witnessed the Great Workers’ Struggle which increased the number of trade unions 
from 2,742 to 4,103 (Chang Dae-oup, 2001: 200). Soon the Korean Confederation of 
Trade Unions (KCTU), the more radical of South Korea's two major umbrella trade 
organizations, emerged as a powerful force in society, and workers collectively raised 
their voices to increase wages and improve working conditions protests.69 Under these 
circumstances where the authoritarian regime gave in to the demands of the people, 
Chaebols sought to accumulate capital through concessions on wages and working 
conditions. In this process, the state refrained from violence and supported a voluntary 
compromise between capital and labour (Kim Hyeong-gi and Suh Ik-jin, 2000: 155-156). 
Now, the rising purchasing power of workers became another source of economic 
growth. From 1982 to 1987, real-wage growth rates were recorded at about 5 per cent, 
but from 1988 to 1990 they exceeded more than 15 per cent: 16.4 per cent in 1988, 20.0 
per cent in 1989, and 16.8 per cent in 1990 (Ji Joo-hyung, 2011: 131). Enhanced wages 
expanded domestic consumption drastically and this lowered the contribution of exports 
to economic growth (Kim Hyeong-gi and Suh Ik-jin, 2000: 149). The percentage of 
exports to GDP decreased sharply from 38 per cent in 1987 to 26 per cent in 1991 (World 
Bank). It was the first time that the balance of exports and domestic consumption was 
achieved—albeit in a limited sense—in South Korea. It seemed that export-oriented and 
labour-intensive economic policies from the Park Chung-hee era had finally come to an 
                                                 
69 The other umbrella trade organization is the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) 
which has been considered more conservative than the KCTU. The FKTU publicly supported 
ruling parties until the year of 1997 (Ahn Cheol-hyeon, 2009a: 381). 
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end. However, it was a temporary phenomenon. The Chaebol who had been the main 
beneficiary of the old policies struck back before long.  
 
4.2. The Development of the Economic Crisis 
 
From the late 1980s, the Chaebol publicly complained that the South Korean economy 
was in crisis due to high wages and high interest rates (Pirie, 2006: 52).70 To maintain 
international competitiveness, they argued, the liberalisation of labour and capital markets 
was critical. In fact, by the beginning of the 1990s, South Korea's products were not as 
competitive as before because of the rise of China and Southeast Asian countries as global 
exporters of labour-intensive manufactured goods. As a response, the Chaebol on the one 
hand attempted to lower production costs, and on the other hand advanced into capital-
intensive industries such as the semi-conductor business, and thus needed huge amounts 
of money to invest in R&D and fixed capital (Pirie, 2006: 50-53). 
To cut down production costs, while calling for more flexible labour laws, 
Chaebols relied upon subcontracting to SMEs more and more. Most SMEs did not have 
trade unions, so the workers did not enjoy wages hikes. Chaebols exploited low-waged 
workers in union-free SMEs to evade active unionism in their own companies. The ratio 
of subcontracting firms within SMEs jumped from 36.5 per cent in 1988 to 63.2 per cent 
in 1992 (You Jong-Il and Lee Ju-Ho, 2000: 16-18). In addition, the ratio of subcontracted 
production for domestic contractors by SMEs sharply increased from 24.8 per cent in 
1986 to 66.8 per cent in 1991 (Hong Jang-pyo, 2010: 190). 
                                                 
70 Unlike the claims by Chaebols, real wages increased four times from 1970 to 1990 while 
labour productivity increased seven times over the same period (Jang Sang-whan, 1998: 177). 
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This subcontracting strategy of Chaebols made most SMEs vulnerable to unfair 
practices.71 Under soft law and sanctions in favour of big businesses, the Chaebol could 
cut down subcontractors' profit margins easily, as the latter's survival depended upon the 
former's orders. The ordinary margin percentage of SMEs was 3.05 per cent in 1985, 
higher than the 2.32 per cent of Chaebols, but the percentage decreased to 1.49 per cent 
in 1995, much lower than the 4.40 per cent of Chaebols (Jang Sang-whan, 1998: 174). 
With enhanced profits Chaebols concentrated their resources on core fields and R&D 
activities, while subcontracting companies with small margins had little room for business 
rationalization and technological innovation (Kim Sang-jo, 2011: 168; Hong Jang-pyo, 
2010: 207). Before long the productivity gap in manufacturing industries between 
Chaebols and SMEs widened drastically. The average productivity of SMEs was 53.9 per 
cent of that of the Chaebol in 1988, but 49.3 per cent in 1990 and 45.7 per cent in 1993 
(Jang Sang-whan, 1998: 174). 
Meanwhile, the Chaebols’ financial domination began during this period. The 
Chaebol used the slow economy right after the Three Lows Prosperity years as a pretext 
for attacking the state's (still) tight control over the financial sector. To avoid recession, 
the state adopted much more comprehensive and substantial financial liberalisation 
measures than in the 1980s, and Chaebols were the main beneficiaries of these (You Jong-
Il and Lee Ju-Ho, 2000: 4). As of 1990, the top-five Chaebols had 12.8 per cent of the 
shares of merchant banking companies, 26.3 per cent of the shares of security companies, 
                                                 
71 For example, Chaebols usually required subcontractors to buy their products in cash but 
purchased parts and components on credit from them. Typically, they wrote promissory notes 
cashable far later than the statutory maximum period of 60 days. Or, they paid subcontractors 
not in cash but in kind, such as gift certificates or their own products. The augmented SME 
Business Coordination Act of 1982 prohibited the Chaebol from entering into the business set 
aside for SMEs. However, Chaebols breached the law whenever they found it to be lucrative as 
the penalties were very soft—the maximum penalty was a mere 30 million won as of 1995 
(Park Hun Joo, 2007: 200-201). 
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and 36.5 per cent of the shares of life insurance companies (You Jong-Il and Lee Ju-Ho, 
2000: 8). The state could no longer easily control Chaebols through financial institutions 
due to the financial liberalisation from the early 1980s. 
The early 1990s witnessed the growing power of the Chaebol at a rapid pace, and 
this was facilitated by a big change in politics. In January 1990, South Korea witnessed a 
merger among the ruling Democratic Justice Party, Kim Young-sam's Unification 
Democratic Party, and Kim Jong-pil's New Democratic Republican Party (Lee Dong-
hyeong, 2011: 451). It was a decisive measure of the hegemonic group to resolve political 
difficulties that the ruling party was a minority. As a result, through political ascendancy, 
the hegemonic group took a firm stand against, rather than making concessions to, 
counter-hegemonic social forces such as nationalists and labour activists. Subsequently, 
a number of critical political decisions in favour of the hegemonic group were made and, 
in the process, the Chaebol-centered economic structure was reinforced. 
The Chaebols’ control of the national economy was even enhanced by a series of 
liberalisation policies by President Kim Young-sam who considered liberalisation as a 
panacea.72 For high national economic growth during his presidency, he opened capital 
markets and joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) in haste. He also accepted a proposal by the Chaebols’ lobby group, the 
Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), to allow raising money in global markets at real 
interest rates of almost half of domestic levels for international competitiveness and 
followed global neoliberalism under the Washington Consensus that led Western banks 
to enter the South Korean market (Pirie, 2006: 52; Jessop and Sum, 2006: 173).  
                                                 
72 For detailed explanations of South Korea’s liberalisation coupled with the globalisation in 
the Kim Young-sam era, see Barry Gills (1996: 667-688). 
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In the early 1990s, cheap credit was easily available to South Korean companies 
because of the then global excess liquidity and the bursting Japan's property bubble and 
its resultant low interest rates of about 0.5 per cent (Jessop and Sum, 2006: 167). South 
Korea’s OECD membership facilitated the influx of foreign capital from North America, 
Europe and Japan that sought a profitable and safe place for investment. With the money, 
Chaebols competitively went on a borrowing binge to invest more and grow bigger. And 
it was not just new factories and production facilities that Chaebols scrambled to have. 
Hotels, hospitals, and other service businesses affiliated with Chaebols took the lead in 
importing costly, high-tech equipment (Kim Hyeong-gi and Suh Ik-jin, 2000: 162). 
Between 1994-1996 the rate of facility investment increase and that of capital goods 
imports increase were 17.1 per cent and 24.1 per cent respectively, while between 1991-
1993 the former and the latter were 5.2 per cent and 6.4 per cent respectively (Hong Soon-
young et al., 2006: 141). 
The state was not just a bystander but an important collaborator. The Kim Young-
sam administration was a strong supporter of Chaebol-friendly exportist accumulation 
strategy and thus even helped Chaebols’ overinvestment by reversing the earlier decisions 
in the past administrations: it allowed Samsung to enter the automobile industry and 
Hanbo to enter the iron industry, to name a few (Son Ho-cheol, 1999: 199). In fact, 
liberalisation under the previous administrations went hand-in-hand with measures to 
keep the Chaebol in check. For example, the Chun Doo-whan administration took a series 
of measures to reduce economic concentration such as the compulsory liquidation of 
insolvent subsidiary companies of Chaebols and the rationalization of the industrial 
structures of Chaebols. The Roh Tae-woo administration also proposed the reform of the 
Chaebol as one of its policy goals and implemented relevant measures such as the 
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regulation of Chaebols' non-business purpose real estate (Kim Yun Tae, 1999: 446).  
By the 1990s, most state bureaucrats were proponents of neoliberalism. However, 
looking inside the bureaucracy, there were two groups: pro-Chaebol bureaucrats who 
supported the interests of the Chaebol and anti-Chaebol bureaucrats who advocated the 
high-intensity reform, if not the disintegration, of the Chaebol. At the initial stages of 
neoliberal reforms, anti-Chaebol bureaucrats led by Kim Jae-ik were the mainstream 
group and the liberalisation in the early 1980s was undertaken with the reform of the 
Chaebol. After his death in 1983, 73  however, they slowly lost power inside the 
bureaucracy. During the Kim Young-sam administration, pro-Chaebol bureaucrats gained 
much strength as the president prioritised ‘national competence’ over ‘balance’ under the 
banner of Segyehwa [Globalisation] and appointed them to important positions in the 
newly established Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE). They maintained more 
drastic neoliberal reforms in collaboration with the Chaebol and successfully called for 
the dissolution of the EPB (Gills and Gills, 2004: 173; Choi Jong-chan, 2008: 118). 
Moreover, the government discarded the Five-Year Economic Plans, one of the symbols 
of the developmental policies, and announced that no more macroeconomic Keynesian 
policies would be implemented (Kim Yun Tae, 1999: 451).  
The Kim Young-sam administration not only relaxed regulations on Chaebols but 
also gave them various preferential treatments, for example, in privatising public 
enterprises, constructing social overhead capital facilities, and undertaking large-scale 
national projects such as mobile communication businesses (Choi Jang-Jip, 2005: 201). 
Furthermore, the introductions of the outside director system, the obligatory audit system, 
                                                 
73 Kim Jae-ik was killed by North Korean terrorists in the 1983 Rangoon Bombing in 
Myanmar. See "New team in Seoul seeks to keep growth and prices steady" (The Christian 
Science Monitor, 1 November 1983).  
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and the protection of minority shareholders' rights were under consideration in the 
previous administrations but they were all deferred in the Kim Young-sam administration 
(Ji Joo-hyung, 2011: 150). In the same vein, the administration passed the new labour law 
in December 1996 with no opposition lawmakers present or even notified. The law gave 
employers much more freedom to dismiss employees, hire replacement workers for 
strikers, adjust working hours, etc. Considering this as a licence for capitalists to cut 
wages and worsen working conditions, the KCTU went on strike. More than 1.2 million 
workers participated in the strike until President Kim Young-sam in late January 1997 
promised to revise the law (Gills and Gills, 2004: 174).74 
Right before the economic crisis, domestic investment increased from 37.1 per 
cent of GDP in 1995 to 38.1 per cent in 1996. However, the private savings rate decreased 
from 27.3 per cent to 25.3 per cent, during the same period, considerably because of the 
low wages of workers in SMEs which accounted for around 80 per cent of total employees 
at that time (Bank of Korea). Meanwhile, South Korea's competitiveness in exports 
declined, squeezed especially by high-tech Japan and low-cost China by the mid-1990s. 
What’s more, the Japanese yen depreciated after 1995. The American Treasury and the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance agreed to devalue the yen against the dollar by 60 per cent 
between April 1995 and April 1997 to espouse the ‘strong-dollar’ policy (Jessop and Sum, 
2006: 167). It was a crushing blow to the South Korean economy. 
Excessive investment and declining profits triggered a chain of bankruptcies in 
1997. Starting with the bankruptcy of the country's fourteenth largest Chaebol, Hanbo, in 
January, the twenty-sixth largest, Sammi, in March, the nineteenth largest, Jinro, in April, 
                                                 
74 The revised law in March 1997 delayed the implementation of the controversial provisions 
until at least two years later (Chicago Tribune News, 22 January 1997). 
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and the eighth largest, Kia Motors, went bankrupt in August. As those Chaebols went 
insolvent, tens of thousands of subcontractors went bankrupt or were on the verge of 
going bankrupt—for example, Kia Motors alone had about 5,000 subcontractors (Kang 
Man-su, 2005: 446-448). In the aftermath of the large-scale bankruptcies, non-performing 
loans of local banks jumped to more than $33 billion. Soon, banks stopped giving fresh 
loans to companies and extensively collected existing loans. As a result, companies 
suffered harshly from financial strains and numerous bankruptcies ensued. In 1997, 40 
companies went bankrupt on average every day, including many stable enterprises. Those 
bankruptcies provoked investors to withdraw from the South Korean stock market, which 
led to a crash in stock prices and an exodus of foreign currencies (Samsung Economic 
Research Institute, 2000: 55-56).  
Massive overinvestment and falling profits caused foreign debt to rise rapidly. As 
the Table 7 shows, South Korea's total foreign debt increased from $31.8 billion in 1990 
to $177.4 billion in September 1997. Especially alarming was the rapid build-up of the 
short-term debt. During the period between 1994 and September 1997, short-term debt 
increased from $38.4 billion to $80.4 billion. The share of short-term debt in total external 
debt increased to more than 45 per cent as of September 1997.   
 
Table 7. Changes in foreign debt from 1994 to September 1997 (1 billion won, %) 
 
Classification 1994 1995 1996 1997.9 
Total foreign debt 89.8 119.8 157.3 177.4 
Long-term debt 51.8 64.9 81.5 96.9 
Short-term debt 38.4 54.9 75.8 80.5 
Total foreign debt/GDP 21.2 23.2 28.2 33.7 
Source: Hong Soon-young et al. (2006: 141). 
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Eventually, South Korea could not pay its debt with its own means. On 2 July 1997, 
Thailand switched to a flexible exchange rate system, which quickly devalued the Thai 
baht by more than 50 per cent. The currency crisis spread like wildfire to most East Asian 
countries including South Korea. After the central bank's abortive efforts to defend the 
value of the won, the exchange rate increased drastically from 860 won to the dollar in 
early 1997 to 1,139 won on November 20 and South Korea’s usable foreign exchange 
reserves dropped sharply to $7.3 billion. To avoid defaulting on foreign loans, Seoul, on 
21 November, formally asked the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a $58.35 billion 
bailout package (Park Hun Joo, 2002: 65). South Korea witnessed the worst economic 
disaster in history and admitted that it was unable to manage the economy on its own.  
 
4.3. The New Ruling Political Group and Neoliberal Reforms 
 
The 1997 economic crisis was an organic crisis which was caused by exportist Fordism 
where Chaebol-friendly economic growth was aggressively pursued. The main difference 
of exportist Fordism in the Kim Young-sam administration from that in the Park Chung-
hee administration was that, first, Chaebols exploited their subcontractors, instead of their 
own employees protected by the enhanced labour power, and second, the state’s series of 
Chaebol-friendly liberalisation policies unleashed their expansionist zeal. In retrospect, 
the historical bloc managed to barely escape the crisis of the bloc in the early 1980s 
through liberalisation policies that were designed to break the chain of collusive ties 
between the state and Chaebols and diminish the power of Chaebols in the South Korean 
economy. This was undertaken by anti-Chaebol bureaucrats such as Kim Jae-ik, while the 
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Chaebol-friendly liberalisation policies in the 1990s were performed by the pro-Chaebol 
bureaucrats in the MOFE.   
 The organic crisis drove the South Koreans to elect liberal nationalist Kim Dae-jung 
as the fifteenth president of South Korea. At the presidential election, Kim obtained about 
10.3 million votes while his opponent Lee Hoi-chang received 9.9 million votes. It was a 
narrow victory by only around 0.4 million votes (Yonhap News, 19 December 1997). The 
unprecedented economic disaster led the public to have strong antipathy towards the old 
ruling politicians and their policies. In addition, the hegemonic group split over the crisis, 
and conservative Kim Jong-pil and members of his faction from the Chungcheong 
Province seceded from the ruling party to join hands with Kim Dae-jung.75 The crisis of 
hegemony no longer held together a cohesive bloc of political alliances. 
Kim’s presidential inauguration marked the first peaceful transfer of power to an 
opposition leader: the change of the ruling political group for the first time in history.76 
In his inaugural speech on 25 February 1998, Kim Dae-jung said, “Democracy and the 
market economy are two sides of a coin, or two wheels of a cart” (The Guardian, 18 
August 2009). This signified that, in managing the economy, the new South Korean state 
would improve transparency and accountability and break away from the political-
business collusion, or the so-called ‘crony capitalism’. Specifically, in the speech, Kim 
                                                 
75 Kim Jong-pil participated in the May 16 coup in 1961 and later founded the Korean Central 
Intelligence Agency (KCIA)—now the National Intelligence Service (NIS) (Suh Jung-seok, 
2007: 92). 
76 To the Chaebol, the results of the presidential election in December 1997 seemed to be a 
nightmare because Kim Dae-jung had been not just a pro-democracy leader but also a staunch 
opponent of any collusion between politics and business. The Chaebol and Kim had been at 
odds with each other for several decades. For example, when he ran for president in 1987, Koo 
Ja Gyong, the President of the FKI, said in a press interview that the FKI would not donate any 
funds to the party which had twelve national assembly members who did ‘not support the free 
market system’. The party was none other than Kim Dae-jung’s Party for Peace and Democracy 
(Kim Yun Tae, 1999: 448). 
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set the reforms of the four sectors—financial, corporate, labour, and public—as the core 
of neoliberal restructuring.  
To begin with, for financial reform, President Kim emphasized the independence 
of the Bank of Korea (BOK) and, more importantly, established the Financial Supervisory 
Commission (FSC). He deemed that bureaucrats in the MOFE had been responsible for 
the crisis and would be incapable of undertaking comprehensive reforms. The FSC could 
issue and revoke licences to financial institutions, which gave it an unrestricted 
jurisdiction to perform its duties efficiently and effectively. Most of all, finance-related 
legislation was drafted and submitted by the MOFE but it had to be done in consultation 
with the FSC (Financial Services Commission, 2000: 25). He appointed Lee Hun-jai as 
chairman of the FSC. Lee had been a high-profile maverick in the MOFE for his anti-
Chaebol stance and had been out of public office for years until his comeback as head of 
the powerful FSC (Kim In-su, 2003: 264).  
On 31 December 1997, the new BOK Act was passed where the BOK was 
allowed to have more independence and less regulatory power (Mo Jongryn, 1999: 481). 
Also, the Governor of the BOK replaced the Minister of the MOFE as head of the 
Monetary Policy Committee whose function was to formulate national monetary and 
credit policies. As a result, compared with the pre-crisis years, the more independent BOK 
had greater authority to pursue price stability and took greater care not to distort the flow 
of credit for political purposes (Iain Pirie, 2005a: 31).77 
The South Korean banks had acted as conduits for the policy loans of the 
government and, therefore, always suffered from hefty non-performing loans and, under 
                                                 
77 One hundred per cent independent central bank is a myth. No nation has that kind of central 
bank (Pirie, 2012: 374). 
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the circumstances, Chaebols had easy access to loans.78 The FSC and the BOK Act 
strengthened the financial sector’s soundness mainly through closing down banks and 
other financial institutions, arranging for banks to merge, or selling them abroad (Ji Joo-
hyung, 2011: 310; Lee Chang-yong and Lee Jong-hwa, 2007: 45; Pirie, 2005b: 365). 
There were 2,072 financial institutions at the end of 1997 but, out of them, only 1,522 
remained by the end of 2001 (Bank of Korea, 2002: 50).  
Corporate restructuring in fact was about how to reform Chaebols. Even before 
his inauguration, President-elect Kim Dae-jung and five major Chaebol leaders (Hyundai, 
Daewoo, Samsung, LG, and SK) agreed upon the following five principles of corporate 
restructuring: first, enhancing the transparency of corporate management;  second, 
dismantling cross-debt guarantee; third, significantly improving financial structures; 
fourth, strengthening core business areas; fifth, enhancing the accountability of 
controlling stockholders and management protests (Ahn Cheol-hyeon, 2009a: 358). 
Additionally, to help realize these, three practical principles were presented: first, 
corporations reform themselves; second, the government provides only guidelines; and 
third, the means of corporate restructuring shall be banks (Ji Joo-hyung, 2011: 263). 
The Chaebol, however, did not reform themselves. They just simulated the 
reform, for example, by reducing debt-equity ratios through the re-evaluation of assets or 
even dubious accounting tricks. Consequently, the total debts of the five biggest Chaebols 
even increased from 221.4 trillion won in 1997 to 234.5 trillion won at the close of 1998 
(Park Hun Joo, 2002: 76). The state resorted to forceful measures in response to the 
lukewarm attitudes. It threatened to divest Chaebol owners of managerial rights over 
                                                 
78 As a result, as of the end of March 1998, non-performing loans stood at $63 billion, which 
accounted for 16.89 per cent of total bank loans, or 20.72 per cent of South Korea's GDP in 
1997 (Ahn Choong Yong, 2006: 165).  
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affiliated companies and to discontinue providing bank loans. President Kim in early 1999 
even warned that those who refused full-fledged reform would go under court 
receivership. 79  Consequently, Chaebols gave in to the state. They took the relevant 
measures to report consolidated financial statements and stop cross-payment guarantees 
(Mo Jongryn, 1999: 471). Also, to dispose of non-core business areas, they agreed to the 
so-called ‘big deal,’ or business swap dealings, to reduce overcapacity problems and to 
create internationally competitive companies (Pirie, 2005b: 366). For instance, the LG 
group sold its semiconductor unit to Hyundai Electronics in April 1999 (Kim Jin-guk, 
2000: 314). Additionally, the state pushed ahead with the sales of subsidiary companies 
of Chaebols or the shares of the companies to foreigners. For example, Daewoo Motors 
was sold to General Motors and, by the end of 2003, overseas investors held 60.1 per cent 
of the shares of Samsung Electronics (Jang Dong-hak, 2007: 125; Kang In-su et al., 2005: 
221). 
Labour reform was carried out through the Korea Tripartite Commission and the 
revision of the labour law. The commission was launched in January 1998 as a 
presidential advisory body to encourage cooperation between labour, management, and 
government. It aimed to make new labour-management relations that would be more 
efficient, more productive, and more neoliberal to ease corporate restructuring and 
overcome the economic crisis (Jegal Hyunsook, 2010: 102-103). The first and most 
important output of the commission was the amendment of the labour law in February 
1998. The law, in particular, permitted management to lay off workers in the case of 
urgent managerial necessity, in exchange for allowing the political activities of labour 
                                                 
79 The President's warning was not a bluff. Daewoo, the second biggest but the most reluctant 
Chaebol to reform itself, went bankrupt with debts of about 80 trillion won and into receivership 
in August 1999. The myth of ‘too big to fail’ went into history (Jeong Gu-hyeon, 2008: 63). 
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unions. This was much more disadvantageous to workers than the 1997 labour law, but 
labour had to accept it in the midst of the economic crisis. The phrase ‘to lay off workers 
in the case of urgent managerial necessity’ was so broadly interpreted to include situations 
where, for example, the company could undergo a ‘potentially anticipated business crisis’ 
(Korealaw.com). In reality the new labour law was utilized as an effective means to 
institutionalizing neoliberal labour-management relations.80 
Regarding public sector reform, the state concentrated on relaxing and lifting 
regulations and restructuring and privatising publicly owned companies in accordance 
with neoliberal norms. Particularly for deregulation, the state set up the Regulatory 
Reform Committee on 18 April 1998 to examine and trim down redundancies and 
inefficiency in the public sector. The final report with recommendations was submitted 
by the committee in February 1999 and, based upon the report, the state implemented 
sweeping reforms (Kim Pan Suk, 2000: 84). To restructure public enterprises, the state 
sought to enhance autonomy in management. Earlier, public enterprises were under the 
tight control of the state and therefore, for example, they could not decide where to invest 
on their own (Jeong Jun-gil, 2007: 134-135). By embracing market principles, those 
public enterprises were expected to become more efficient and more productive.81  
Overall, the reforms during the Kim Dae-jung administration seemed to be 
successful. The commercial banks of South Korea, collectively, recorded their highest 
                                                 
80 During the presidency of Kim Dae-jung, the labour movement was divided into two: one 
group took the labour reform as an opportunity for political inclusion, and the other resisted the 
neoliberal restructuring and returned to militant tactics, such as strikes and other protest actions 
(Gills and Gills, 2004: 170-171). 
81 The Planning and Budget Committee, established in February 1998, took full charge of the 
privatisation of public enterprises. Eleven public enterprises, such as Pohang Iron and Steel 
Company, Korea Integrated Chemical Inc. had found private owners by February 2003. See 
Kim Dae-jung, Kim Dae-jung Jaseojeon [The Memoirs of Kim Dae-jung] (Seoul: Sunin, 2011), 
67. 
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rates of profitability in both 2001 and 2002 (Pirie, 2005b: 362). Also, the average level of 
the manufacturing sector's ordinary profits increased to 4.7 per cent in 2002, which was 
the highest level since 1974. The manufacturers reduced their levels of collective 
indebtedness successfully: the average interest coverage ratio of the manufacturing sector 
rose to 260.3 per cent in 2002, which was the highest level since 1965. The number was 
slightly lower than the American case of 278.8 per cent in 2002 (Pirie, 2005b: 368). In 
addition, the unemployment rate dropped from 6.8 per cent in 1998 to 3.3 per cent in 2002 
(Jeong Jae-hak, 2008: 115). The South Korea government repaid all IMF loans on 23 
August 2001 and made a public statement that the economic crisis was over (Kim Dae-
wu, 2009: 94). 
Celebrating success, however, was too early. Actually, the economic conditions 
at that time were not that good. In March 2000, the dot-com bubble burst in the United 
States. This directly damaged South Korea’s IT industry, particularly IT venture 
companies. In fact, the government had made great efforts to activate those venture 
companies, expecting them to serve as important momentum for bringing about a quick 
recovery of the whole economy. Kim Dae-jung even considered them as, at least, a good 
supplement to the Chaebol in economic development and thus encouraged banks to 
provide more loans to some promising venture companies, as well as providing funds to 
venture capital companies which would lend money to them with low interest rates (Shim 
Jae-Seung and Lee Moosung, 2008: 88; Chamberlin, 2001: 81). This was in line with Kim 
Dae-jung’s long-held ideas to break the chain of collusive ties between politicians and 
businessmen and go beyond the Chaebol-centered economy. From the late-1960s, he 
emphasized the role of SMEs by saying that SMEs “tend to use more labour-intensive 
technology and thus create more jobs than the Chaebol. Therefore, the growth of SMEs 
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will improve the distribution of income significantly. Also, SMEs are more dynamic and 
innovative than the Chaebol that are often stuck in a rut” (Ohmynews, 19 February 2010). 
In the early stages of his presidency, Kim took note of infinite potentials of IT venture 
companies, illustrated by the cases of Yahoo, Amazon, and so on. Kim was determined to 
press ahead with a comprehensive reform of Chaebols, if not break up them, and expected 
IT venture companies to be an important supplement to, though not a replacement for, 
Chaebols for rapid economic recovery. This strategy invited the hegemonic group's 
intense resistance. In particular, conservative media outlets that had close relationships 
with Chaebols were vehemently attacking the government's relevant policies by 
highlighting cases of failure, but the state managed to continue the strategy. At this 
juncture, what happened in America in the spring of 2000 was a disaster to the ruling 
political group.  
It was around this time that the South Korean state began to closely collaborate 
with the Chaebol again. Why? The government attempted to get out of the economic crisis 
and restore the economy as early as possible for political gain. Specifically speaking, the 
government needed high economic growth for victory in the presidential election 
scheduled for December 2002. Thus, it asked for more investments and more exports 
from Chaebols in return for the discontinuance of compulsory corporate reform (Yu Jong-
il, 2011: 70). Regarding this, the most important occurrence was the so-called ‘August 7 
cabinet reshuffle’ in 2000. Through this reshuffle, all reformist figures in the economic 
sector were replaced by those pro-Chaebol economic bureaucrats who had taken high-
ranking positions in the Kim Young-sam administration. Lee Hun-jai, the anti-Chaebol 
reformist, also stepped down. Instead, Jin Nium, who had served as Minister of Labour 
and Minister of Energy and Resources in the earlier administration, became the Minister 
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of the MOFE and assumed full charge of government’s economic policies (Hankook 
Kyeongje, 7 August 2000; Yonhap News, 7 August 2000). From January 2001, he 
concurrently held the post of the newly-created Deputy Prime Minister for Economy 
(Dong-A Ilbo, 28 January 2001). 
The suspension of corporate reform was a blessing to the Chaebol. As neoliberal 
reforms in the financial, labour, and public sectors made far more progress than the reform 
of the corporate sector, Chaebols’ business environment became much more favourable 
than before. The Chaebol, one of the main culprits of the economic crisis, benefited most 
from the neoliberal reforms. The post-crisis social changes were consequences not only 
of the state’s neoliberal policies, but also of the concentration of economic power in the 
hands of a few Chaebols who became stronger than before the crisis.  
 
4.4. The Consequences of Chaebol-friendly Neoliberal Reforms 
 
In order to surmount the economic crisis in a short period of time, the new ruling political 
group aggressively sought to promote economic growth by expanding investments and 
exports, especially by relying on the Chaebol from 2000. The Chaebol could maximize 
corporate profit owing to neoliberal restructuring, and also they became more competitive 
with sound financial structures than they were before the crisis. Chaebols' enhanced 
profitability, however, was possible at the sacrifice of most South Koreans including 
consumers, labourers, and other capital fraction such as small industrial capital.  
First of all, Chaebols became globally competitive at the expense of competition 
in domestic markets. In the late 1990s, due to the ‘big deal’, most major South Korean 
markets became oligopolistic and some markets became nearly monopolistic. For 
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example, Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics together controlled the appliances 
market in post-crisis South Korea. Hyundai Motor Company took over Kia Motors in 
1998 and Hyundai-Kia Motor Company has enjoyed almost a monopoly in the domestic 
car market ever since.82 Chaebols gained huge profits in oligopolistic markets at home, 
and with the profits they established solid footholds in the world market.  
Second, corporations reduced wage costs through flexible labour and increased 
labour intensity in the workplace. According to the new labour law in 1998, they could 
lay off permanent employees easily and, instead, hired temporary employees and contract 
workers. The percentage of non-permanent employees increased from 43.2 per cent in 
1996 to 49.5 per cent in 2003 (Jegal Hyunsook, 2010: 109). The wage differential between 
permanent workers and non-permanent workers was substantial: the average wage of 
non-permanent workers was 54.9 per cent of that of permanent workers in 2002 (Goo In-
hoe, 2007: 228). In addition, South Korean workers were required to work longer than 
before the crisis. They worked 199.2 hours a month in 1998 on average, but worked 208.1 
hours in 1999, and 204.8 hours in 2000.83 Consequently, the proportion of labour costs 
to sales dropped to 11.4 per cent in 1997 and to 9.8 per cent in 1998-1999 and to around 
10.0 per cent in 2000-2003 from around 12 per cent to 14 per cent between 1988 and 1996 
(Gray, 2011, 318; Kim You-sun, 2005).  
Third, Chaebols’ pursuit of short-term profits in accordance with the state’s 
neoliberal guidelines reduced subcontractors' profit margins even more. Subcontractors 
had to find cost-cutting measures such as outsourcing and replacing permanent workers 
                                                 
82 Hyundai-KIA Motor Company had a 68.5 per cent share of the domestic car market in 2004 
and an 80.5 per cent share in 2009 (Hideo, 2011: 105). 
83 South Korea has had longest working hours amongst the OECD members: in 2005, they 
worked 2354 hours in 2005, 629 hours more than the OECD average of 1725 hours (Seoul 
Daily, 22 Feburary 2007). 
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with non-permanent workers (Hong Jang-pyo, 2010: 208). Those who failed to adapt to 
the new circumstances went insolvent or were taken over by Chaebols. Those who 
survived, though, witnessed their profit rates shrink significantly (Kim Sang-jo, 2010: 
165). Eventually, the state’s neoliberal reform measures did not contribute to the increase 
in profitability of all corporations: they increased the profit rates of Chaebols to a large 
extent but decreased the profit rates of most SMEs.  
While Chaebols grew rapidly, most South Koreans suffered. Chaebols' high 
profitability was attained mainly through easing domestic competition, reducing wage 
costs, and squeezing their subcontractors’ profit margins. Hence, most South Koreans 
underwent a decline in real income. As Table 8 shows, South Korea achieved impressive 
economic growth from 1999 to 2002 but the rate of real wages increased only a little over 
the same period. Likewise, the percentage share of compensation of employees to national 
income (NI) fell from 62.3 per cent in 1997 to 58.2 per cent in 2002 (Jegal Hyunsook, 
2010: 102).  
 
Table 8. Changes in GDP and real wage increase rate from 1997 to 2002 (%) 
 
Source: National Statistical Office (2005: 70). 
 
To mitigate the side effects of neoliberal reforms, the Kim Dae-jung administration 
increased welfare spending to more than double that of the previous administration. 
However, it was far from sufficient. As of 2002, welfare spending accounted for only 8.7 
Classification 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Economic growth rate 4.7 -6.9 9.5 8.5 3.8 7.0 
Real wage increase rate 2.5 -9.3 7.3 5.6 1.0 3.9 
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per cent of GDP, the lowest amongst the OECD countries (Hong Soon-young, 2006: 290). 
Furthermore, the government's welfare programme claimed ‘productive welfare’ linking 
social spending to productivity enhancement (Oh Gi-pyeong, 2000: 517). It was devised 
to help laid-off workers during the restructuring process and to provide permanent 
employees with the so-called ‘Four Major Insurances’—national pension, health 
insurance, unemployment insurance, and occupational health and safety insurance. 
Accordingly, if jobless people became permanent employees, they could receive welfare 
benefits. But if they remained unemployed or became non-permanent workers or self-
employed, they could not receive subsidies from the government except for health 
insurance subsidies (Jegal Hyunsook, 2010: 93, 115). There were so many people who 
were excluded from the new welfare system.  
The South Korean state nominally overcame the economic crisis through 
neoliberal restructuring, but it was accompanied by worsening income inequality. 
President Kim was aware that neoliberal reform measures would deepen social disparity, 
as was the case in other countries. He strengthened the social safety net instead but it was 
not effective. As the following Table 9 shows, the polarization of society was intensified 
and entrenched in his presidency. 
 
Table 9. Gini coefficient of income and deciles distribution ratio between 1997 and 2002 
Source: Kang In-su et al. (2005: 310).  
 
Classification 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Gini coefficient of income 0.283 0.316 0.320 0.317 0.319 0.312 
Deciles distribution ratio 0.587 0.507 0.496 0.504 0.497 0.514 
156 
 
South Korea's Gini coefficient (0=most equal, 1=most unequal), a key index on income 
inequality between the rich and the poor, rose from 0.283 in 1997 to its highest level of 
0.316 in 1998. The figure did not undergo drastic changes after 1998, indicating that the 
inequality was fixed after that. The deciles distribution ratio was 0.587 in 1997 meaning 
that the poorest 40 per cent of households earned 58.7 per cent of the income of the top 
20 per cent. The number decreased to 0.507 in 1998 and continued at around the same 
level, representing a higher concentration of wealth in the upper income groups since 
1998.84 These show that, despite the state’s efforts to alleviate the adverse effects of 
neoliberal reforms, it failed to solve the problem of the polarization of wealth.  
 
4.5. Conclusion: Changes in the Historical Bloc 
 
The historical bloc formed in the Park era underwent many changes from 1980. In 
particular, the year 1997 was an important juncture as a group of counter-hegemonic 
forces led by Kim Dae-jung took political power because of the economic crisis. President 
Kim promised comprehensive and high-intensity reforms and made considerable progress 
in many fields. However, much had remained unchanged. So, what had changed or not 
changed with regard to the historical bloc? This is a meaningful question by itself and 
also in terms of inter-Korean relations, which will be discussed later in the thesis. 
To begin with, with regard to the economic structure, we need to take note of the 
following two characteristics. First, the export-oriented strategy continued and thus 
                                                 
84 Moreover, the number of credit delinquents increased rapidly from 1.60 million in 1998 to 
2.64 million in 2002 and 3.72 million in 2003. This was largely due to the over-issue of credit 
cards by banks and Chaebol-affiliated credit card companies. They issued credit cards to people 
who were not qualified. The government was also responsible for the so-called 'credit card 
fiasco' because it tolerated or even aided the over-issue in expectation of consumption increase 
(Kim Gi-won, 2008: 144). 
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exportist Fordism maintained. There was an attempt to attain a balance between exports 
and domestic demand in the early 1980s. However, that period was exceptional. In 
particular, during the presidency of Kim Dae-jung, in order to overcome the economic 
crisis as early as possible, the strategy was reinforced and, in the process, the power of 
the Chaebol over society was even intensified. The Chaebol became an even more 
important actor in the economy than the state, and the latter had to rely on the former to 
resolve the crisis. Second, the influence of finance was deepened all the areas of economy. 
As neoliberalism posits that finance can contribute more to economic growth than 
production, a power shift was being undertaken from production to finance, particularly 
in accordance with the IMF's conditions (Harvey, 2005: 33). In the process, the 
beneficiaries were not the ordinary citizens but those people in the financial sector, as the 
neoliberal state favoured “the integrity of the financial system and the solvency of 
financial institutions over the well-being of the population” (Harvey, 2005: 70-71). For 
instance, banks expanded personal loans recklessly and, as a result, the number of credit 
delinquents increased rapidly from 1.60 million in 1998 to 2.64 million in 2002 and 3.72 
million in 2003 (Kim Gi-won, 2008: 144). This was largely due to the over-issue of credit 
cards by banks and Chaebol-affiliated credit card companies. They issued credit cards to 
people who did not qualify, such as minors.85 
The developmental state turned itself into the neoliberal state.86 The practice of 
the neoliberal state varies on a case-by-case basis and, in the case of South Korea, the 
state's attitude toward the Chaebol is critical to understand the uniqueness. The 
                                                 
85 The government was also responsible for the so-called ‘credit card fiasco’ because it tolerated 
or even aided the over-issue in expectation of consumption increase (Kim Dong-ho, 2012: 366). 
86 Why do we call ‘developmental’ state or ‘neoliberal’ state, instead of ‘anti-Communist’ state 
or ‘nationalist’ state, with regard to forms of the state? It is because “each particular form of 
capitalist State must be referred back, in its unity, to important modifications of the relations of 
production and to important stages of class struggle” (Poulantzas, “1969: 75). 
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neoliberalisation of the state which started from the early 1980s was a choice to break the 
economic slump. In the Kim Young-sam era, pro-Chaebol bureaucrats became 
mainstream and the state actively pursued neoliberalisation in favour of the Chaebol. 
During the early stages of the Kim Dae-jung administrations, anti-Chaebol bureaucrats 
occupied important posts and they implemented the reform of the Chaebol intensively. 
However, as the United States’ internet bubble bursting in the spring of 2000 cast dark 
shadows on the export front, the state strengthened its reliance on the Chaebol for high 
economic growth in a short period of time. Thus, the neoliberal state in South Korea 
returned to its previous trait that supported Chaebol-centered exportist accumulation 
strategy.  
Civil society's influence on the changes in the historical bloc was limited. 
Churches and schools in general were still great supporters of the existing historical bloc. 
One notable case was the controversy about the Korean Teachers’ and Education Workers' 
Union. The union emerged as a potential force to tackle the vested interests of the existing 
hegemonic group, particularly after January 1999 when it was legalized, but its clout 
turned out to be restrained after a series of attacks by the conservative press that called 
the union members reds or North Korean sympathizers (Park No-ja, 2008: 141-142). 
Many civic organisations, including trade unions, criticized neoliberal policies but failed 
to provide alternatives. On the other hand, the media's role was significant as proponents 
of Chaebol-friendly neoliberalisation. The conservative press which dominated the 
market condemned the reform of the Chaebol harshly and welcomed acts for greater 
labour flexibility and other neoliberal measures. Regarding the August 7 cabinet reshuffle, 
for example, Chosun Ilbo said that the new economic team would be communicable, 
unlike the previous one in the administration (Chosun Ilbo, 9 August 2000). Dong-A Ilbo 
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said that the government had finally learned a lesson from the past and the reshuffle was 
the outcome of years of trial and error (Dong-A Ilbo, 9 August 2000).  
As argued in Chapter II, the ideology of the historical bloc in the Park Chung-
hee era was anti-Communism ‘bolstered’ by developmentalism. The ideological base of 
the hegemonic group was anti-Communism and the group carried out developmental 
policies for capital accumulation. From the early 1980s, developmental policies were 
slowly replaced by neoliberal policies by young state bureaucrats. Eventually, by the 
1990s, all constituents of the hegemonic group such as ruling-party politicians, Chaebols, 
state bureaucrats, and the conservative media supported neoliberalism for capital 
accumulation. We can say the ideology of the hegemonic group in the Kim Young-sam 
era was anti-Communism bolstered by neoliberalism.  
The ruling political group led by Kim Dae-jung was a proponent of neoliberalism 
for capital accumulation. The difference with that in the Kim Young-sam era was that the 
new ruling political group attempted to undertake Chaebol reform in the process of 
neoliberalisation, even though the attempt was halted from the mid-2000. It was, in a 
sense, inevitable because the group did not have its own capital accumulation strategy 
that was different from its predecessors. By the same token, the suspension of Chaebol 
reform was unavoidable when the export-oriented accumulation—the Chaebol had 
superiority over SMEs in exports—was considered common sense even to the counter-
hegemonic group. The Kim Dae-jung administration could not jettison the accumulation 
strategy for the victory of the next presidential election in which achieving high economic 
growth would be incomparably important and, thus, had to keep relying on Chaebols for 
export-oriented growth. 
The new ruling political group was composed of liberal nationalists and its main 
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difference from its predecessor lay not in its liberal economic policies—particularly after 
the mid-2000—but in its North Korean policies. As a strong advocate of nationalism, 
instead of anti-Communism, it went to make great efforts to replace anti-Communism 
with nationalism, which was of great significance as the successful replacement would be 
key to attaining hegemony. Consequently, South Korea witnessed a clash between the two 
ideologies of anti-Communism and nationalism over hegemony during the presidency of 
Kim Dae-jung. This will be explained in detail in Chapter VI. 
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Chapter V. Organic Crisis of North Korea  
  
North Korea's productivity had deteriorated over a long period of time due to its unique 
characteristics of autarkist Soviet Fordism as well as the socialist system's general 
features such as comprehensive central planning. Then, from the mid-1990s, a severe 
economic crisis occurred in the North and, at least, hundreds of thousands of people 
starved to death. The economic crisis impaired the state’s control over society. That is, 
the paralysis of the central planning system and the breakdown of the public distribution 
system diminished the dependency of the people on the state and led them to depend on 
themselves for survival. In this process, spontaneous marketisation at a grassroots level 
expanded quickly throughout the country and, consequently, the Party’s everyday control 
of the people was seriously loosened.  
Not every crisis, however, leads to the transfer of political power. In particular, 
political stability depends upon the ruling group's manoeuvres (Carnoy, 1984: 78). In the 
case of North Korea, the hegemonic group managed to prevent the economic crisis from 
developing into a political crisis, which could have led to regime change, by relying on 
the Cabinet and the military. Instead of the Party, the hegemonic group brought the 
Cabinet and the military to the forefront and devised and implemented Silli [Practical] 
socialism and Seongun [Military-first] politics to manage the crisis. And yet, these were 
makeshift measures by patching up, not resolving, the problems that the North Korean 
system had. Consequently, the hegemonic group needed helping hands from abroad as it 
had no intention to implement a comprehensive reform of the system. 
The following section will demonstrate how the economic crisis unfolded in the 
1990s and will then move on to show North Korean society's responses to the crisis and 
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the consequent weakening of the Party. The hegemonic group’s responses to the crisis—
Silli socialism and Seongun politics with the Cabinet and the military as the two key 
institutions to overcome the crisis—will be explained thereafter. This chapter concludes 
with an investigation of changes in the historical bloc. 
 
5.1. Development of the Economic Crisis 
 
North Korea's economy fell into a crisis in the 1990s but it was not a sudden disaster.  
Typical faults of the socialist system which led to the fall of socialist regimes in Eastern 
Europe also emaciated the economy. In addition, idiosyncrasies, which originated from 
the excessive subordination of economic gain to political goals, served to worsen it. For 
example, unlike the Sole Manager Management System of the Soviet Union, the 
management of a North Korean enterprise was conducted according to collective 
decisions of the party committee which was presided over by the party secretary who was 
responsible for political and ideological guidance.87 The unique management system was 
to concretize the mass line in production in order to help the Party effectively mobilize 
human and material resources by emphasizing politics and ideology.88 Signs of economic 
depression were manifest in the late 1980s as the amount of the rice ration decreased from 
1989 (Lee Mu-cheol, 2008: 102). The 1990s saw the culmination of economic hardship 
to the extent that it threatened the very existence of the socialist system of North Korea.  
                                                 
87 The committee is composed of about twenty-five to thirty-five people elected from the ranks 
of workers, engineers, mangers, and leaders of the labour union. An executive committee, 
responsible for daily operations of the factory, is made up of the committee secretary, the 
factory manager, and the chief engineer (Suh Dong-man, 2005: 868-874). 
88 The new management system was established in the late 1950s and early 1960s in which the 
North Korean regime was afflicted with deficiency of capital and technology due to diplomatic 
predicaments with the Soviet Union and China that had tried to intervene in domestic affairs of 
North Korea and depose Kim Il-sung (Lee Jong-seok, 1995a: 275-284).  
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A number of external factors aggravated North Korea’s dire economic 
circumstances. The relaxation of Cold War tensions had a negative impact on the North 
Korean economy (Smith, 2005a: 172-173). Then, from 1989 the Eastern European 
communist regimes collapsed and in 1991 the Soviet Union broke up. The new regimes 
had little political motives to maintain their ties with North Korea. As they accounted for 
70 to 80 per cent of its trade before, North Korea faced predicament in economic 
management (Kang Seong-gil, 2002: 9). Especially, trade with the Soviet Union fell 
drastically from a total of 2.46 billion USD in 1990 to 0.46 billion USD in 1991 (Gwon 
Young-kyung, 2005: 148-149). Trade reduction with Moscow was destructive to the 
economy as it had been the main source of energy and basic raw materials such as crude 
oil and coke (Cho Dong-ho, 2011: 70). 
Natural disasters exacerbated the situation. Heavy downpours and severe 
droughts from 1995 to 1997 intensified economic difficulties of North Korea. Particularly, 
harsh torrential rains in July and August of 1995 caused devastating floods which washed 
away, for instance, about 30 per cent of the total rice field in the South Hwhanghae 
Province which was North Korea's largest granary by producing a quarter of the national 
rice yield. The rains also submerged many coal mines, which dropped production of coal, 
the biggest single source of energy for electricity production in North Korea. As crude oil 
was no more supported by Moscow, underproduction of coal had a crippling impact on 
the North Korean economy. Power shortages paralyzed the railroad system, hampered 
food production, and led to intermittent production halts in factories (Gwak Dong-gi, 
2006: 24-25). An energy crisis occurred.89 
                                                 
89 According to Bank of Korea's estimates, North Korea's coal production decreased from about 
33 million ton in 1990 to about 20 million ton in 1998, crude oil imports decreased from about 
2.5 million ton in 1990 to about 0.5 million ton in 1998. See Yang Moon-Soo (2004: 248-249). 
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Factory utilization rates dropped significantly from an average of 40 per cent in 
1990 to an average of 25 per cent in 1996 (Jeong Wu-gon, 2004: 91). Significant setbacks 
in production in the mid 1990s led to a financial crisis in which the budget plunged from 
19.19 billion USD in 1994 to 9.13 billion USD in 1997 (Yang Moon Soo, 2008: 124). A 
sharp drop in the budget was lethal to its economic management, as roles of national 
finance in the socialist country were much greater and broader than those in capitalist 
countries. The financial crisis resulted in the state being unable to provide enterprises 
with the necessary means to implement central and local plans and thus weakened the 
state’s control over production. North Korea was caught in the vicious circle of state 
budget retrenchment and production disruption (Yang Moon Soo, 2010: 350-351). 
As a result, the State Planning Committee became inactive. State and cooperative 
enterprises had to procure necessary materials for themselves. State-owned stores could 
not receive goods to sell. The breakdown of the national supply system made statutory 
prices meaningless. Inflation owing to lack of goods and soaring prices in markets made 
workers' wages worthless. North Korean people could not purchase food and other daily 
necessities with their wages (Jeong Wu-gon, 2004: 90-91).  
Furthermore, basic social safety nets such as the public distribution system, the 
pension system, and the once-proud free medical care did not work.90 Want of food was 
widespread even from around the year of 1990 as North Korea launched the ‘eat two 
meals a day’ campaign from 1992 (Yu Yeong-ok, 2002: 307). By the mid 1990s, most 
North Korean people, particularly those in local areas, could not survive with rations.91 
                                                 
90 The social safety net of North Korea in the Kim Il-sung era was well developed compared 
with that of South Korea in the Park Chung-hee era. It was one of the key material bases that 
made possible rule by consent in the North. For North Korea's social safety net, see Smith 
(2005b: 52-53).  
91 People in local areas had to look after themselves to survive. Agricultural capacity and 
market opportunities in their regions played a critical role in their nutrition and survival (Smith, 
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In the farmers’ market, the price of rice soared 12 times in 1996 compared with that in 
1992 (Jeong Gwang-min, 2005: 82). North Korea used to retire workers on pensions by 
giving pensions to men above 60 years old and to women above 55 years old. They could 
live on their pensions. In the mid 1990s, however, concurrently with the halt of the public 
distribution system, the pension system became inoperative as the state did not have 
enough money amid the financial crisis (Jeong Wu-gon, 2004: 93-94). North Korea's free 
health care system also ground to a halt. Lack of food led medical personnel to sell 
medicines in the black market, and lack of medicines caused patients to pay money for 
them dearly. Those who were not rich enough to go to hospital relied upon drugs 
circulating in the black market; however, a significant portion of the drugs was fake ones 
made by unqualified individuals (Jeong Wu-gon, 2004: 97). 
North Korea experienced widespread starvation and social disorder above all 
because of the discontinuance of food rationing by the state and the soaring rice price in 
the markets. According to Hwang Jang-yop, the former International Secretary of the 
Korean Workers’ Party, the Party estimated that up to 3.5 million people had died from 
starvation or hunger-related diseases (Hwang Jang-yop, 1999: 305). 92  Hundreds of 
thousands of North Koreans who tried to avoid malnutrition and starvation defected from 
the country. This led many people to die or imprisonment. Most defectors chose to cross 
the Yalu or Tumen Rivers into Jilin and Liaoning provinces in Northeast China. China 
considered defectors from North Korea as illegal economic migrants and refused to grant 
them refugee status. Therefore, if they were caught, they were repatriated back to face 
                                                 
2009: 231-256). 
92 Estimates on the number of deaths vary widely. Somewhere between 660,000 and 3.5 million 
people died from starvation or hunger-related causes, out of a total population of approximately 
21.5 million. For more information about famine in North Korea, see Smith (2005b); Haggard 
and Noland (2007); Woo-Cumings (2002); Lee Suk (2003); Goodkind, West, and Johnson 
(2011).    
166 
 
imprisonment in North Korean prison camps or even execution (Jeong Ji-hwan, 2012: 
139-142). 
During his speech at Kim Il-sung University in December 1996, Kim Jong-il 
admitted social turmoil due to the famine followed by malfunction of the existing system 
by saying “The food problem is creating chaos in society” (Hamm In-hee, 2004: 276). It 
was around this time that North Korean society, facing mass starvation, began to actively 
find a way to survive by itself.   
 
5.2. Marketisation and Weakening of the Party  
 
For Gramsci, an economic crisis can trigger structural changes only if mass consciousness 
for change exists and, without that, no structural change is possible. Thus, he believed 
that through ideological struggles structural changes occur (Carnoy, 1984: 79). However, 
in North Korea, there was no soil for alternative ideas. According to Kim Il-sung's ‘May 
25 Instructions’ in 1967, all North Koreans were forced to burn their books written by 
foreigners or donate them to libraries. After that, even books written by Marx or Lenin 
were hardly accessible to ordinary North Koreans and, before long, even Marx's 
materialistic dialectic disappeared from North Korean society (Hwang Jang-yop. 2010: 
174-186). The only idea left was Kim Il-sung's. The North Korea system, which was 
based upon the Party's monolithic ideology, the Juche Ideology of Kim Il-sung. 
Additionally, there were no political rivals to Kim Jong-il to compete for the correct 
implementation of the Juche Ideology as he monopolised the right to interpret his father's 
ideas and eradicated even potential challengers. There was no room for ideological or 
political alternatives to emerge. There was only space for an economic alternative. It was 
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the farmers' markets. 
At the farmers’ markets, which existed from 1958, the state allowed farmers to 
sell surplus farm products as an incentive to work harder. North Korea considered the 
market to be a necessary evil for social stability and also as complementing the state 
distribution network. In the middle of acute food shortages and the consequent easing of 
restrictions on freedom of travel, they were substantially expanded in number and scale. 
Most towns in North Korea had a farmers’ market which sold daily necessities and 
industrial products as well as farm products (Yang Moon Soo, 2011: 240). Besides, inside 
and outside the market, a black market was created where almost all goods in the farmers’ 
market were traded (Lee Mu-cheol, 2008: 105).93 Spontaneous marketisation from below 
spread far and wide.  
Prices in private markets were not dictated by the state, but determined by the 
laws of supply and demand. People deliberately sold goods in markets as they could sell 
at a much higher price than they sold to the state. There was a wide gap between statutory 
prices and market prices. For example, in 1998, the state regulated price of rice was only 
0.08 won per kilogram while the average price in the farmers’ market was 77 won. Almost 
every item showed a big gap between them, as Table 10 shows. 
 
Table 10. Difference between state-regulated prices and farmers’ markets prices in 1998 
(North Korean won) 
                                                 
93 There are four types of goods in supply in farmers' and black markets: 1. Private property 
such as clothing, tableware, and furniture. 2. Farm products and livestock farming products. 3. 
Industrial products produced or stolen. 4. Foreign products imported, smuggled, or donated by 
foreign countries or international organisations. See Yang Moon-Soo (2011: 240). 
Item Unit State-regulated Prices Prices in Farmers’ Mkt 
Rice 1 kg 0.08 77 
168 
 
 
Source: Yang Moon Soo (2004: 251). 
 
At the outset, North Koreans in their spare time sold their personal property or stolen 
goods from their workplaces to survive and support their families. As time went by, some 
who had retired or housewives fully engaged in peddling. Some workmen skipped work 
and conducted business in markets. In order to do that, they received fake medical 
documents from doctors in exchange for bribes or obtained permission from their bosses 
in return for money or contributions in kind (Jeong Wu-gon, 2004: 99, 104-105; Yang 
Moon Soo, 2004: 181). Soon, amongst those people, professional brokers appeared who 
purchased goods made in China in a border town or in a big city and sold them in a local 
market with large margins (Kim Chang-hui, 2004: 180-181). 
Marketisation made significant progress in the late 1990s as markets spread to 
every corner of the country (Yang Moon Soo, 2011: 181). The number of young and 
middle-aged men who took part in trade activities increased rapidly; as a result, on the 
whole, about 70 to 80 per cent of women and about 40 per cent of men engaged in market-
related activities (Chung Chung-gil and Jeon Chang-gon, 2000: 101). Not all of them 
worked as sellers. For example, some engaged in semi-legal or private farming, and some 
were employed in private businesses as hired workers (Lankov et al., 2013: 68). In 
everyday life, importance of the market was overwhelming as ordinary people obtained 
Flour 1 kg 0.06 61 
Pork 1 kg 9 181 
Egg 1 each 0.22 16 
Apple 1 each 0.1 23 
Salt 1 kg 0.13 36 
Beer 1 bottle 0.5 78 
TV 1 set 350 6,000~12,000 
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about 60 per cent of their grain and about 70 per cent of daily necessities from markets 
(Jeong Gwang-min, 2005: 8).  
Meanwhile, market-related activities contributed to the spread of information 
about the outside world to one of the most closed countries in the world (Lee Woo Young, 
2004: 357-359). In the past, the regime's tight grip on the media did not permit ordinary 
people to receive any foreign news unfiltered. However, eased restrictions on freedom of 
travel and the vitalization of the market allowed North Korean merchants who traded with 
Chinese counterparts or Korean-Chinese who frequently crossed the border to introduce 
outside information (Hamm In-hee, 2004: 286-287). In particular, radios, mobile phones, 
CDs and DVDs of South Korean films and dramas smuggled from China had serious 
repercussions. Some North Koreans adjusted their radios to pick up foreign broadcasts 
(Gaouette, 10 May 2012). Many North Koreans contacted their Korean-Chinese relatives 
or defectors living in China with mobile phones (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 24 January 
2005). South Korean films and dramas became so widespread across the country that the 
authorities launched frequent crackdowns on people to stop the inflow of information 
through these media because they were considered to be detrimental to regime security, 
given that they showed the South’s prosperity and much higher quality of life (Daily NK, 
2 November 2007). 
As the number of North Koreans who engaged in trade increased, more and more 
people stayed away from work and home. This not only meant that the Party found it 
difficult to manage enterprises, but it also weakened the Party’s everyday control over the 
people. All workers had to participate in Saenghwal Chonghwa regularly—at least once 
a week. In the meetings, people studied writings of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il and took 
part in self-criticism and mutual criticism sessions to evaluate if they had been living up 
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to the Ten Principles for the Establishment of the Party's Monolithic Ideological System 
(Kim Byoung-Lo, 2004: 155-156). As the number of people who went to work dropped 
sharply, the attendance rate for the review meeting plunged. Besides, most North Korean 
men and women above 14 years old affiliated themselves with extra-governmental 
organisations which connected the people with the Party and served as primary 
institutions of social control and socialization. The number of individuals who 
participated in the activities of extra-governmental bodies also shrank from the mid 
1990s.94 People’s poor participation in those Party activities severely debilitated the 
Party’s power and authority in North Korea as those were the key vehicles of the Party to 
control society.  
The weakening of the Party was detrimental to the dictatorship of the Kim family 
because it, most of all, signified the waning influence of the Juche Ideology in society. 
The consent mechanism of inculcating the Juche Ideology into people’s minds through 
the Party activities no more worked as before. Consequently, the legitimacy of the North 
Korean system was seriously undermined. The economic crisis was about to develop into 
a political crisis via the marketisation of society.  
In February 1999, North Korea attempted to close down all the farmers’ markets 
in the country and ordered people to return to work (Lee Mu-cheol, 2008: 107). The 
economy showed a marked improvement in late 1998 (Chung Young Chul, 2004: 294).95 
The North Korean state made use of this opportunity in order to ‘reabsorb the control that 
was slipping from its grasp’ (Gramsci, 1988: 218). However, the attempt ended up in 
                                                 
94 The numbers who participated in the Review Meeting and activities of extra-governmental 
bodies were nearly halved from the mid 1990s (Kim Keun-sik, 2004b: 178). 
95 Other than active trade in the market, a sharp increase of humanitarian aid from 1997 and 
large-scale inflow of capital for the Mt. Kumgang Project from 1998 contributed a lot to this 
economic recovery (Lee Young Hoon, 2005: 188-192). 
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failure, and the order soon became nominal. Marketisation turned out to be hard to control 
by the state. 
The response of society to survive the economic crisis brought negative 
consequences to the state by spreading uncensored information about the outside world 
and, most of all, sapping the traditional system of its everyday control over the people. 
Prevalent private transactions—which were for many North Koreans to survive and for 
some to gain profits—eroded the dependency of society on the state and loosened the 
tight grip of the Party on people. Nevertheless, the socialist state which could not 
distribute food had to tolerate them. 
Generally speaking, a dictatorship has an advantage over a democracy in coping 
with an economic crisis because it monopolises the definition of material reality. Material 
facts are not independent of the discursive frames that accord them meaning and 
significance (Sim Soek-Fang, 2006: 153-154). Any discussion about the cause of the 
economic crisis can only occur within the discursive limits set by the regime. The North 
Korean regime attempted to avoid responsibility by imputing the economic crisis to the 
fall of the Soviet Union, a series of natural disasters, the United States' threat to the North, 
to name a few. However, the disruption of information monopoly due to the influx of 
outside information and the weakening of social control by the state led Pyongyang to 
find practical measures—on top of the discursive remedies—such as Silli socialism and 
Seongun politics which will be detailed in the next section. 
 
5.3. Pyongyang's Countermeasures  
 
In October 1997, about three years after the death of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il became 
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the General Secretary of the KWP and, from September 1998, Kim Jong-il's era officially 
began with the revision of the Constitution. The new Constitution brought the Cabinet 
and the military to the forefront, instead of the Party. The Party congress, the most 
important political event in the socialist country, existed formally in the Kim Il-sung era 
as a rubber-stamping entity but it was not held at all in his son's era. The Central 
Committee of the Party, the chief policy-making body of the Party, was not convened 
from December 1993 until September 2010.96 The Party’s Central People's Committee 
(CPC), as an institutional link between the government and the Party, had made all 
important decisions on the economy, national defense, justice and security, and foreign 
affairs, etc. However, the once top executive body of North Korea was abolished in the 
revised Constitution (Kim Kap-sik, 2007: 10-11). 
The Cabinet became the head of the government and now had full responsibility 
and power to run the economy. It consisted of the Premier, Vice Premiers, and Ministers 
of the government and exercised control over all executive ministries. From the late 1980s, 
North Korea ascribed the economic depression to prioritizing politics over the economy 
and, thus, reduced direct intervention of the Party in the economy by degrees. From 1993, 
the state installed the State Administrative Council (SAC) under the supervision of the 
CPC and let it manage the economy in general with least intervention from the Party. 
Then, the Constitution of 1998 abolished the CPC and replaced the SAC with the re-
created Cabinet (Kim Kap-sik, 2007: 12).97 That is, from 1998, the Cabinet had the right 
                                                 
96 The 2010 September Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party was held to appoint Kim 
Jong-un vice chairman of the Central Military Commission to begin the process of succession as 
the next supreme leader of North Korea, following his father Kim Jong-il (Jeon Hyeon-jun, 
2010: 1-2). 
97 With the establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 1948, the Cabinet 
was set up and was institutionally independent from the Party. The 1972 Constitution abolished 
the Cabinet and instead set up the SAC which was supervised by the Party (Yunhap News, 
1999: 39). 
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to supervise and manage the national economy without direct intervention from the Party 
(Lee Yeong-hwa, 1999: 11). For instance, the Local People's Committee, responsible for 
local economies, was now controlled by the Cabinet and became independent of the local 
party.98  
The military grew into the main force in preserving the North Korean system. 
The 1992 Constitution made the National Defense Commission (NDC) an independent 
body and its chairman the supreme commander of the armed forces. In April 1993, Kim 
Il-sung transferred the chairmanship to his son. The new Constitution in 1998 stipulated 
the NDC as ‘the highest guiding organ of the military and the managing organ of military 
matters,’ which was followed by Kim Young Nam's endorsement of the post of the 
Chairman of the NDC as the highest position in North Korea in charge of all national 
policies of politics, economy, military, etc. (Ryoo Kihl-Jae, 2004: 185; Kim Chang-hui, 
2004: 154-155).99 These allowed Kim Jong-il to rule North Korea not as President but as 
Chairman of the NDC.100  
The Cabinet and the military became key institutions to implement Silli socialism 
and Seongun politics which were initiated to cope with nationwide social turmoil and 
international threats against the regime. Kim Jong-il considered the Party to be 
responsible for the economic crisis and inefficient to surmount the hardship. Instead, he 
empowered the Cabinet and the military to prevent the economic crisis from developing 
into a political crisis that could topple his regime. He strove to manage the crisis, on the 
                                                 
98 In addition, the prime minister of the Cabinet now represented the government as head of the 
government. See Choi Jinwook (1999: 7).  
99 Kim Young Nam was Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly and, 
according to the 1998 Constitution, he was the de facto head of state of North Korea (Choi 
Jinwook, 1999: 6). 
100 To commemorate his father, Kim Jong-il let the post of President remain vacant and 
proclaimed his father as Eternal President (Oh Il-hwan, 1999: 131). 
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one hand, by accommodating grassroots change through the Cabinet and, on the other 
hand, by strengthening the coercive measures of the military. Silli socialism and Seongun 
politics were embodied forms of these attempts. 
 
5.3.1. Silli socialism  
 
Gradually, in the midst of the economic crisis, North Korea began to emphasise 
productivity strongly in managing the economy. One of the explicit changes began in the 
agricultural sector with the reform of the sub-work team management system in 1996. 
Under the new system, the size of a work team unit was reduced from 10-25 to 7-8 
members, and the system allowed the members of a team to keep or sell any surplus 
products over the production quotas at their discretion. This was designed to enhance 
agricultural productivity by providing stronger material incentives.101 However, these 
measures failed because, most of all, a substantial number of products and factors of 
production drifted away from the public sector to the private sector and, accordingly, the 
state could not manage the economy properly. North Korea was in need of a major shift 
in economic policy.   
Silli, which means ‘utility’ or ‘practicality’, was first proclaimed in an editorial 
of Rodong Shinmun in September 1997 (Rodong Shunmun, 17 September 1997).102 The 
new idea was concretized the next year when the Cabinet was authorised to supervise and 
manage the economy independently from the Party. The Cabinet in 1998 initiated a 
                                                 
101 The sub-work team management system was established in 1965 by an instruction of Kim 
Il-sung while he visited Pochon Cooperative Farm (Yang Moon-Soo, 1999: 255).  
102 Rodong Shunmun is the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the ruling Korean 
Workers' Party. 
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reform in which it reduced the power of the party secretary, the presider of the Factory 
Management Committee, and gave more power to the manager in order to enhance 
economic effectiveness in operating a factory (Lee Mu-cheol, 2007: 327-328). The 
successful outcome of the measure on the basis of Silli, coupled with Kim Jong-il’s 
astonishment at the prosperity of Shanghai when he visited in January 2001, led him to 
proclaim Silli as an official economic policy guideline.103 In October 2001, he gave 
formal instructions to ‘seek the maximum utility and innovate economic management 
methods while sticking to the socialist principles’. Afterwards, the North Korea 
authorities defined Silli socialism as ‘seeking the maximum utility while sticking to the 
socialist principles’ and insisted that the priority target in economic activities should be 
to follow Silli socialism (Education Center for Unification, 2004: 180). North Korea then 
materialised Silli socialism as it adopted the so-called July 1 Measures for economic 
management improvement and sought to take advantage of the market as an integral part 
of its new economic approach. 
The July 1 Measures in 2002, first and foremost, were to normalise the economic 
system by returning food, daily necessities, currency and labour—which had illegally 
spilled over to the private sector—to the public sector. To this aim, North Korea adjusted 
the statutory prices of food and daily necessities to make them closer to the prices of the 
private markets. This increased all the prices drastically. For example, previously, 1 kg of 
rice was purchased by the government at 0.8 won and sold to the people at 0.08 won at 
the rationing centres. With the July 1 Measures, it was purchased at 40 won and sold at 
44 won at the rationing centres and markets. Furthermore, the wages of an average 
                                                 
103 Kim Jong-il described the change as ‘cataclysmic’ (Education Center for Unification, 2004: 
179).  
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manufacturing worker increased 18 times to 2000 won from 110 won, which could enable 
workers to make a living on their wages alone (Kim Yong-jo, 2006: 388). In addition, the 
authorities applied differential rates according to occupation, to provide bigger incentives 
for those who engaged in more intensive labour.104 The table below illustrates significant 
changes to commodity prices and wages in the wake of the July 1 Measures.  
 
Table 11. Changes in commodity prices and wages after the July 1 Measures (North 
Korean won) 
 
Classification Item/Type Unit Before After 
Increase 
Rate(times) 
Commodity 
Prices  
Rice 1 kg 0.08 44 550 
Corn 1 kg 0.07 33 471 
Pork 1 kg 7 170 24 
Soap 1  2 20 10 
Bus and  
Subway Fare 
1 time 0.1 2 20 
Electric Charges 1 kWh 0.035 2.1 60 
Wage 
Ordinary Worker monthly 110 2,000 18 
Heavy Worker 
(miner, etc.) 
monthly 240~300 6,000 20~25 
Source: Yang Moon Soo (2004: 258). 
 
In addition, the July 1 Measures aimed to expand the autonomy of an enterprise in order 
to enhance productivity. For this, North Korea granted the general right to operate an 
enterprise to the manager and strengthened the Independent Accounting System (IAS) in 
the direction of guaranteeing the autonomous disposal of surplus revenue. The latter was 
                                                 
104 The July 1 Measures, however, fell short of expectations because the state could not pay 
wages regularly due to its budget deficit, and skyrocketed demands and lack of goods provoked 
serious inflation (Yang Moon-Soo, 2004: 264).  
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intended both to increase the material incentives of workers and to relieve the financial 
burden on the state, as profits could be distributed amongst workers and the enterprise 
should meet all the relevant expenses for itself (Im Hyun-jin and Chung Young Chul, 
2004: 152-153). The IAS existed nominally in North Korea from the late 1940s as one of 
the fundamental management techniques of the socialist enterprise (Im Su-ho, 2008: 52-
53). The July 1 Measures enforced it practically and fully, which also empowered the 
manager who was responsible for the implementation of the IAS. 
North Korea insisted the July 1 Measures were intended to strengthen Urisik-
sahoejuui [Socialism of Our Own Style], but it could be seen to have introduced market 
mechanisms into North Korea officially for the first time. Formerly, in deciding the price 
of goods, the North followed the demand-based pricing system but, with the policy, it 
followed the balance between supply and demand in the market. Raising wages and 
adjusting prices of rice and daily necessities to a realistic level can be interpreted as 
accepting the supply and demand system of the market (Im Hyun-jin and Chung Young 
Chul, 2004: 152-153). Furthermore, the new policy permitted an enterprise to 
manufacture, distribute, and sell goods if materials were self-procured without any 
support from the state (Yang Moon Soo, 1999: 259-261). To facilitate this, North Korea 
set up a market for the exchange of materials between enterprises and allowed a certain 
percentage of products to be traded freely amongst them (Im Hyun-jin and Chung Young 
Chul, 2004: 153). 
These changes, however, were implemented for economic rehabilitation to 
maintain the regime, not to promote the welfare of the people. The hegemonic group 
strove to create a new system of control to reassert authority over the economy through 
giving greater weight to market rationality. The active utilization of material incentives 
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and the market was designed to normalise and protect the socialist economy which had 
been on the brink of destruction: it was a ‘reform within the socialist system’, not a 
‘reform of the system’ (Chung Young Chul, 2004: 303, Emphasis in original). For example, 
North Korea did not change its unique production process, in which all major decisions 
were made through collective discussions within the party committee which was directly 
controlled by the Party, not the Cabinet. It gave more power to the manager, but not 
absolute power (Lee Mu-cheol, 2007: 327-328). 
Nevertheless, Silli socialism was a major policy change in terms of managing the 
economy. In a broad sense, this policy can be interpreted as an extension of reform 
measures that had been conducted by Pyongyang before as it was to normalise the planned 
economic system by enhancing efficiency. And yet, it was noteworthy in that it was for 
the first time a change to acknowledge and utilize the market mechanism as afore-
mentioned. The state’s approval for the market mechanism began with its new wording 
of Silli around 1997, and the July 1 Measures was a reform to make use of the mechanism. 
The crisis was so severe that Pyongyang made the unprecedented decision of taking 
advantage of market power. 
Silli socialism turned out to be effective by sanctioning the change in which North 
Korea’s economics was increasingly ‘governed by the laws of supply and demand’ (Smith, 
2009: 245). Table 12 indicates that the North Korean economy started to recover from 
1998, although the recovery was not significant enough to bring most people back to their 
workplaces. The market mechanism, though in a limited sense, contributed to political 
stability by helping North Korean people to survive with reliance on the market in the 
situation that the state no longer provided the public distribution system properly. The 
economic rebound, however, was not solely due to active business activities of North 
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Koreans in the market but also to commercial and non-commercial transactions with 
foreign countries (Lee Young Hoon, 2005: 188-192). Nonetheless, the idea of Silli was 
critical here as well by allowing North Korea to take a positive and more open-minded 
stance toward the market and the outside world and, thus, enabling aid from and trade 
with foreign countries to play a more significant role in relieving people from starvation. 
For example, until the early 1990s, it was unimaginable to see products made in capitalist 
countries—most of them were smuggled or illegally appropriated from aid—displayed in 
the North Korean markets (Yang Moon Soo, 2011: 240). 
 
Table 12. Changes in the economic growth rate in North Korea (%) 
 
Source: Chung Young Chul (2004: 294). 
 
5.3.2. Seongun politics  
 
The term Seongun was first proposed by Kim Jong-il on 1 January 1995, but it was not 
an official policy of North Korea until 1998 in which Kim Jong-il was formally authorised 
to rule the country as Chairman of the NDC (Jeon Miyeong, 2009: 182-185). North Korea 
defines the military-first politics as the politics that ‘gives priority to the military affair 
and relies on the military as the pillar promoting revolution and socialist construction’ 
(Kim Jae-ho, 2000: 26). It was devised not only to defend the security of the regime from 
domestic and foreign threats by strengthening the coercive apparatus of the state, but also 
to conduct the restoration of the economy in a ‘revolutionary manner’ with the military 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Rate -3.5 -6.0 -4.2 -2.1 -4.1 -3.6 -6.3 -1.1 6.2 1.3 3.7 1.2 1.8 
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as a main agent.  
The military emerged as the only viable option to bring about social order in the 
mid 1990s. As the Party lost control of the everyday activities of the public, Kim Jong-il 
criticised it for not playing a proper role and urged it to emulate the military in engaging 
itself in political activities (Kim Jong-il, 2000: 255). Instead of the Party, he sought to 
make use of the military's strong discipline and organizing ability in preventing any 
popular uprising and other forms of opposition from below. This led the new Constitution 
to emphasise the role of the military and Kim Jong-il to rule the country as Chairman of 
the NDC (Smith, 2005a: 177). Here, the official title of Kim Jong-il as Chairman of the 
NDC indicated that, between the Cabinet and the military, the latter had a more central 
role in overcoming the crisis. 
In addition, the military-first politics was devised to protect the North Korean 
regime from possible threats by its own armed forces. Kim Jong-il perceived the collapse 
of the socialist regimes to have been attributable to the military’s sympathy with regime 
change (Choi Sun-ok, 2001: 16). Kim Jong-il attempted to prevent it by locating the 
military at the forefront of his rule and offering preferential treatment to it. Instead of 
distributing resources—which included relief goods by foreign countries—impartially, he 
allowed the military to take the lion's share.105 This did not mean that soldiers could 
receive enough food from the state. They also suffered harshly (Smith, 2005b: 154). 
However, compared with party officials, armed forces could get food more regularly 
(Jeong Wu-gon, 2004: 77-78). 
The end of the Cold War prompted North Korea to deem it imperative to be 
                                                 
105 Accordingly, foreign countries hesitated to provide aid for North Koreans as it could prop up 
the military which had posed serious security threats to themselves directly or indirectly. It was 
a dilemma that cannot be ignored. See Hwang Jang-yop (2001: 293). 
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militarily self-prepared to ward off threats, particularly, from the United States. The 
military-first politics was also an aggressive response to cope with threats from outside, 
and it was best embodied in Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile development. Besides, the 
North knew from experience that the development of nuclear weapons and long-range 
missiles could be a lucrative business. As early as 1992 North Korea negotiated with 
Israel over receiving money as economic compensation in return for discontinuing to 
export missiles to Arab countries. 106  Amid the economic crisis, Pyongyang utilised 
nuclear and long-range missile technologies not only to maintain regime security but also 
to obtain economic benefits (Park John and Lee Dong Sun, 2008: 269-295). Concretely, 
at the end of 1997, the United States demanded a special inspection of Kumchangri, near 
North Korea's border with China, where the Defence Intelligence Agency indicated that 
there might be some facilities operating for nuclear purposes. In response, North Korea 
from the beginning demanded economic compensation from the United States and 
permitted the inspection in exchange for approximately 500,000 tons of food.107 This 
displayed that one main, albeit not the primary, purpose of its nuclear development 
programme was to use it as a bargaining chip. The primary purpose of the North's nuclear 
and missile programmes may be the achievement of “a strategic breakout by altering the 
balance of power on the peninsula and in the region, enabling the Kim Jong Il regime to 
deal from a position of strategic deterrence” (Wright, 2001: 3-4 in Lee Chung Min, 2001: 
                                                 
106 Israel was persuaded to stop the negotiation by the United States after North Korea 
withdrew from the NPT in March 1993 (Choi Yong-hwan, 2005: 103-104). North Korea 
allegedly sold missiles to Libya, Syria, etc. and cooperated with Pakistan and Iran on the 
development of missile technology from the early 1990s (Im Gang-taek, 2000: 109-111). 
107 The inspection was performed in May 1999 but failed to find any nuclear-relate evidence 
(Choi Yong-hwan, 2005: 102-103). North Korea perceived the relations with the United States 
as the key to regime security and economic recovery. Therefore, it has called for two-party 
discussions with the United States, rather than the six-party talks with South Korea, China, 
Japan, Russia, and the United States. See Lee Jong-seok (2000: 358). 
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96). 
The nuclear and missile programmes were also used as domestic propaganda 
tools. Kim Jong-il presented the concept of Gangseongdaeguk [Strong and Prosperous 
Country] as the national goal in his era, and put forward the military as a critical means 
to realizing the ambitious goal (Rodong Shinmun, 22 August 1998).108 For instance, 
North Korea launched a long-range Daepodong missile on 4 September 1998, one day 
ahead of the 10th Supreme People’s Assembly that officially launched the Kim Jong-il 
regime. The North insisted that the test was a military symbol of building a strong and 
prosperous nation, and recordings of the tests were broadcast nationwide with 
exaggerated commendation (Park Hyun-hee, 2005: 264-265). Thus, North Korea’s 
nuclear and missile programmes served multiple purposes and, for that reason, it would 
not discard the programmes until the regime is relieved of security concerns at home and 
abroad, which is close to impossible.109  
Under the slogan of Seongun, Kim Jong-il expanded the role of the military to 
make soldiers actively participate in economic recovery as many civilians were absent 
from their workplaces to engage in trade. The military was regarded as the most workable 
option in the situation as Kim Jong-il referred to it as an ‘all-purpose sword’ (Choi 
Jinwook, 2005: 89). Soldiers took part in various economic activities: they were sent out 
as labourers to construction sites, state farms, etc. and as guards in major factories, 
                                                 
108 The concept includes three elements of political and ideological power, military power, and 
economic power. According to Prime Minster Hong Songnam, North Korea's political, 
ideological, and military power have secured its status as a ‘strong and prosperous nation’, 
which will be contributive to building up an ‘economically strong nation’ (Chung Young Chul, 
2004: 293). 
109 Lee argues that the assumption that North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons if the 
United States provides a security guarantee is a myth because Pyongyang's insecurity stems not 
only from external threats but also from the idiosyncrasies of its system (Lee Chung Min, 2007: 
15-22).  
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collective farms, and so on (Kim Chang-hui, 2004: 166).110 Thus, during the economic 
crisis, the military was not a burden but a pivotal actor in rehabilitating the national 
economy (Vorontsov, 26 May 2006). 
Furthermore, the military was at the front line when it came to earning foreign 
currency. In the mid 1990s, the budget crisis of the state led Kim Jong-il to allow the 
military to raise its own working funds. In response, the government soon transferred 
operating rights of a handful of collective farms, railways, factories, and enterprises to 
the military (Park Hyeong-jung, 2011: 224). However, the military was not satisfied with 
them so acted swiftly by setting up trading companies and opening branch offices 
throughout the country, as earning foreign currency was regarded as the most profitable 
business.111 The military was abundant in youth labour forces and means of transport and 
it took full advantage of them to gain hard currency. Before long, this lucrative business 
was dominated by top-ranking generals and their families. The armed forces’ active 
participation in commercial activities could be harmful in normalising and managing the 
economy in general. However, Pyongyang deemed it unavoidable as there was no 
alternative way to solve the financial problems of all the military units and organs (Park 
Hyeong-jung, 2010: 271-278). 
Seongun politics brought about many changes in the power structure to the 
advantage of the military, and yet Kim Jong-il did not throw up the reins. He made it clear 
                                                 
110 For example, a lot of construction projects were completed by soldiers such as Anbyeon 
Youth Power Plant and many pharmacy and porcelain product lines. Also numerous chicken, 
ostrich, and catfish farms were made by soldiers (Jeon Miyeong, 2009: 196). 
111 For the same reason the State Security Department, above all other agencies, also engaged in 
trade and earned a lot of money. The State Security Department is the secret police of North 
Korea reporting directly to Kim Jong-il. It is an autonomous agency and responsible for 
enforcing the monolithic ideological system to strengthen dictatorship. It also has border-
policing functions. For more information about the State Security Department, see North Korea 
Leadership Watch. 
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that the military was still subordinate to and under the control of the Party. North Korea 
made sure that the military was guided by the Party, and the military-first politics was 
implemented on the condition that the armed forces must be faithful to the guidelines of 
the Party in order not to preserve the authority of the Party per se within the military, but 
to make the military be controlled closely by Kim Jong-il through the Party (Goh Sang-
jin, 1999: 18). The party organs operated regularly in the military, unlike in the civilian 
sector. In particular, the General Political Bureau of the Korean People's Army (KPA), 
the supreme organ of the Party within the military, controlled the Army with its countless 
political commissars which existed in every military unit down to the company level (Kim 
Kap-sik, 2007: 18-19). Furthermore, Kim Jong-il intensified control of the military during 
the period of the military-first politics. He personally checked the Army on a daily basis 
via three individual party organs: the Guidance Department of the Central Committee of 
the Party, the Military Committee of the Party, and the General Political Bureau of the 
KPA (Kim Yeong-su, 2004: 325). The military could not stage a coup, not only because 
of the preferential treatment it received, but also because of the highly-intensive control 
through the party organs. The military-first politics did not mean that the military replaced 
the Party. It was a provisional solution to prevent the collapse of North Korea’s system 
amid the dwindling power of the Party.112  
  
5.4. Conclusion: Changes in the Historical Bloc  
 
                                                 
112 By the same token, North Korea did not replace the Juche ideology with the ideas of the 
military-first politics. The North emphasized that the military-first politics was deeply rooted in 
the Juche ideology and that it was a method to materialize demands of the ideology in new 
circumstances (Jeon Yeong-ho, 2006: 29-30). 
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The existing historical bloc of North Korea underwent many changes, as described above. 
In this conclusion, I will recapitulate the changes to each component of the historical bloc 
one by one, as I did in the previous chapter. To begin with, the economic structure had 
one major change: the introduction of the market mechanism. Pyongyang implemented a 
series of reform measures under the banner of Silli socialism, which included the 
introduction of the market mechanism. As the state no longer operated the public 
distribution system properly, it had to overlook the expansion of the market and 
eventually accepted the market mechanism, albeit in a limited sense. The reform, however, 
remained a reform within the existing system, which manifested itself in the continuation 
of autarkist Soviet Fordism; even though the reform gave more power to the manager, it 
was still the party secretary that made key decisions in production management.  
The North Korean state was still the Stalinist state. Owing to the disastrous 
economic crisis and the ensuing weakening of the Party, the role of the supreme leader 
vis-à-vis the Party was strengthened. Then, were characteristics of the Stalinist state 
deepened? No, they were not. One of the central premises of the Stalinist state is the 
communist party's tight grip on society. In that context, as the degree of social control 
diminished, the North witnessed the weakening of the Stalinist state. As a countermeasure, 
instead of the Party, the hegemonic group strove to regain control over society mainly 
with the help of the military under the flag of Seongun politics. Civil society was still 
controlled by the state but the degree of control was also decreased because of the 
economic crisis. For example, the state's clout over society using extra-governmental 
organisations dwindled as less and less people participated in the political activities of the 
organizations. 
The Juche Ideology remained the only ideology of North Korea. In the course of 
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overcoming the economic crisis, Pyongyang proposed Urisik-sahoejuui, Silli, Seongun, 
Gangseongdaeguk, and so on. These were all complements to, not replacements of, the 
Juche Ideology. However, the legitimacy of the Juche Ideology was severely undermined 
because the North Korean system failed to provide economic rewards for people's loyalty 
to the Kim family. Above all, the mechanism that injected the ideology into people's 
minds was significantly impaired as, above all, the number of people who participated in 
the Party activities such as the Review Meeting on Everyday Life and activities of extra-
governmental organisations dropped significantly.  
Even though the severity of the economic crisis of North Korea was much higher 
than that of South Korea, the existing hegemonic group maintained both hegemony and 
political power. With regard to the constituents of the hegemonic group, military generals 
and high-ranking government officials could wield more power than before vis-à-vis 
high-ranking party officials, even though the military and the Cabinet were still controlled 
by the Party. However, the weakened power of the Party was not tolerable on a long-term 
basis because the Party's everyday control over society was vital for the maintenance of 
hegemony.  
The (once successfully established and maintained) consent mechanism in which 
North Korean people were deeply inculcated with the Juche Ideology into believing that 
only Kim Il-sung and his successor were legitimate leaders in the North was debilitated 
with the weakening of the Party. Even though Pyongyang relied mainly on the coercion 
of the military to prop up the existing system and succeeded in it in the short term, 
coercion alone cannot sustain the system. Only when North Korean people accept the 
legitimacy of the absolute rule of the Kim dynasty can the current hegemonic rule be 
preserved. For that reason, the normalisation of the economy was crucial because that 
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would enable ordinary people to actively participate in the Party activities and normalise 
the consent mechanism in the end.  
North Korea had taken a series of noticeable reform measures to enhance 
economic efficiency on its own; nevertheless, they failed to produce satisfactory results 
sufficient to bring most people back to their workplaces, as the reforms were limited for 
fear of out-of-control capitalization and liberalisation. The hegemonic group, accordingly, 
required support from outside in forms of aid, trade or compensation which were 
considered to be more manageable. This was one of the central reasons why North Korea 
began to have a strong interest in the reconciliation with South Korea, which will be 
specified in Chapter VII.  
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Part III. Inter-Korean Reconciliation as Hegemonic Projects 
 
Chapter VI. Reconciliation with North Korea  
   
Inter-Korean relations have been closely related to hegemonic struggles in South Korea, 
and the policy toward North Korea before 1998 was the corollary of the interaction 
between anti-Communism and the hegemonic group's interests. Anti-Communism 
provided members of the hegemonic group with the ideological unity and it was their 
raison d'etre in a divided Korea. And yet, the group could not disregard nationalistic 
aspirations for unification of the Korean people. Therefore, it had to tread the tricky path 
between anti-Communism and nationalism all the time, and yet before 1998 it slanted 
severely in favour of anti-Communism which was correlated to the Chaebol-friendly 
exportist Fordism.   
The economic crisis in 1997 was an organic crisis that exportist Fordism in the 
early stages of neoliberalisation yielded. The organic crisis led liberal nationalists led by 
Kim Dae-jung to be the ruling political group from 1998. However, the existing 
hegemonic group, though weakened, maintained its hegemony. Because the ruling 
political group accommodated neoliberalism and acknowledged the role of the Chaebol 
in economic development, its chief difference from the hegemonic group was its stance 
toward North Korea. As inter-Korean reconciliation can damage the hegemonic group's 
ideological leadership of anti-Communism and garner public support by realizing the 
people’s long-held nationalistic aspirations, the counter-hegemonic group pursued it as a 
means to obtain hegemony. 
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The following section begins with the accounts of Seoul’s North Korean policy 
before 1998, which demonstrates that the policy contributed to the hegemonic group’s 
maintaining hegemony. Then, it identifies the ruling political group. This thesis argues 
that the group was made up of liberal nationalists. Explanations of why liberal nationalists 
became the most powerful counter-hegemonic force will be provided here. The next 
section will show the process of the inter-Korean reconciliation from 1998 to 2002 as a 
hegemonic project initiated by the new ruling political group. Then, consequences of the 
reconciliation on domestic hegemonic struggles will be presented. This chapter ends with 
a summary. 
  
6.1. North Korean Policy before 1998 
  
After independence, a number of social forces tried to achieve unification through inter-
Korean talks but all their schemes went awry. For example, in 1946, center-right Kim 
Kyu-shik and center-left Yuh Woon-hyung pushed ahead with the nationwide 
collaboration between leftists and rightists. It was initiated by the USAMGIK who sought 
to rally a national support embracing all ideological forces, but it was also a result of 
efforts by leftist and rightist nationalists who strove to unite all social forces to establish 
a single government on the Korean peninsula. In April 1948, nationalist Kim Gu with his 
companion Kim Kyu-shik went to North Korea to have unification talks with Kim Il-sung 
to prevent the permanent division of the peninsula. Their efforts failed because, by the 
time of the talks, each Korea had almost finished all the preparations to establish separate 
governments (Jeong Hae-gu, 1995: 273-275).   
Rhee Syngman and anti-communists, in contrast, claimed that the communist 
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government in North Korea was illegitimate because, say, the electoral process by 
communists in the North was not sanctioned by the United Nations. According to them, 
the government in the North was a mere anti-government organisation and, therefore, 
there should be no inter-governmental talks on the Korean peninsula and the unauthorised 
communist regime should collapse. It was against this backdrop of ideological tension 
that Rhee Syngman claimed for unification by force. His plan was, first, to establish a 
separate government in the South and, second, to strengthen the capabilities of military 
and police forces and, third, to retake the northern region of Korea by force if communists 
in the North resisted (Shim Ji-yeon, 2005: 35). 
While the Rhee administration externally showed open hostilities towards 
communists, it internally made use of the hostile relationship with the North for its own 
benefit. For example, in May 1949, the state arrested thirteen members of the National 
Assembly, including Deputy Speaker Kim Yak-su. They had proposed the Seven 
Principles for Peaceful Unification, such as the withdrawal of foreign forces and inter-
Korean talks for peaceful unification. They were subjected to trial and punishment on the 
charge of espionage because their proposals were similar to those of North Korea and 
they allegedly contacted communists (Choi Jang-jip, 2005: 68). However, in fact, they 
had to be jailed in a rush because they were core members of the Special Committee for 
Prosecution of Anti-National Offenders which had been organised to investigate 
behaviour by pro-Japanese collaborators during the colonial period (Kim Jin-guk, 2000: 
66-70; Choi Yong-beom, 2008: 431-433). As vigorous activities of the committee would 
seriously undermine the political base of the ruling group, i.e., rightists, most of whom 
had been pro-Japanese collaborators before independence and were anti-communists after 
independence, the committee needed to be dissolved, and the arrest was carefully 
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designed for that purpose. The so-called Gukhoe-ppeurakjji-sageon [National Assembly 
Spy Incident] played a critical role in anti-Coummunists' attaining hegemony in the South 
as their unclean pasts during the colonial period were erased or ignored with the 
dissolution of the committee primarily due to the incident.  
The Korean War jeopardized the safety of the regime but yet provided a great 
opportunity to Rhee Syngman and his Liberal Party. They forged a political system that 
guaranteed Rhee's long hold on power through constitutional amendments in 1952 and 
1954 after the arrests of opposition politicians who were framed as communists. Those 
undemocratic behaviours were justified as measures to protect the South from the threat 
of communism (Suh Jung-seok, 2007: 60-61; Jeong Hae-gu, 1995: 278-279). The horrible 
experience of war against communist North Korea made anti-Communism spread widely 
and rapidly in society and, consequently, the ruling political group's ideologically driven 
leadership helped its establishing dictatorship in the South.  
Rhee Syngman openly used anti-communism in the name of security and cracked 
down on any figures who claimed peaceful unification or even inter-Korean talks (Korea 
Human Rights Foundation, 2006: 59). One example was the execution of Cho Bong-am 
on the charges of high treason and conspiring with the North. He was the runner-up of the 
1956 presidential election in which he won about 30 per cent of the total votes in the 
election even though it was severely rigged.113 Cho established the Progressive Party on 
a platform of peaceful unification but this became the ground upon which the ruling 
political group accused him of being a communist sympathizer as his plan was to achieve 
                                                 
113 Officially, the number of votes Rhee Syngman received in the Kangwon Province was more 
than 90 per cent of the total votes. However, according to the testimony of Choi In-kyu after the 
April 19 Revolution, Cho Bong-am actually received more than 70 per cent in the province (Suh 
Jung-seok, 1999: 147-148). 
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unification by peaceful means, different from the official unification method by Rhee. He 
was also accused of receiving funds and directed by North Korea when he founded the 
party and ran the election campaign in 1956. These accusations were proven fabricated 
by Rhee to eliminate his biggest political rival at that time (Hankyoreh, 21 January 2011; 
Andrei, 9 January 2011). 
The collapse of the first republic by the April 19 Revolution gave rise to the 
explosion of unification movements in society. The mounting demand for unification led 
progressive parties, such as the Socialist Party and the Socialist Public Party, and 
progressive civic organizations, to form the Central Council for Autonomous National 
Unification for peaceful unification based upon the principles of autonomy, peace, and 
democracy (Son Ho-cheol, 1999: 356). Many student activist groups also conducted 
unification movements. They formed the Union of National Unification on 18 November 
1960, suggested an inter-Korean student conference, and went ahead with the plan for 
South-North student exchanges (Yu Jae-il, 1995: 448-449).  
The North Korean policy of the Rhee administration was welcomed and 
supported by the fledgling hegemonic group members. The ruling political group created 
and nurtured the Chaebol, say, by transferring state properties once owned by the Japanese 
for next to nothing, provided various preferences such as giving import licenses to 
selected people, and stifled voices for labour rights. In return, it received political funds 
and bribes which were used to reinforce the police and the military, key means to support 
the undemocratic regime. Ruling politicians and Chaebols attained and enlarged their 
profits by strongly advocating anti-Communism and severely suppressing socialists, 
nationalists, and labour activists, which were in line with hostile policy toward communist 
North Korea. Besides, hostile North Korean policy was also used to attract more 
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American aid, the sole reliance to materially sustain the anti-communist structure, by 
showing that the South Korean state was successfully performing its role as a bulwark 
against Communism in East Asia. 
Unlike Park Chung-hee who utilized inter-Korean relations in a 
multidimensional way, Rhee Syngman exclusively suppressed nationalistic aspirations 
for peaceful unification. This caused the gushing of enthusiasm for unification in society 
after the collapse of his regime. The voices for peaceful unification demanded cooperation 
with communists in the North and consequently made the Second Republic unstable and 
even chaotic, which led people at home and abroad to be anxious for national security of 
the South. This gave a good excuse for the military coup d’état by Park in 1961. Also, the 
instant approval of the United States for Park's regime would not have been obtained 
without Washington's concern in 1960-1961 over the security of South Korea and over 
the possibility of its being communized by North Korea. 
The rise of Park Chung-hee was a counteraction to the unification movements 
and the precarious position of anti-Communism in society by the hegemonic group. Park 
seized power under the pretext of protecting South Korea from the threat of communist 
North Korea and implemented a series of measures that strengthened the anti-communist 
structure in the South, such as the enactment of the NSL in June 1960 and the 
establishment of the KCIA in June 1961 (Suh Jung-seok, 2007: 91-97). These were soon 
utilised as main instruments to suppress voices calling for democracy as well as to crack 
down on unification movements from below.  
At this juncture, armed provocations by the North were of great help to Park’s 
establishing dictatorship. North Korea, for instance, sent 31 guerillas in January 1968 to 
assassinate Park and infiltrated 121 guerillas into Kangwon Province from October to 
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November in 1968 to gain a foothold upon which to carry out anti-government activities 
in the South. The North's provocative actions provided a good pretext for Park to raise 
the level of statist mobilisation. For example, the South Korean government established 
the Homeland Reserve Forces for regional defense in April 1968 and required male high 
school and university students to receive military training and female high school students 
to learn emergency nursing skills from March 1969. Escalating security threats from 
North Korea formed a social consensus that could accept the abuse of political power for 
the safety of the people, which eventually made possible the constitutional amendment 
that allowed the incumbent president to run for a third term in September 1969 (Lee Jong-
Seok, 1995b: 149-159).114 
It was the Nixon Doctrine of the United States in July 1969 that made President 
Park change his North Korean policy. The doctrine stated that a nation assumes ‘the 
primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense’.115 Park Chung-hee 
deemed it critical to improve relations with North Korea because he interpreted the 
doctrine as a signal that Washington would reduce U.S. forces in South Korea in the near 
future—in fact, about 20,000 American troops were withdrawn in March 1971 (Kim Se-
kyun, 2006: 127).   
On 15 August 1970 Park Chung-hee announced the plan of peaceful unification 
that urged competition in good faith between South and North Korea. This was the first 
time that the South Korean government ever acknowledged the North Korean government. 
                                                 
114 Security issues were not necessarily related to a gesture for inter-Korean reconciliation. For 
example, South Korea detected a big underground tunnel excavated by North Korea in October 
1978, but proposed unconditional inter-Korean talks in January 1979 (Koh Byung Chul, 2005: 
49). It was the period when the Park Chung-hee administration suffered harshly due to the 
economic downturn. 
115 About the contents of the Nixon Doctrine, see Nixon Doctrine available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Nixon_Doctrine.html (accessed 3 
March 2013). 
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About a year later, he made it clear that Seoul would engage itself in inter-Korean talks 
(Jeon Sang-bong, 2007: 81). Soon the two Koreas agreed to hold the South-North Red 
Cross conference, which was realised from September 1971. Furthermore, after a series 
of secret contacts between envoys from Seoul and Pyongyang, both Koreas in 1972 
announced the July 4th Joint Communiqué in which they agreed to the three unification 
principles of ‘autonomy, peace, and great national solidarity’ (Research Association for 
Korean History, 1992: 392-393). 116  Only during this period did the South Korean 
governent permit unification movements in society, albeit in a limited manner.  
The positive stance on unification, however, turned out to be a politically 
motivated action. The ruling political group used the issue of unification as a means to 
strengthen dictatorship. When Park Chung-hee announced the Yusin system to be a 
president-for-life in October 1972, he justified his iron rule with the pretext of building a 
solid foundation for peaceful unification (Kim Jae-hong, 2012: 17). In fact, connecting 
the July 4th Joint Communiqué with the reinforcement of Park's dictatorship had already 
been heralded by Director of the KCIA Lee Hu-rak when he repeated the necessity of 
much stronger political system to push ahead with inter-Korean talks at the press 
conference right after the announcement of the communiqué (Koh Byung Chul, 2005: 46-
47). 
The US policy towards Asia in the early 1970 included the reduction of US 
Forces in South Korea and the easing of tensions on the Korean peninsula in line with 
détente with communist China. This collided with South Korea’s hostilities towards 
                                                 
116 The communiqué was formulated in a hurry for domestic political gain and thus made many 
concessions to North Korea. For example, the principles of ‘autonomy’ and ‘great national 
solidarity’ have been frequently used by North Korea as a ground to claim for the withdrawal of 
U.S. troops from the South. 
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communist North Korea and its socio-political system based upon anti-Communism and, 
consequently, bred discord between Washington and Seoul. The South’s responses were 
Jajugukbang-ron [the discourse of self-reliance of national defense] and the attempt to 
develop nuclear weapons. Park Chung-hee, in an address on 15 August 1971, said that 
the future of the Korean peninsula depended not upon the Great Powers or international 
situations but upon the South’s independent efforts and autonomous resolution (Min 
Kyeong-wu, 2006: 45-46). Thus, Park emphasized Juche [independence] and Jaju 
[autonomy] to refuse the new world order led by the United States, which was analogous 
to Kim Il-sung's calling for Juche in the late 1950s when he sought political independence 
from the Soviet Union and China. 
The détente in East Asia in the early 1970s was positive for peace on the Korean 
peninsula, but the ruling political group in Seoul reckoned it disadvantageous to its 
maintaining the Cold War structure in South Korea. Park Chung-hee chose three 
directions in response, as aforementioned: reconciliation with the North, independence 
from the United States, and strengthening dictatorship in the South. For those aims, he 
emphasized minjok [nation]. As the new international situation was not contributing to 
his rule, Park appealed to independence and autonomy of the Korean nation, drawing a 
line of demarcation between South Korea and the United States. However, as his usage 
of minjok was intended to reinforce his dictatorship, rather than to enhance the welfare of 
the Korean nation or to realise the unification of the two Koreas, his nationalism was 
‘anti-nationalistic’ as Min Kyeong-wu (2006: 47) pointed. This was also analogous to 
Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il's usage of minjok, in which they used the term primarily to 
consolidate the dictatorship by the Kim family in the North.  
There was a striking difference in the United States’ Asian policy between the 
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1960s and the 1970s. However, the hegemonic group took advantage of both to strengthen 
its power by relying on anti-Communism. In line with the United States’ political and 
military policies in the 1960s, South Korea normalised diplomatic relations with Japan 
and participated in the Vietnam War. These worsened inter-Korean relations, and North 
Korea responded with a more aggressive South Korean policy including the excessive 
military buildup which ultimately resulted in a number of armed provocations. And yet, 
these developments contributed to reinforcing the rightist groups’ hegemony in the South. 
For example, the ruling party politicians, including ex-military politicians such as Park 
Chung-hee, strengthened political power on the pretext of the provocations of the North 
from the late 1960s, and the Chaebol rapidly grew bigger from the early 1960s as a main 
beneficiary of Tokyo's ODA loans and of Washington's support for South Korean private 
sector's overseas expansion. Contrastively, the 1970s was the era of détente. The ruling 
political group, however, used it to reinforce dictatorship, instead of earnestly 
endeavouring to realise peaceful unification by talks. As a measure to resist the US-led 
détente, Park emphasized independence and self-defense, and the resulting heavy 
chemical industry drive served as another momentum for the Chaebols' rapid growth. In 
the process, the fear of communisation was actively used to obtain consent from society 
to the statist mobilisation and the concentration of political and economic power in the 
hands of a few. 
In January 1982, Chun Doo-whan announced the National Reconciliation and 
Democratic Unification Plan which elaborated the existing two-Korea policy. This rather 
abrupt announcement was designed to make up for his lack of legitimacy due to the Coup 
d'état of December Twelfth and the Gwangju Massacre. The unification plan was not 
accepted positively by nationalists in South Korea and the North Korean government as 
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it was basically to perpetuate the division (Jeong Hae-gu, 1995: 291).  
It was in 1984 when Seoul decided to accept Pyongyang's offer to provide relief 
goods to those who suffered from severe flooding in the South that inter-Korean talks 
began. Before long, both Koreas witnessed economic talks in 1984, Red Cross talks in 
1985, and so on. It was noteworthy that in the autumn of 1985 Director of KCIA Jang Se-
dong of South Korea and Secretary for South Korean Affairs Heo Dam of North Korea 
met together several times to discuss having an inter-Korean summit (Min Kyeong-wu, 
2006: 79-80). The summit was proposed by Chun to shore up the legitimacy of his rule.  
He had been afflicted with a lack of legitimacy all the way since the coup and the massacre 
and considered the summit would generate a reversal of the situation. However, the inter-
Korean talks were discontinued in January 1986 as Pyongyang suspended all talks as it 
realized that the summit could be interpreted for North Korea to approve the Chun 
administration and its atrocities in Gwangju.117 After the ruling political group failed to 
utilise nationalistic aspirations in society by having an inter-Korean summit, it relied upon 
the fear of communisation again to quell discontent over its undemocratic rule. From 
October 1986, the South Korean government escalated the fear of communist attack by 
exaggerating and distorting the facts about North Korea's Mt. Kumgang Dam: it 
announced that the dam had been built to inundate Seoul before the 1988 Summer 
Olympics. This was intended to oppress pro-democracy movements that were spreading 
nationwide rapidly at that moment (Lee Jong-seok, 1995: 150). 
The Roh Tae-woo administration took an active approach towards North Korea 
based upon changes in external and internal circumstances. Externally, it was the period 
                                                 
117 Pyongyang's official justification for the discontinuence was that the Team Spirit, the annual 
South Korea-U.S. military exercise, was inconsistent with dialogue for reconciliation (Jeong 
Hae-gu, 1995: 292). 
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of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, which eventually brought 
about the end of the Cold War at the Malta summit in December 1989. The easing of 
tension with the communist giant led Washington to pass the Nunn-Warner amendment 
in July 1989 which demanded a three-stage U.S. troop reduction on the Korean peninsula 
from 1990 (Min Kyeong-wu, 2006: 141). Internally, the democratization in 1987 
triggered the eruption of unification movements in society, such as university students’ 
large-scale demonstrations to hold inter-Korean student talks on 15 August 1988. In the 
midst of these pressures at home and abroad, the ruling political group tried to take the 
initiative with the July 7th Declaration in 1988 that called for inter-Korean exchanges and 
cooperation. This was followed by its Nordpolitik that sought for diplomatic 
normalizations with communist countries and, in the end, the realisation of unification 
with North Korea. Also, the government announced the principle of a ‘single-window’ in 
negotiations with North Korea to stifle exuberant demands for reconciliation with the 
North from below (Kim Ji-hyung, 2012: 171-172). 
Roh Tae-woo’s North Korean policy was different from his predecessors’, 
particularly during the first half of his presidency. An example was the Korean National 
Commonwealth Unification Plan in September 1989 that incorporated confederation 
based unification formula which officially approved the North Korean communist system 
for the first time (Kim Ji-hyung, 2012: 176).118 Apparently, the shift of North Korean 
policy to the direction of reconciliation was similar to that of the Park Chung-hee 
administration in the early 1970s that started inter-Korean talks to cope with the détente 
                                                 
118 As the confederation based unification formula had been claimed by opposition leader Kim 
Dae-jung, opposition parties also welcomed the unification plan, and it has been the official 
unification plan of the South Korean government since then. This indicated that a bipartisan 
agreement on the North Korean policy can survive transfer of political power. 
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and the subsequent reduction of U.S. forces from South Korea. However, while the 
achievements in inter-Korean relations in the Park Chung-hee era were blatantly used to 
strengthen autocracy, those in the Roh Tae-woo era, such as the Basic Agreement on 
Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation in 1992, were not utilized 
to suppress the opposition forces, at least explicitly. 
The inter-Korean talks ended at the end of 1992. Officially, it was the Team Spirit 
exercise again that was taken as an excuse by the North to discontinue the talks. However, 
the end of the South-North dialogue was also the result of the South Korean hegemonic 
group's resistance to the reconciliation with the North. During the 8th round of high-level 
inter-Korean talks in August 1992, Lee Dong-bok, special advisor of the Agency for 
National Security Planning (ANSP), a predecessor of the NIS, ignored and even 
fabricated presidential directives and consequently led the talks to end fruitlessly. 
President Roh ordered that the South Korean delegates should concede the issue of the 
repatriation of Lee In-mo, the unconverted long-term prisoner who had been in prison for 
34 years in South Korea, for the issue of the reunion of family members separated after 
the Korean War. However, the actual directive conveyed to the delegates in Pyongyang 
said that no agreement should be made until North Korea agreed to the issue of the 
reunion of the family members (Sisa Journal, 10 June 1993; Kim Yeon-chul, 2009; Kim 
Ji-hyung, 2012: 184; Min Kyeong-wu, 2006: 111). Interestingly, Lee Dong-bok was not 
punished. The incident rather raised his status as an anti-communist to the backbone. 
There were many powerful figures who protected and helped him, so he could easily get 
away with what he did. He just left office in 1993 but became a member of the National 
Assembly in 1996 (Han Wan-sang, 31 July 2012). 
There had been two groups in the state bureaucracy with regard to North Korean 
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policy: one was a pro-reconciliation (or nationalist) group and the other was an anti-
reconciliation group. Changes in the international and domestic arenas led to the rise of 
pro-reconciliation bureaucrats—such as Kim Jong-hwi, presidential secretary for foreign 
affairs and national security, and Lim Dong-won, deputy secretary of the Board of 
National Unification—who were very active in the process of the inter-Korean 
reconciliation from the late 1980s. However, there were still more bureaucrats who were 
anti-communists and thus strongly opposed reconciliation with the North (Min Kyeong-
wu, 2006: 110-111). They deemed that the reconciliation would conflict with their 
ideology and interests, so even ignored laws as was the case of the manipulation of 
presidential directives in 1992. As the North Korean nuclear issue broke, the anti-
reconciliation group regained ascendancy and many members of the pro-reconciliation 
group had to resign from government service. Amongst them, Lim Dong-won later played 
a key role in reconciling with North Korea during the presidency of Kim Dae-jung. His 
case was similar to that of Lee Hun-jai who had been ousted for his anti-Chaebol stance 
but returned as head of the powerful FSC in 1998. 
Kim Young-sam at the early stages of his presidency seemed to be interested in 
reconciling with North Korea by repatriating Lee In-mo to North Korea without any 
condition (Jeon Sang-bong, 2007: 94). However, his gesture of reconciliation was a one-
off. In June 1994, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter visited North Korea and met Kim 
Il-sung to resolve the nuclear issue. Then, Kim Il-sung expressed the hope that he wanted 
to have a summit with President Kim Young-sam. Kim in the South instantly accepted 
the offer, and both Koreas agreed to have a summit on 25 July. However, the summit was 
not realized as Kim Il-sung died on 8 July. Afterwards, inter-Korean relations were 
worsened drastically as the South Korean government refused to express condolences on 
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his death, did not allow any South Korean figures to express them, and even imprisoned 
some of those who wanted to attend the funeral in Pyongyang. Also, on the day of his 
funeral, Seoul published a Russian document indicating that Kim Il-sung started the 
Korean War and argued that he was a war criminal (Koh Byung Chul, 2005: 60-61). 
Furthermore, in an address on 15 August 1994, Kim Young-sam said that liberal 
democracy had finally won the war against communism and unification (by absorption) 
might come suddenly. His remarks were vigorously echoed by conservative media outlets 
that predicted the imminent collapse of the North Korean regime (Min Kyeong-wu, 2006: 
174-175). 
On 7 October 1994, in the midst of negotiations between the United States and 
North Korea in Geneva, Kim Young-sam publicly criticised the Clinton administration 
that it assumed a compliant attitude towards the North without understanding the true 
nature of the communists—that is, North Korea was not an entity to be negotiated with 
(Min Kyeong-wu, 2006: 167-169). The ruling political group's hardline position against 
Pyongyang was a counteraction to the improving relations between the United States and 
North Korea, which could significantly undermine the domestic historical bloc and thus 
could be detrimental to the interests of the hegemonic group. The hardline stance of Seoul 
did not affect much the negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang, which resulted 
in the Agreed Framework in 21 October 1994. However, the North's responses to the 
hostilities of the South were good grounds to emphasize the necessity to strengthen anti-
Communism in South Korean society. 
Why did South Korea see worsening inter-Korean relations during the presidency 
of Kim Young-sam? This thesis considers the deterioration of inter-Korean relations as a 
counteroffensive by the hegemonic group, and the symptom began from 1990, in the latter 
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half of the presidency of Roh Tae-woo. The early 1990s coincided with a time of the 
resurgence of hegemonic anti-communists who once hit hard by the democratisation and 
labour movements in 1987. In 1990, the ruling politicians regained their political power 
by the merger of three parties. Around this time, Chaebols also regained full control of 
the national economy which was once considerably challenged by the labour union after 
1987. The hostile North Korean policy was vital to strengthen the hegemonic group’s 
anti-Communism.  
 In general, North Korean policy before 1998 was the interplay of anti-
Communism and the hegemonic group's interests. The ruling party politicians needed 
antagonistic relations with North Korea to consolidate their political power by stressing 
and exaggerating threats from the North. Chaebols who made gains through cheap labour 
supported hostile policies against communist North Korea, which were interlinked with 
the oppression of socialists and labour activists. Conservative media outlets were 
supportive of the policies, working as a trumpeter for the government, and yet it also 
reflected their owners' political stand as anti-communists. They were supported by anti-
reconciliation bureaucrats who made up the majority of the state bureaucracy. The 
behaviours of each member of the group were justified by anti-Communism, and they 
were connected with each other by ideological unity.  
 
6.2. New Ruling Political Group – Liberal Nationalists  
 
There had been a number of counter-hegemonic social forces in the South that struggled 
against the dictatorships of Rhee Syngman, Park Chung-hee, and Chun Doo-hwan. In a 
broad sense, major groups within the social forces can be divided into nationalists and 
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labour activists even though they were inseparable in some issues such as democracy and 
anti-dictatorship. The former dedicated themselves to unification movements and 
emphasized cooperation with the North Korean government for unification, while the 
latter espoused Marxism and put stress on resolving class matters of the capitalist society. 
They all explicitly and implicitly threatened the privileges of the hegemonic group in the 
South. Nationalists can be divided into the two groups: liberal nationalists and 
independent nationalists. Nationalists in South Korea were born over the issue of the 
establishment of separate governments in the two Koreas in the latter half of the 1940s. 
After the bloody 1980 Gwangju Democratization Movement, independent nationalists 
emerged with conspicuous difference from existing liberal nationalists by aggressively 
calling for the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from South Korea—even though liberal 
nationalists emphasized self-determination, the degree of self-determination was far 
lower than that claimed by independent nationalists as they acknowledged the necessity 
of the U.S. Forces stationing on the Korean peninsula. The three groups were ‘counter-
hegemonic’ because they could be direct threats to the hegemonic group in that, first, they 
strongly opposed anti-Communism with which the hegemonic group exercised 
ideological leadership and, second, nationalists and labour activists, compared with other 
social forces, had a significant degree of power to mobilise people in society. Amongst 
the three groups, liberal nationalists led by Kim Dae-jung took the helm of state affairs in 
the midst of the economic crisis.  
The origin of South Korean nationalists goes back to the mid 1940s. After 
independence in 1945, the USAMGIK classified political forces in South Korea into 
rightists and leftists: rightists, mostly, had been pro-Japanese collaborators during 
Japanese colonial rule and, after independence, ardently asserted anti-Communism, 
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whereas leftists were communists who had a close relationship with communists in North 
Korea. But there was another major group which can be called nationalists that included 
Kim Gu and Yuh Woon-hyung (Do Jin-sun, 1997: 355-357). During the colonial period, 
Kim was president of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in Shanghai, 
and Yuh was one of the most famous leaders of the independence movement in the 
southern part of the Korean peninsula.119 They could be referred to as the first generation 
nationalists in South Korea who gave priority to national unity over anything else. 
Kim Gu was an avowed liberal who said, “My political belief in one word is 
liberalism.” He maintained that the new Korea should be the country of liberty and 
abhorred class dictatorship based upon a philosophy, which was indirect criticism of 
communism (Kim Gu, 2000: 306-308). While Kim took a negative stance on Marxists 
throughout his lifetime, Yuh Woon-hyung deemed socialism as the ideal system for the 
Korean nation (Han Bae-ho, 2000: 137). Even though their political views were different, 
they shared something in common: both were strong nationalists, as the USAMGIK 
considered Kim a ‘staunch nationalist’ and Yuh a ‘pure nationalist’ (Ohmynews, 6 
September 2005). There were two types of nationalists at that time: liberal nationalists 
like Kim Gu and socialist nationalists like Yuh Woon-hyung. However, terrorist acts of 
rightists against socialist leaders and the ensuing Korean War eliminated most socialist 
nationalists and, after that, only liberal nationalists remained in existence, at least 
ostensibly, until the 1970s.  
In 1946-1948 in which Koreans witnessed a high possibility of the permanent 
division of the peninsula, nationalists put in a great deal of effort to prevent it. They 
                                                 
119 Regarding Kim Gu, see Sin Yong-ha (2003) and regarding Yuh Woon-hyung, see Lee Jong-
sik (2008). 
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vehemently opposed setting up separate governments in the North and the South. That is 
why Kim Gu and Kim Kyu-shik went to Pyongyang to have unification talks with Kim 
Il-sung in April 1948 before the establishment of separate governments in the two Koreas 
(Baek Yu-seon, 2008: 346). Their efforts were unsuccessful but their acts became the 
prototype of unification movements. Later, unification activists considered it important 
to go to Pyongyang and meet North Korean leaders personally (Do Jin-sun, 1997: 358). 
A new form of nationalism in South Korea was formed during this period. While 
nationalism in the colonial period focused on independence, after the division of Korea it 
concentrated on peaceful unification and self-determination (Park Seong-ok, 1997: 11). 
This differed significantly from the rightists’ view that agreed the establishment of a 
separate government in the South and championed the United States’ close involvement 
in Korean affairs. Most of all, there was a significant distinction between rightists and 
nationalists regarding the method for unification. Rightists were willing to wage a war 
for unification and thus calling for unification by force or absorption, but nationalists 
strongly claimed that peaceful unification should be the only way to unification and thus 
called for unification by talks (Kang Man-gil, 2008b: 177-179). 
Immediately after liberation, amongst rightists, leftists, and nationalists, no social 
force took hegemony in South Korea. Then, it was the issues of trusteeship and the 
establishment of a separate government that brought about a full-scale collision of the 
three forces. Most cities were inundated with relevant demonstrations, which threw South 
Korean society into disorder. Leftists first participated in the anti-trusteeship movement 
but later, directed by Moscow, turned their attitude completely. Rightists and nationalists 
were strong advocates of anti-trusteeship from beginning to end. However, they fought 
over the issue of establishing a separate government in the South (Park Hyun-hee, 2005: 
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21-22). Then, under the auspices of the USAMGIK, rightists gained an upper hand. From 
October 1947, after the complete breakdown of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission 
negotiations, Washington chose the armed repression of leftists and thus leftists lost their 
ground rapidly. Nationalists were also subject to suppression because they called for 
unification by talks, which was explained by rightists as a sign of espionage. Eventually, 
Rhee Syngman and the USAMGIK’s crackdown on leftists and nationalists, the 
assassinations of Yuh Woon-hyung in July 1947 and Kim Gu in June 1949 and, above all, 
the Korean War had rightists take hegemony in the South (Kang Man-gil, 2008a: 128-
135). 
In the 1950s, nationalists suffered harsh oppression by the dictatorship of Rhee 
Syngman. They strongly opposed Rhee as proponents of ‘liberal’ ideas as well—in other 
words, they opposed Rhee not only because he was an advocate of unification by invasion 
but also because he was a dictator. Rhee, especially during and after the war, actively used 
anti-communism in the name of security and purged his rivals by framing them as pro-
communists, as was the case of the execution of Cho Bong-am in 1959 (Korea Human 
Rights Foundation, 2006: 59). In fact, the nationalists were not on good terms with 
communists in North Korea even though they insisted upon direct dialogue with North 
Korean leaders. Kim Gu was a famous anti-communist while he led the Provisional 
Government in China during the colonial period and, after the division, North Korea put 
up a banner saying, “Kim Gu is a traitor to the Korean people” (Lee Uk-yeol et al., 2008: 
444). In the case of Cho Bong-am, he used to be a communist but in 1946 he turned 
against communism after he publicly denounced North Korea and the Soviet Union for 
their disregard for democracy. Immediately after his conversion, Cho allegedly said, “We 
need neither a bourgeois dictatorship nor a proletarian dictatorship” (Lankov, 9 January 
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2011).  
After the April 19 Revolution in 1960, the opposition Democratic Party (DP) 
took political power and asserted peaceful unification founded upon nationalistic 
aspirations, contrary to Rhee's plan of unification by force upon ideological antagonism 
(Ma In-seop Cha Mun-seok, and Yun Cheol-gi, 2012: 63). In fact, the DP was a very 
conservative party and skeptical over inter-Korean talks. The party passively accepted the 
necessity of inter-Korean talks after it witnessed the people's effusive enthusiasm about 
peaceful unification. However, this caused discontent inside the party and, as a 
compensation, it also pushed ahead with the plan of establishing the Special Anti-
Communist Law to protect its rule from any interference from Pyongyang (Shin Jong-
dae, 2005: 191). 
The predecessor of the DP, organized in September 1955, was the KDP which 
was formed in September 1945. The dominant old-line members of the DP were strong 
anti-communists from the landed class and advocates of conservative nationalist 
movements which emphasized education and cultural advancement during the colonial 
period. As they considered Western capitalist society an ideal model, they accepted 
capitalism and liberalism. They had a plan of gradual independence and took a 
conciliatory stance towards the Japanese and, thus, were subject to harsh criticism by 
leftists and nationalists who stressed the role of armed force in the independence 
movement. In fact, not a few figures who carried out conservative nationalist movements 
were involved in pro-Japanese activities directly or indirectly (Shim Ji-yeon, 2005: 14).  
In the Rhee Syngman era, the members of the DP called for democratic rule 
against the dictatorship by Rhee who had destroyed their economic bases by the land 
reform in 1950. On economic and social issues, however, they were as conservative as 
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the ruling Liberal Party members. After the coup, they opposed Park’s rule but remained 
conservative on those issues and, consequently, ignored labour rights, let alone 
representing them. They had a keen interest in the transfer of political power but did not 
devote themselves to devising and implementing an alternative strategy for economic and 
social development. It presented a striking contrast to the accomplishments of the ruling 
political group who were realizing rapid economic development by taking the export-
oriented growth strategy. This was one of the main reasons that, in the sixth presidential 
election, Park Chung-hee could easily defeat Yoon Bo-sun, the presidential candidate of 
the NDP, the successor of the DP.  
At this juncture, Kim Dae-jung emerged as a powerful new force in the NDP by 
proposing new ideas on the economy and inter-Korean relations. In the presidential 
primary for the seventh presidential election, Kim Dae-jung with a superb political 
dexterity beat Kim Young-sam who was backed by the party leader Yu Jin-san and most 
of the old-line members of the NDP (Suh Jung-seok, 2008: 155-157). In the presidential 
election campaign, Kim Dae-jung issued a number of noteworthy campaign pledges. With 
regard to economic policy, he promised to establish the independent national economy 
and nurture SMEs-based national capital. With the help of economist Park Hun-che, Kim 
Dae-jung formulated ideas of the nationalist strategy for economic development in which 
SMEs played a crucial role in economic development—concretely, by the state's support 
for enhancing the capabilities of SMEs for self-supply of parts and materials. His strategy 
was also intended to head off the dominance of the national economy by foreign capital, 
for example, by seeking balance in the induction of foreign capital by dividing the sources 
of foreign capital into three equal places of the United States, Japan, and Europe to 
prevent the national economy's subordination to one particular place (Kim Dae-jung, 
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1991: 97-98; Min Kyeong-wu, 2006: 48-49; Suh Jung-seok, 2008: 157-159). For inter-
Korean relations, Kim Dae-jung advocated unification by talks and proposed inter-
Korean exchanges and the three-stage unification formula which put forward the stages 
of confederation, federation, and complete unification. He also suggested unification 
through security assurance by the United States, China, Russia, and Japan (Jeon Sang-
bong, 1999: 222). These were devised to realize peaceful unification through 
functionalism, one of the main liberal approaches to international relations. 
Park Chung-hee framed Kim as a pro-communist and closely won the 
presidential election in 1971 even though it was rigged. 120  From that time, Park 
considered Kim the greatest threat to his rule. After the Yusin system was set up, Kim 
Dae-jung fled to Japan, but in August 1973 the KCIA kidnapped him in Tokyo and 
attempted to kill him by throwing him into the ocean. It was stopped by Washington in 
the last minute (Suh Jung-seok, 2007: 133-134). During the Yusin system which lasted 
until the assassination of Park Chung-hee in October 1979, voices for unification from 
below were taken as pro-communist and ruthlessly suppressed. This was also intended to 
oppress opposition leader Kim Dae-jung.  
The Gwangju Democratization Movement in May 1980 triggered the 
development of social movements extensively. The junta massacred civilians in Gwangju 
who participated in demonstrations against the military group and confined Kim Dae-
jung and other opposition leaders. It was a great shock to the public, and lots of people 
rose in opposition to the military rule. This was a time when student political movements 
                                                 
120 Park advocated modernization as a nationalist project by saying ‘development first 
unification later’ and, by the same token, he frequently denounced labour activists as 
undermining the future of the nation. (Institute of Historical Studies, 2004: 522). This thesis 
argues that Park’s rhetoric of modernization of the nation shall not be the base on which he can 
be considered as a nationalist. Rather, he can be referred to as a developmentalist. 
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were nationally organized and student activists became a powerful social force (Lee 
Jeong-hee, 2003: 120). Previously, in the Park Chung-hee era, student activists ordinarily 
devoted themselves to settling campus-related issues but, after the Gwangju 
Democratization Movement, they engaged themselves in social and political issues 
actively and gained popularity rapidly (Institute of Historical Studies, 2004, 445-446).  
In the 1980s, student movements developed with National Liberation (NL) and 
People's Democracy (PD) as the two major groups. While NL interpreted the system of 
South Korea as semi-capitalism or semi-feudal colonial capitalism, PD construed it as 
state monopoly capitalism. NL emphasized national issues rather than class issues and 
claimed that the present task was to realize the autonomy of the Korean nation from 
American imperialism. Jusapa, the strongest faction of the NL group, adopted the Juche 
theory of North Korea as a nationalistic thought, and the ultimate goal of NL was the 
unification of the two Koreas. PD prioritised class issues over everything else and insisted 
that the pressing task was to resolve class matters between capitalists and labourers. It 
took Marxism as a guiding philosophy and its ultimate goal was the construction of 
socialism in South Korea.121 NL gained much more social support than PD by appealing 
to nationalism and anti-Americanism: South Korean society in the 1980s was more 
interested in national problems than in class problems, and anti-American sentiment grew 
rapidly after the public was informed that the United States had allowed the military junta 
to use force against civilians in Kwangju (Maeil Kyeongje, 11 May 2012).  
With regard to PD, its effect on labour movements was even more prominent than 
on student movements. Labour movements in the 1980s took on a new aspect because of 
                                                 
121 Jusapa is an abbreviation for Juche [Independence] Sasang [Thought] Pa [Faction] (Hong 
Jang-pyo, 2010: 175-188). 
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the active participation of university students. In the Park era there were a number of big 
incidents in the history of labour movements, such as the self-burning of a 22-year-old 
worker Chun Tae-il in 1970 and the YH Incident in 1979. However, they were one-offs 
with no organizational unity, as setting up the labour union itself was illegal. From the 
early 1980s university students, mostly from the PD group, went to factories disguising 
themselves as workers to organize the working class (Kwon Oh-mun, 2004: 383-385). 
The so-called No-hak Yondae [Worker-Student Alliance] resulted in a series of large-scale 
strikes, and labour groups became connected with each other on a national scale (Chang 
Dae-oup, 2001: 199). 
The June Democracy Movement of 1987 was a successful anti-government 
struggle in which nearly all domestic dissidents participated. Student and labour activists 
played an important part by mobilizing hundreds of thousands of demonstrators on the 
streets all across the country (Ahn Cheol-hyeon, 2009b: 379). Nonetheless, it was the 
opposing Unification Democratic Party (UDP), the successor of the NDP, which led the 
movement—the name of the party indicated that ‘unification’ was regarded as important 
an issue as ‘democracy’ in South Korean society at that time. Unification movements 
became more active with the revision of the constitution in October 1987 which 
strengthened civil rights and reintroduced direct presidential elections (Kim Dang-tek, 
2006: 508-510). A number of unification activists visited Pyongyang without the 
government's permission. For instance, Moon Ik-hwan, a pastor, visited Pyongyang in 
March 1989 to have two talks with Kim Il-sung about unification. About three months 
later, Lim Soo-kyung, a university student, went to Pyongyang to participate in the World 
Festival of Youth and Students and met Kim Il-sung (Research Association for Korean 
History, 1992: 416-417). 
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The UDP was founded by Kim Dae-jung and his longstanding friend and rival 
Kim Young-sam on 1 May 1987 (Ahn Cheol-hyeon, 2009b: 212). Kim Dae-jung was a 
nationalist who was internationally famous for his ideas on the peaceful unification of the 
two Koreas. Unlike Kim Dae-jung, Kim Young-sam was not, at least, an ardent nationalist 
but rather an anti-communist (maybe) because his mother was killed by a North Korean 
spy when he was three years old. His anti-Communism was one of the reasons that the 
old-line members of the NDP supported him in the presidential primary of the NDP for 
the seventh presidential election. As an opposition leader, he did not show any sincere 
enthusiasm for unification and his main criticism against the government was about 
democracy, rarely about unification policy. While he was president, he was antagonistic 
to Pyongyang and did not alter significantly the earlier governments’ North Korean policy. 
Then, why did he accept Kim Il-sung's offer of having an inter-Korean summit in 1994? 
The summit was not taken as a measure to achieve inter-Korean reconciliation but to 
garner more support to his rule and more personal popularity from the public. 
Ahead of the presidential election in December 1987, the UDP was divided into 
two as Kim Dae-jung and his faction left it to form a new party titled the Peace 
Democratic Party in November. The two Kims failed to agree on a single candidate and 
were defeated in the election by the ruling party candidate Roh Tae-woo, a close friend 
of Chun Doo-hwan and one of the key figures in the 1979 coup (Institute of Historical 
Studies, 2004: 451). In order to beat Kim Dae-jung and win the presidential election of 
1992, Kim Young-sam decided to merge his party with Roh’s ruling Democratic Justice 
Party and Kim Jong-pil's New Democratic Republican Party to form the Democratic 
Liberal Party (DLP) in 1990, which was suggested by Roh to break the political deadlock 
in which the ruling party was a minority (Lee Dong-hyeong, 2011: 451).  
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The hegemonic group, through the merger of three parties, expanded its 
membership to include pro-democracy politicians of the Kim Young-sam faction, which 
made the group more legitimate and, more importantly, extended the regional support 
base to South Gyeongsang region where Kim Young-sam was born. In South Korea, 
except for the capital area, South Gyeongsang region—including South Gyeongsang 
Province, Busan, and Ulsan—was the most populous region, followed by North 
Gyeongsang region—including North Gyeongsang Province, Taegu, and Pohang—where 
Park Chung-hee was born (Kim Jong-hoe, 2007: 52-54). The merger was one of the main 
reasons that Kim Dae-jung was in league with Kim Jong-pil ahead of the 1997 
presidential election because he knew that regionalism would have a major impact on the 
election result. 
From the early 1990s onward, as those politicians from the faction of Kim Young-
sam who had more conservative and anti-communist views joined the hegemonic group, 
major counter-hegemonic groups could be approximately sorted into the following three 
categories: liberal nationalists, independent nationalists, and labour activists. Kim Dae-
jung was the leader of liberal nationalists by providing political leadership and relevant 
visions. Independent nationalists consisted of, mostly, the (former) NL group members, 
in particular, Jusapa students and ex-Jusapa civic activists. The two nationalist groups, 
above all, were divided over the issue of the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. 
Liberal nationalists recognized the importance of American troops stationed in South 
Korea even though they accentuated self-determination. Independent nationalists 
advocated anti-Americanism and strongly insisted on the withdrawal of the troops. 
Labour activists were union members and civic activists closely linked to the PD group. 
There were other forces who criticized the behaviour of the hegemonic group, such as 
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many civic organizations for human rights, environment, education, etc. However, they 
were not as powerful as those three groups as they lacked the organizing ability to exert 
political influence by mobilizing a considerable number of citizens, students, or labourers. 
Nationalists and labour activists alike rejected anti-Communism as they easily 
fell prey to anti-communist attacks. Earlier administrations occasionally applied the NSL 
to arrest those who secretly contacted North Koreans on espionage charges (Park Hyun-
hee, 2005: 53). They took advantage of the law as well to suppress labour movements by 
branding labour activists as ‘reds’ (Korea Academic Organization Council, 1997: 69). 
Indeed, anti-Communism was one of the most effective tools of the hegemonic group in 
maintaining its power. One vivid example was a secret request to North Korea by the 
National Intelligence Service (NIS) in 1997 to fire several shots to the South with a view 
to fomenting fear amongst South Koreans just before the presidential election (Hankook 
Ilbo, 11 December 2000).  
Amongst the three groups, liberal nationalists were the most powerful because of 
nationalist aspirations in South Korean society, the popularity of Kim Dae-jung, to name 
a few. Nevertheless, it would be more noteworthy to examine the reasons why the other 
groups were so weak. Most of all, the existence of communist North Korea hindered them 
from becoming possible alternatives to the hegemonic group. As ordinary South Koreans 
were always aware of threats from the North, they guarded themselves against pro-North 
Korean activists. Independent nationalists were mostly regarded as pro-North Korean by 
the public because some of their demands, such as the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the 
South, were identical to those by North Korea. Labour activists were often misunderstood 
as pro-North Korean, even though they consistently deprecated North Korea’s 
dictatorship and were not on good terms with independent nationalists as the former 
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criticized the latter for their pro-North Korean inclinations (Cho Kuk, 2009: 25). Liberal 
nationalists were also afflicted with anti-communism, but the extent of the damage was 
smaller compared with the cases of the two groups that were blocked from entering into 
the National Assembly until 2004. South Korea’s main opposition party, after the 
defection of the Kim Young-sam faction in 1990, was mostly made up of liberal 
nationalists who belonged to the Kim Dae-jung faction.  
As a South Korean party was organized around renowned political figures, 
instead of being founded upon interests or demands of the people (Choi Jang-jip, 2005: 
64), ideas and goals of the party leader(s) were critical in the operation of the party. Before, 
leading opposition political forces were made up of the Kim Dae-jung faction and the 
Kim Young-sam faction. Both Kims were liberalists, and the key difference between them 
was their attitude toward communist North Korea. As Kim Young-sam was an anti-
communist, when he led his party into a merger with the conservative ruling party in 1990, 
nationalists, such as Roh Moo-hyun, joined the Kim Dae-jung faction. Subsequently, 
from the mid-1990s, the main opposition party was the party of Kim Dae-jung, and the 
members can be referred to as liberal nationalists although the degree of ideological 
faithfulness amongst them varied.   
As of 1997, the main opposition party’s economic and North Korean policies 
were based upon Kim Dae-jung’s ideas on them. Regarding economic policy, Kim 
opposed the collusion between politics and business and criticized the inordinate 
economic dominance of the Chaebol in the South. As a countermeasure, he 
accommodated neoliberalism at this time. He, strongly influenced by economist Park 
Hun-che, had claimed to take protective measures against foreign capital during his 
campaign for the presidency in 1970-1971 (Ohmynews, 19 February 2010). However, 
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while he witnessed the global trend of neoliberalism, he changed his views from 
protecting the national economy from foreign capital to taking advantage of it. Most of 
all, he deemed it effective to take neoliberal reforms to sever the collusive link between 
politics and business and to rectify the Chaebol-centered economy. With regard to North 
Korean policy, Kim considered North Korea not a neighboring enemy to fight against, 
but a country of the same nation with which to cooperate for peaceful unification (Choi 
Wan-Kyu, 3 February 2008). He maintained North Korean policy on the basis of 
functionalism, a liberal approach for integration between different systems. 122  He 
dreamed of a South-North Korean economic community through close and 
comprehensive inter-Korean exchanges—for example, by exchanging South Korea's 
capital and technology with North Korea's natural resources and labour—and, eventually, 
economic integration (Ahn Cheol-hyeon, 2009b, 364).  
Between issues on economy and inter-Korean relations, the latter was what made 
the liberal nationalists counter-hegemonic because the hegemonic group also 
accommodated neoliberalism in the 1990s. They called for the reform of the Chaebol, but 
the degree of the reform fell short of the dissolution of the Chaebol which could lead to 
the complete change of the economic structure by taking SMEs as a replacement for the 
Chaebol. This was one reason that domestic hegemonic struggles occurred over the issue 
of North Korean policy. As explained before, a more central reason was that anti-
Communism with which the hegemonic group exercised ideological leadership can be 
severely undermined by inter-Korean reconciliation.  
 
                                                 
122 Concerning functionalism, see David Mitrany (1948: 359). 
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6.3. Inter-Korean Reconciliation as a Hegemonic Project 
  
The economic crisis in 1997 led the liberal nationalists led by Kim Dae-jung to attain 
political power by winning the presidential election in December 1997. However, the 
power of the new ruling political group was not solid. The victory was won as Kim Dae-
jung formed a political alliance with conservative Kim Jong-pil, a political icon of 
Chungcheong Province, in the middle of the economic crisis which was deemed the worst 
crisis South Korea had ever faced after the Korean War.123 However, relations between 
Kim Dae-jung’s party, the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP)—the Millennium 
Democratic Party (MDP) from January 2000—and Kim Jong-pil’s United Liberal 
Democrats (ULD) deteriorated before long over the issue of the introduction of the 
parliamentary government system which had been the key condition of the political 
alliance (Lee Seok-yeon, 2007: 229).  
The existing hegemonic group maintained its hegemony even though it handed 
over political power. Most of all, the opposition Grand National Party (GNP) held the 
majority in the National Assembly, and the conservative media still took control of public 
opinion. This cast a dark cloud over the new ruling political group’s maintaining political 
power, let alone attaining hegemony. At this juncture, new inter-Korean relations were 
considered to be a great opportunity for reversing the situation as it would seriously 
impair the hegemonic group’s ideological leadership through anti-Communism. That is, 
in order to attain hegemony, the counter-hegemonic group relied on the new North Korean 
                                                 
123 Regionalism played a major role in the election as before and the alliance contributed a lot 
to the first peaceful transfer of political power in the South Korean history. For example, Kim 
received more than 90 per cent of the electoral votes in his home province of Jeolla, whereas 
Lee received more than 70 per cent of the votes from the North Gyeongsang Province (Sung 
Han-yong, 2001: 17-21). 
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policy, a national-popular project of pursuing nationalism. This section is about the new 
ruling group’s attempts to win hegemony with the new North Korean policy. 
On the first day of his presidency, Kim Dae-jung laid out the three guiding 
principles of North Korean policy in his inaugural address. First, South Korea will not 
tolerate any armed provocations. Second, it has no intention to damage or absorb North 
Korea. Third, it will actively seek reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea. In 
the speech he added that the two Koreas, on the basis of separating economy from politics, 
needed to expand economic exchanges together with the expansion of cultural and 
academic exchanges (Hankyoreh, 26 February 1998).  
A few months later, on 3 April, President Kim first used the term ‘Sunshine 
Policy’ at the London University School of Oriental and African Studies. He said:  
 
It is now time for big changes in inter-Korean relations … I have been steadfast 
in advocating what I call a Sunshine Policy, which seeks to lead North Korea down 
a path toward peace, reform, and openness through reconciliation, interaction, and 
cooperation with the South. As President, I will carry out such ideas step by step 
(Office of the President, 1999: 63-64). 
 
The new policy toward North Korea was in accordance with functionalism and the goal 
was a gradual and peaceful integration of the two Koreas. That is, the Sunshine Policy 
was a unification policy. The organization in charge of the policy was the Ministry of 
Unification, not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. To this end, the Board of 
National Unification under the wing of the Prime Minister's Office was changed to the 
status of ministry with the inauguration of the Kim Dae-jung administration (Hankook 
Ilbo, 24 February 1998). During the presidency, the Ministry of Unification was a more 
powerful organization than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.  
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Establishing new and improved inter-Korean relations was a hegemonic project 
as it could enable the ruling nationalists to realize their vision of peaceful unification 
through a liberal approach and to take hegemony from the hands of the existing 
hegemonic group by appealing to nationalist aspirations and undermining anti-
Communism. The existing hegemonic group still maintained its hegemony in society. 
Kim Dae-jung sought to use his power to make the counter-hegemonic group sustain its 
political power and, in the end, attain hegemony by reconciling with the communist 
regime in the North. 
Eventually President Kim, for political purposes, stuck to reconciliation itself and 
neglected to abide by the Sunshine Policy he had initially proclaimed. When the Sunshine 
Policy in its original sense collided with reconciliation with the North Korean government, 
he jettisoned the former for the latter. That is to say, the Sunshine Policy in principle was 
different from the Sunshine Policy in reality. For example, one of the emphases of the 
new policy was a gradual progression in relations with North Korea but, in retrospect, 
President Kim did not keep the functionalist principle of gradualism when he actually 
implemented it (Kihl Young Whan, 2004: 248-249). During the address at SOAS, he said 
that he was willing to wait patiently but, in reality, he was in a hurry to show relevant 
accomplishments to the public.   
At the beginning of his presidency, Kim Dae-jung assumed a cautious attitude 
toward inter-Korean relations. For instance, at the negotiation table in April 1998, South 
Korean delegates attached conditions by connecting the North's demand for fertilizer 
assistance with the issue of the reunion of separated families in the two Koreas and did 
not care much about the breakdown of negotiations with their North Korean counterparts 
(Jeon Sang-bong, 1999: 102). However, President Kim picked up speed soon as he was 
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assured of concrete, positive and early outcomes in relations with North Korea after he 
witnessed Chung Ju-young, the founder of the Hyundai Group, crossing the cease-fire 
line with 500 ‘unification cows’ on 16 June 1998, followed by the announcement of the 
agreement on 23 June between Hyundai and North Korea's Asia-Pacific Peace Committee 
(APPC) on the tourism project of Mt. Kumgang in North Korea (Park Hyun-hee, 2005: 
85-89). In his speech at Korea University on 30 June 1998 Kim promised, “Korean people 
are hot-tempered so you shall see a noticeable progress in relations with the North in a 
year” (Dong-A Ilbo, 1 July 1998). On that day the principle of functionalism was publicly 
thrown away.  
As President Kim wanted to see substantial developments in inter-Korean 
relations in haste, ministers of the government advanced relevant ideas competitively. For 
example, Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Kim Sun-kihl proposed that South 
Korea provide non-operating ships to North Korea. Minister of Justice Park Sang-chun 
said that the South would repatriate unconverted, long-term prisoners to the North. Even, 
Jang Young-shik, president of the Korean Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), 
suggested that the KEPCO build a 100,000KW thermal power generation plant in 
Pyongyang (Jeong Yong-seok, 1999: 100). At the talks on fertilizer assistance in March 
1999, South Korean delegates changed their attitudes and said to the North Koreans that 
they would give 50,000 tons of fertilizer at once with no strings attached (Chosun Ilbo, 
19 April 1999).  
The South Korean government became more anxious to see tangible results with 
less than one year to go before the general election scheduled in April 2000. In particular, 
as the ruling party's chances of victory in the general election became so low, the group 
sped up the progress in inter-Korean relations. In his speech on 7 May 1999, the Minister 
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of Foreign Affairs and Trade Hong Sun-young claimed that South Korea could not wait 
blindly and urged the North to respond quickly to the South’s proposals for reconciliation 
on an extensive scale (Chosun Ilbo, 8 May 1999). This indicated that a lot of proposals 
were put forth by Seoul behind closed doors. Amongst them, there was one major 
proposal which was related to a summit between North and South Korea.  
For political gain in the shortest time possible, the ruling political group pursued 
drama and, as for a dramatic event, there was nothing like an inter-Korean summit. For 
that purpose, President Kim personally curried favour with Kim Jong-il and also sent his 
delegate to pave the way for the summit. In an interview with the Tokyo Broadcasting 
System on 9 February 2000, Kim Dae-jung said, “Kim Jong-il is known as having 
judgment and insight as a leader” (Dong-A Ilbo, 24 September 2003). One of his longtime 
right-hand men, Park Ji-won, worked as a special envoy. In early March, Park secretly 
went to Singapore to meet Song Ho-gyung, Vice President of APPC, to talk about a 
summit between the leaders of the two Koreas. The Berlin Declaration in which President 
Kim publicly showed a willingness to build up North Korea's infrastructure was issued 
on 9 March, just one day after the meeting between Park and Song. Lim Dong-won, a top 
aide to President Kim on the policy towards North Korea, later revealed that the large-
scale aid plan in the declaration was included at the last minute (Dong-A Ilbo Special 
Report Team, 2005: 273-274). This indicated that there had been a certain kind of deal 
between the two special envoys from North and South Korea. About a month later, on 10 
April, both Koreas announced that they would hold an inter-Korean summit on 13-15 
June 2000.  
On 14 June, after a four-hour long discussion, a joint declaration was signed 
between the two leaders. The declaration stated that, first, North and South Korea agreed 
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to resolve the question of unification independently without any foreign interference. 
Second, they agreed that there is a common element in the South's concept of a 
confederation and the North's concept of a loose form of federation. Third, they agreed to 
resolve promptly humanitarian issues such as exchange visits by separated family 
members. Fourth, they agreed to promote economic cooperation and exchanges in 
cultural, sports, environmental, and all other fields. Finally, they agreed to hold follow-
up meetings soon after to implement the above agreements (Hankook Ilbo, 15 June 2000).  
The contents of the declaration showed that it was an agreement for unification 
between the two Koreas, not for peace between the two hostile countries as it did not 
mention anything related to security such as the naval battle which had occurred just one 
year previously with dozens of casualties. What made the declaration historic was its first, 
second, and fourth clauses because there had been a couple of cases of reunions between 
separated family members in the past. The first clause was about self-determination on 
the issue of unification, which was one of the central claims by the nationalists. The 
second was about commonality between the two governments’ unification formulae. The 
fourth was in accordance with functionalism that the counter-hegemonic group adopted 
as a unification method. Overall, it was a long-anticipated outcome for the liberal 
nationalists as it was a first step toward peaceful unification through a liberal approach.  
The summit talks were a milestone in inter-Korean relations but they were also a 
very political event. The declaration was called the June 15 Joint Declaration even though 
it was signed on the evening of 14 June, suggested by Kim Dae-jung who thought 15 a 
lucky number. He insisted that it should be announced in the evening in order to be 
reported in the morning newspapers the next day around the world, and Kim Jong-il 
accepted it (Dong-A Ilbo Special Report Team, 2005: 288). The summit was carefully 
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designed for the benefit of the counter-hegemonic group from the outset. The 
announcement to have a summit with the North Korean leader was issued three days 
before the general election day, scheduled for 13 April, with a view to winning the hearts 
and minds of voters. The summit was a dramatic event that signaled the beginning of a 
new relationship between the two Koreas, and President Kim tried to make the most of it 
in order to maximize political influence. 
In contrast to the progress in inter-Korean relations, many initial promises of 
President Kim were not met. For example, the South Korean government was not faithful 
to the rule of the separation of economy from politics that President Kim had stated in his 
inauguration address. The government supported the private sector’s North Korean 
projects. According to what the National Assembly hearings revealed in 2003, Hyundai 
was given preferential treatment by borrowing 500 million USD from the Korea 
Development Bank and secretly remitted it to North Korea in return for business rights in 
seven areas such as tourism, telecommunications, electricity, railroad, and the Kaesong 
Industrial Complex. The government granted it in the name of promoting national 
interests and peace on the peninsula and let the NIS help Hyundai to transfer money to 
Pyongyang even though it violated the positive law (Yunhap News, 25 June 2003; Yang 
Moon Soo, 2005: 285).  
Above all, President Kim broke the first principle of the North Korean policy, 
which he had stated in the inaugural address, that the South will not tolerate any armed 
provocations of the North. In his presidency there were many military provocations from 
North Korea. For instance, on 22 June 1998, a North Korean midget submarine was 
caught in a fishing net off the eastern coast of Korea. Its nine crew members all killed 
themselves. A few months later, on 18 December of the same year, a North Korean semi-
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submarine boat showed up off the southern coast and was sunk by the South Korean navy 
(Noh Ho-rae and Lee Dae-seong, 2004: 144-145). The Kim Dae-jung administration 
minimized the gravity of the situation by saying “East Germany sent spies to West 
Germany until shortly before unification” and “The inter-Korean relations became much 
worse after the earlier Kim Young-sam administration overly reacted to the submarine 
incident in September 1996, and the new administration will not repeat that kind of 
mistake” (Chosun Ilbo, 25 June 1998). This signified that the ruling group was concerned 
more with the possible deterioration in inter-Korean relations than security threats posed 
by the North.  
In August 1998 when Pyongyang test fired a three-stage ballistic missile, 
Taepodong-1, over northern Japan, Tokyo and Washington reacted with a mixture of panic 
and anger. However, Seoul said that the long-range missile was basically aimed at Japan 
and the United States, so the South did not have to make a fuss and made clear that there 
would be no setback in economic cooperation with the North (Dong-A Ilbo, 3 September 
1998). The military also affirmed that it was not considering any military response as the 
missile was not targeted at South Korea (Chosun Ilbo, 1 September 1998). With regard to 
North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons development in Kumchangri, Yongbyon, 
foreign minister Hong Sun-young stated in the National Assembly that it might be a 
ground-water reservoir, an underground power station, or an underground bunker 
(Yunhap News, 26 August 1998). Moreover, President Kim tried to allay the suspicion by 
saying, “There is doubt but no positive evidence … If we deepen the suspicion without 
evidence, it will disrupt the economic recovery” (Dong-A Ilbo, 21 November 1998). 
The South did not change its position even in the face of direct, armed 
engagements with the North and subsequent military causalities. On 15 June 1999, four 
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North Korean patrol boats crossed over into South Korean waters. South Korean high-
speed boats and guard ships attempted to push them back. In the process, three North 
Korean torpedo boats joined the scene and fired machine guns together with the patrol 
boats. South Korean boats and ships retaliated with machine guns. In the naval battle near 
Yeonpyeong Island, more than 17 North Korean soldiers were killed and 9 South Korean 
soldiers were injured (Hankook Ilbo, 15 June 1999). On 29 June 2002, three years after 
the so-called first battle of Yeonpyeong, the second battle of Yeonpyeong broke out. Two 
North Korean guard ships crossed the northern limit line, and four South Korean high-
speed boats warned them to go back. Suddenly, the North Koreans opened fire and one 
of the South Korean boats was severely damaged. Soon, two high-speed boats and two 
guard ships reinforced the South Korean vessels that returned fire. The engagement 
resulted in the deaths of 6 South Korean soldiers and at least 13 North Koreans (Yunhap 
News, 29 June 2002).  
The new ruling political group claimed to establish peace on the Korean 
peninsula with its engagement policy but turned a blind eye to the North’s behaviour that 
threatened, and broke, peace. Over the North's missile tests, suspicious nuclear activities, 
and armed provocations, the South Korean government expressed concern but did not 
take any corresponding actions. The government always asserted that the inter-Korean 
relations would go sour if it overreacted to North Korea’s actions. However, such an 
attitude was counterproductive in ensuring peace on the peninsula. Instead of taking 
concrete measures to secure peace, Seoul had a naive hope that improved relations with 
Pyongyang would naturally bring about peace sooner or later and, therefore, it clung to 
repairing inter-Korean relations itself.  
Reconciliation with North Korea could have contributed to peace in the long run. 
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However, it was not to be fruitful because the reconciliation process was done at the 
expense of tolerating North Korea's armed provocations and nuclear and missile 
development. The measure of a threat is defined as a combination of a nation’s capabilities 
and intent (Caldwell and Williams Jr., 2011: 13). Out of these two, the former is 
considered more critical than the latter in preventing armed conflict and war as it takes 
much more time to enhance its capabilities than to change intent. It was worthwhile 
making efforts to change North Korea's intent in favour of peace, but it was unreasonable 
if the process was done by overlooking and even financially assisting its military 
capability enhancement. In addition, North Korea’s armament development drove Japan 
to shift further to the right and sparked a new round of debates in Tokyo about becoming 
a ‘normal’ state that included the revision of its pacifist constitution banning its right to 
possess war materials and wage war (Hughes, 2009: 291-312). This could provoke an 
arms race in Northeast Asia. Overall, the South Korean government's policy toward North 
Korea was not a success in the aspect of promoting peace. 
Then what was ‘peace’ regarding the Sunshine Policy, in reality? It was primarily 
about ‘peaceful’ unification as a measure for unification. The counter-hegemonic group’s 
North Korean policy was a great step forward for peace in the future compared with, e.g., 
Rhee Syngman’s plan of unification by invasion. However, the policy was not that helpful 
for settling peace in the present. Strictly speaking, it sacrificed current, tangible peace for 
peace in the indefinite future.  
While reconciliation with the North failed to foster peace on the peninsula, it 
succeeded in repairing relations with the North Korean government. That was the very 
first step for the ruling liberal nationalists to realize their long-fostered nationalistic wish 
of unification. Also, the inter-Korean reconciliation was a key means to convert 
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nationalistic aspirations of the public into a political force that would bring hegemony to 
them. It could end the South Korean people’s antagonism towards communist North 
Korea as well, which could weaken anti-Communism with which the hegemonic group 
exercised ideological leadership. Thus, the counter-hegemonic group made use of newly 
acquired political power to gain hegemony through promoting relations with Pyongyang.  
 
6.4. Consequences of Inter-Korean Reconciliation on Hegemonic 
Struggles 
 
Reconciliation with North Korea could stay neutral in the domestic struggle for hegemony. 
However, the nationalists pursued it to attain hegemony from the hands of the existing 
hegemonic group. In the process, President Kim pushed ahead with it rigidly, even 
contradicting what he said before. Nevertheless, the consequences of new and improved 
relations with North Korea were not satisfactory to the new ruling political group. Strong 
resistance from the hegemonic group was instrumental in preventing the nationalists from 
attaining hegemony by disparaging the North Korean policy, overstating its negative 
aspects, and arousing public opinion against them. The satisfying of nationalist 
aspirations was outweighed by fear of communisation which was magnified by the 
hegemonic group.  
Amongst the major constituents of the group, the opposition GNP and the 
conservative media played a much bigger part than Chaebols who were deeply occupied 
with surviving neoliberal restructuring during that time. To begin with, the strong 
opposition party severely condemned the government’s policy toward North Korea with 
few exceptions. Opposition leader Lee Hoi-chang maintained that President Kim’s 
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obsession about reconciliation with North Korea was politically motivated, as were the 
cases of his predecessors’ attempts to make use of inter-Korean relations to resolve 
domestic political problems (Segye Ilbo, 8 May 1999). As for the summit, the party tried 
to denigrate its historical significance by saying that the phrase ‘without any foreign 
interference’ in the June 15 Joint Declaration could mean the withdrawal of U.S. troops 
from South Korea, and North Korea’s concept of a loose form of federation was merely 
a preparatory stage for federation (Maeil Kyeongje, 15 June 2000). Regarding security 
issues, the party members unanimously blamed the government for the military 
provocations of North Korea by insisting that the policy of appeasement instigated them 
(Munhwa Ilbo, 13 July 1998). They also argued that the Sunshine Policy had weakened 
the military's awareness of national security and driven South Korean people to be much 
more insecure (Segye Ilbo, 27 August 1998). After the second battle of Yeonpyeong on 
29 June 2002, the party asserted that the Kim Dae-jung administration ‘pumped’ money 
into Pyongyang’s hands in return for bullets.124  
The conservative media also harshly censured the government's engagement 
policy. Their criticisms were even harsher than the opposition party’s because the party 
could not oppose the reconciliation itself nor disregard the people’s aspirations for 
unification. In South Korea, Chosun Ilbo, Joongang Ilbo, and Dong-A Ilbo were three key 
conservative newspapers, the market share of which altogether accounted for more than 
70 per cent at that time and thus played a great role in the formation of public opinion.125 
Regarding the inter-Korean summit, Dong-A Ilbo in its editorial expressed concern that 
                                                 
124 After the nuclear tests in 2006, they said the Sunshine Policy ‘pumped’ money into North 
Korea for nuclear weapons in return.  
125 Chosun Ilbo boasted the largest circulation in the country. As of December 2000, their 
market share altogether was 71 per cent (Dailian, 20 January 2005). 
230 
 
the emphasis on ‘independence’ in the joint declaration could spark problems in the 
South’s relations with the United States, Japan, Russia, and China (Dong-A Ilbo, 16 June 
2000). When reporting the second battle of Yeonpyeong, according to the chairperson of 
Newspapers Monitor Committee Kim Eun-ju, Chosun Ilbo bashed the government for 
reinforcing the North's position by its appeasement policy, distorted facts to stir up 
antagonism towards Pyongyang, and raised tensions on the Korean peninsula by 
representing the opinions of hard-liners in Washington (Pulppuri Media, 12 November 
2002; Kim Jong-dae, 27 July 2012). The media were not commentators outside politics, 
but critical players that safeguarded the South Korean anti-communist system inside 
politics (Choi Jang-jip, 2005: 141).  
In response, the Kim Dae-jung administration expressed its discomfort with those 
conservative newspapers by saying that they were major obstacles to the efficient 
management of state affairs. A document made by the Office of the Senior Secretary to 
the President for Civil Affairs on 30 November 2000 stated that government policies were 
not smoothly implemented owing to extremely conservative, anti-communist and 
reactionary media that spoke only for vested interests and the GNP (Dong-A Ilbo Special 
Report Team, 2005: 325). President Kim in a beginning-of-the-year press conference on 
11 January 2001 declared that the press, academia, civic organizations, and National 
Assembly should work together to establish proper measures for media reform. Shortly 
afterwards, from 8 February, the National Tax Service conducted special tax audits of 23 
media corporations and, on 20 June, it made public the findings of the investigations and 
reported six owners of media corporations, including Chosun Ilbo, Joongang Ilbo, and 
Dong-A Ilbo, for prosecution. For this, President Kim allegedly mobilized almost all 
inspection agencies such as the Fair Trade Commission, the Financial Supervisory 
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Commission, the prosecution, the police, and the NIS (Dong-A Ilbo Special Report Team, 
2005: 326-327). However, contrary to the expectation of the counter-hegemonic group, 
the conservative media’s influence on public opinion was strengthened even further as 
the three conservative newspapers’ market share increased from 71 per cent in 2000 to 
73.7 per cent in 2002 (Mediatoday, 7 July 2004).  
Public opinion could be easily manipulated by those conservative newspaper 
companies. In fact, it was not easy to distinguish public opinion from published opinion. 
Winston Churchill once said, “There is no such thing as public opinion. There is only 
published opinion.” As dominating conservative media outlets gushed negative opinions, 
more and more people had negative views on the government's policy toward North 
Korea. Later, in a survey of nearly 1,200 people conducted in 2005, even one year before 
North Korea's first nuclear test, more than 60 per cent of South Koreans said that the inter-
Korean summit talks in 2000 were not fruitful.126 
The national interests the ruling political group claims mean the interests that 
contribute to its winning hegemony. Here, attaining hegemony in the sphere of civil 
society is critical. As civil society had been under the control of the existing hegemonic 
group for several decades, it was very difficult for the new ruling political group to 
transfigure its interests as the national interests. Particularly, as above-mentioned, in a 
situation where a few conservative media giants held sway over the media market, the 
North Korean policy that the counter-hegemonic group claimed to be contributive to the 
national interest was not sanctioned or supported as such by the ‘majority’ of the public—
                                                 
126 Specifically, 714 people out of 1,186 answered that the summit talks were not fruitful 
(Korea Broadcasting System, 2005: 41). In contrast, in a survey of 1,200 South Koreans 
conducted in December 1999, about 84 per cent supported inter-Korean summit talks (Korea 
Institute for National Unification, 1999: 68-69). 
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which is critical in the case of a formal democracy such as the South Korean political 
system. 
Eventually, the reconciliation with North Korea deepened ideological disputes in 
society, failing to undermine the anti-Communism which had made possible the 
hegemonic rule. One example was that from the year 2000 South Korea witnessed a 
growing number of conservative civic groups that advocated anti-Communism 
aggressively on the street. Construing the reconciliation as being detrimental to their 
vested interests, they criticized that the new ruling political group was imperiling South 
Korea's identity by colluding with brutal communists in North Korea. Likewise, 
ideological polarization intensified rapidly in society (Shin Jong-dae, 2005: 196).  
At large, the inter-Korean rapprochement had rather a negative effect on 
changing the holder of hegemony. The controversy over ‘pumping’ money into 
Pyongyang's hands always dragged the counter-hegemonic group down from that time 
on. The issue was brought up again and again, often exaggerated by the hegemonic group, 
particularly before elections. By the same token, anti-Communism has remained the 
strongest weapon for the hegemonic group in suppressing its opposition forces. One 
recent piece of evidence was the NIS's intervention in the 2012 presidential election in 
which its agents attempted to manipulate public opinion on the internet by branding 
opposition candidates as reds (New York Times, 14 June 2013).127  
The hegemonic project failed, and the existing hegemonic group still holds 
hegemony. The GNP (now ‘Saenuri Party’) has been the dominant party except for once 
when it impeached President Roh Moo-hyun in 2004. The three conservative newspapers 
                                                 
127 There have been many other cases that show how powerful anti-Communism still is in 
South Korean society. In September 2013, one university lecturer was reported to the NIS for 
teaching Marxism (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 9 September 2013). 
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above-mentioned are still the three biggest newspaper companies. Most of all, the power 
of the Chaebol has been enhanced due to the economic policy by the counter-hegemonic 
group. I argue that this is of particular importance to society in general as well as to 
hegemonic struggles in the South.   
The new ruling political group had to concentrate more on changing the 
economic structure if it were to attain hegemony. South Korean people chose the counter-
hegemonic group in 1997 primarily in expectation of a different economic management 
from its predecessors. The fact that the economic crisis was an organic crisis indicated 
that the new leadership had a historical task to change the historical bloc, and that it should 
start with a change in the excessive Chaebol-centered economic structure. Actually, the 
presidency of Kim Dae-jung was a very rare chance for a full-scale reform of the Chaebol 
because they were predominantly responsible for the unprecedented economic crisis in 
the 1990s. However, in reality, the new ruling political group joined hands with the 
Chaebol for short-term political victories. This myopic decision, along with far-reaching 
neoliberal restructuring, worsened social contradictions of South Korea.128  
Aggravating social instability owing to the ongoing exportist Fordism has been 
detrimental for the counter-hegemonic group to secure hegemony. In retrospect, it was 
concrete evidence that, as Jessop indicates, any programme to attain hegemony will prove 
most successful when it is closely connected with an appropriate accumulation strategy 
(Jessop, 1990: 211). This is in line with what Gramsci said, “for though hegemony is 
ethical-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive 
function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity” 
                                                 
128 I argue that social contradictions in South Korea have been exemplified, most of all, by its 
highest suicide rate amongst the OECD countries from 2004—for nine years, until 2012 (Lee 
Gwang-ja, 25 March 2014). 
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(Gramsci, 1971b: 161). 
Indeed, the failure of the hegemonic project was owing to its de-linkage with the 
accumulation strategy. In fact, it is noteworthy that Kim Dae-jung had long envisioned 
the linkage between inter-Korean reconciliation and an accumulation strategy through a 
South-North Korean economic community. In that context, he was very enthusiastic about 
inter-Korean business and infrastructure projects, such as building an industrial complex 
in the North Korean city of Kaesung and pursuing inter-Korean railroad linkage project, 
as those would be the first steps toward an inter-Korean economic community where the 
South's capital and technology would be combined with the North's natural resources and 
labour. However, this conception could not be realized because of uncertainties North 
Korea gave as well as resistance the domestic hegemonic group made. In a sense, it was 
outdated because the linkage of nationalism with an accumulation strategy was 
formulated around the year 1970 and, thus, could not reflect the reality about 30 years 
later. Or, it was premature because circumstances in the two Koreas and the international 
arena were not ready for the successful implementation of the plan. In capsule, it was too 
idealistic at that time.129 Resultantly, the inter-Korean reconciliation had little to do with 
the accumulation strategy of the ruling political group.    
Theoretically, the hegemonic project was a national-popular programme in which 
the ruling political group pursued nationalism to secure hegemony. Whilst the opposition 
GNP represented the hegemonic group, including the Chaebol, consistently, the new 
ruling political group did not “base itself specifically on any historical class” (Gramsci, 
1988: 249). The forerunner of the ruling NCNP was the KDP which had represented now 
                                                 
129 The volume of inter-Korean trade, at its peak (in 2008), accounted for less than 0.3 percent 
of the total trade volume of South Korea (Asia Gyeongje, 12 August 2010). That is, the inter-
Korean reconciliation gave little economic benefit to South Korea. 
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the defunct landed class (Choi Jang-Jip, 2005: 130-131). The NCNP represented neither 
the working class, nor small industrial capital such as the owners of the SMEs. Besides, 
the ruling political group could not devise an alternative accumulation strategy to the 
hegemonic group's Chaebol-centered exportist accumulation strategy. In such 
circumstances, the nationalistic goal seemed to be the only viable option for obtaining 
hegemony, though the result was far from satisfactory. 
 
6.5. Conclusion 
 
Each country has its own characteristics in its historical development of the hegemonic 
struggles. In the case of South Korea, the struggles took place over the North Korean 
policy, not over the economic policy. Anti-Communism in South Korean society was so 
deeply-rooted that those who were sympathetic to communism, socialism, and even 
labour movements were brutally punished. As a result, even labour activists who strove 
to change the Chaebol-centred economic structure were easily branded as communist and 
harshly penalized. Instead, initiated and reinforced by nationalism, nationalists that 
prioritised the improvement of inter-Korean relations for unification became major 
counter-hegemonic social forces. That is, the mobilisation power of labour activists was 
not as strong as that of nationalists in South Korean society. The division of the Korean 
peninsula characterized the form of the hegemonic struggles in South Korea, where 
nationalists such as Kim Dae-jung, not labour activists, posed the greatest threat to the 
existing hegemonic group. 
The principal agent of the reconciliation with North Korea from 1998 was the 
new ruling political group. This group can be specifically categorized as liberal 
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nationalists, distinct from independent nationalists, even though the hegemonic group did 
not, or would not, distinguish between them. The group's liberal character was manifested 
not only through its neoliberal economic reforms but also through its functionalist 
approach to inter-Korean relations. This was also revealed in the three guiding principles 
of the North Korean policy that President Kim proclaimed in his inaugural address.  
The three principles, however, were not kept in reality. The new ruling political 
group used inter-Korean relations for political gain by appealing to South Korean people’s 
nationalist aspirations. As a result, the inter-Korean reconciliation accelerated and, in the 
process, Seoul made too many concessions and gained too little in return from Pyongyang. 
The South Korean government did not even take particular measures against North 
Korea's repetitive armed provocations and turned a blind eye to the North's nuclear and 
missile developments in order to maintain good relations with the North Korean 
government. 
If President Kim had adhered to the initial principles of the Sunshine Policy, the 
hegemonic group’s offensive would have been less effective and the North Korean policy 
could have achieved much more in the long run. Seoul had to take time in reconciling 
with North Korea, keep the rule of the separation of economy and politics, and deal with 
the North’s military provocations more sternly. In that context, the ruling political group’s 
hastiness was ‘primarily’ responsible for fierce criticisms over the North Korean policy. 
In addition, Pyongyang was responsible too. But for the North’s unilateral actions, such 
as its occasional military provocations against the South, the situation would have been 
different. However, to Kim Jong-il, those actions were entirely consistent with his 
interests, as will be detailed in the next chapter. 
Last but not least, this thesis takes note of the relationship between South Korea's 
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economy and its North Korean policy. Before 1998, North Korean policy was closely 
related to the economic structure of South Korean society, but the new North Korean 
policy in the Kim Dae-jung era had little to do with it. Kim's vision of linking inter-Korean 
reconciliation with an accumulation strategy through establishing an inter-Korean 
economic community did not consider, most of all, the idiosyncrasy of the North Korean 
system which was averse to implementing a full-scale reform and opening enough to 
make it realized in the short-term. The de-linkage between the North Korean policy and 
the economic structure was one of the main reasons that the hegemonic project failed, and 
South Korean society witnessed the continuance of exportist Fordism. The significances 
of the failure are presented in the fourth section of Chapter IV.  
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Chapter VII. Reconciliation with South Korea  
 
Inter-Korean relations have been closely related to hegemonic struggles in North Korea, 
and South Korean policy has been utilised for the Partisan Faction to maintain its 
hegemony as well as political power. In the mid-1990s, Kim Jong-il witnessed a major 
economic crisis that autarkist Soviet Fordism gave birth to. The organic crisis which was 
the result of excessive subordination of the economy to politics, however, did not bring 
about a new ruling political group, let alone a new hegemonic group. The Party’s 
Monolithic Ideological System did not allow mass consciousness for change and any 
political rivals to Kim Jong-il to exist. The hegemonic group struggled to stop the 
economic crisis from developing into regime change and the collapse of the whole North 
Korean system through Silli Socialism and Seongun Politics. However, these were 
provisional measures as the hegemonic group was afraid of undertaking a comprehensive 
reform for fear of out-of-control capitalization and liberalisation. 
At this juncture, the transfer of political power to Kim Dae-jung in the South 
seemed to be a great opportunity to the hegemonic group in the North. The new ruling 
political group in South Korea was made up of liberal nationalists who had been eager 
for inter-Korean reconciliation, and President Kim Dae-jung kept signaling a major 
change of North Korean policy. As the hegemonic group had no intention of carrying out 
a full-scale reform of the existing system, the possibility of large-scale economic aid from 
Seoul was something that it could not ignore. Thus, new inter-Korean relations could be 
an important instrument in weathering the crisis and maintaining its hegemony. 
The following section begins with the accounts of the existing ruling political 
group’s policy toward South Korea in the Kim Il-sung era. This will show how the ruler 
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in the North took advantage of inter-Korean relations and the issue of unification. The 
next section will demonstrate that the reconciliation with South Korea between 1998 and 
2002 contributed a lot to overcoming the grave economic crisis and strengthening the 
legitimacy of the Kim Jong-il regime. Then, consequences of the reconciliation will be 
presented with regard to domestic hegemonic struggles. This chapter will conclude with 
a summary.  
 
7.1. South Korean Policy in the Kim Il-sung Era  
 
The South Korean policy by Kim Jong-il was consistent with that in the Kim Il-sung era. 
In fact, the continuation of the policy was not an option for Kim Jong-il: he became the 
successor over his uncle Kim Young-ju because he was better than his uncle at reading 
Kim Il-sung's mind. Before 1994 when Kim Il-sung died, Kim Jong-il, as an heir to the 
‘Great Leader’, had adopted and implemented policies toward South Korea in accordance 
with his father's thoughts, or the Juche Ideology—also, he was a de facto co-leader with 
his father for more than ten years. This continued even after Kim Il-sung's death as the 
legitimacy of his rule lay in the fact that he was the very person who could understand 
and realize his father’s thoughts best. Besides, Kim Jong-il's perception of inter-Korean 
relations was already formed while Kim Il-sung was alive, so it would not change 
overnight upon the death of his father (Choi Wan-Kyu, 1998: 196-197). Indeed, it is 
important not to consider Pyongyang's new South Korean policy as completely different 
from the past even though it appeared to be so and, thus, it is critical to understand Kim 
Il-sung’s thought and ideas on inter-Korean relations to analyse the South Korean policy 
of the ruling group. 
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To Kim Il-sung, South Korea was the object with which to unify and inter-Korean 
relations were the instrument with which to achieve it. The unification was to place the 
whole Korean Peninsula under communism—and under the Juche Ideology later—and 
not under capitalism or anything else. As North Korea branded South Korea as an 
American colony and the South Korean government as a puppet government for the 
United States, unification also meant the liberation of the South Korean people from 
American imperialism (Hwang Jang-yop, 2008: 430). 
From the early stages of his rule, Kim Il-sung used the issue of unification as a 
means to strengthen his power in North Korea. For example, in the speech at the inaugural 
congress of the KWP in late August 1946, Kim asserted that the fundamental demand of 
the Korean people was to transform North Korea into a ‘democratic base’ to set up a 
unified, democratic, and wholly independent state, and proposed that unification should 
be the ultimate goal of the Party (Park Tae-ho, 1985: 72). Since then, the party charter has 
specified that the Party should carry out the pressing tasks of national liberation and 
people’s democratic revolution on a national scale, including in South Korea (Jeong Kyu-
seob, 2004: 91-92).  
Kim Il-sung exterminated his rivals within the Party by claiming that the Party 
should be a strong and solid entity for unification with no ‘impure’ forces within the 
organization (Oh Il-hwan, 1999: 356). This was critical in establishing his dictatorship as 
North Korea took the form of the party-state system in which the single communist party 
commanded and controlled all governmental and non-governmental organizations and 
institutions. The August Faction Incident paved the way for his taking full control of the 
Party, and he made the most of antagonistic inter-Korean relations. He argued, “These 
days, the Rhee Syngman faction is abetting this very small number of anti-revolutionary 
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forces to start a riot like the case of Hungary to invade North Korea as it used to do.” and 
added “South Korea is now sending numerous spies to hatch a plot against the Party and 
the government.” (Lee Jong-seok, 1995a: 150). 
In the October Plenum of the Central Committee in 1966, Kim Il-sung insisted 
that South Korea's diplomatic normalization with Japan, in fact, established the military 
base to wage another Korean War and, thus, created a great anxiety over the security of 
North Korea. This became a key ground to establish a permanent Secretary Bureau and 
the post of the General Secretary. This served as another key momentum to strengthen 
dictatorship because, afterwards, he could make important decisions on his own without 
having to hold a formal party meeting (Ryoo Kihl-jae, 2005: 221-222; Oh Il-hwan, 2000: 
70). Later, when Kim Il-sung became the ‘Great Leader’ by calling for the monolithic 
leadership in the new constitution of 1972, the issue of unification was also an effective 
pretext (Kim Se-kyun, 2006: 141). It was similar to the South Korean case of Park Chung-
hee who justified the Yusin system with the excuse of building a firm foundation for 
unification (Kim Jae-hong, 2012: 17). 
While unification was empty political rhetoric to Rhee Syngman and Park 
Chung-hee, Kim Il-sung of North Korea had economic and military capabilities until the 
early 1970s, provided that the U.S. troops were pulled out of the Korean Peninsula. 
Therefore, the North placed the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea as one 
of the key objectives in its relations with the South. Kim Il-sung repeatedly claimed that 
all foreign forces should be withdrawn. However, he did not claim this at the outset. He 
depended upon the power of foreign forces from the Soviet Union and China when he 
waged the Korean War. His rejection of foreign forces was simply aimed at driving 
American troops out of South Korea after the Korean War, and this was aggressively 
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voiced after 1958 when all remaining Chinese troops left North Korea (Lee Sin-cheol, 
2008: 399).  
Kim Il-sung, from the outset, took advantage of the issue of unification in inter-
Korean relations as well. Straight after independence, he deemed that there were many 
nationalists in South Korea and sought to make use of them for political gain. In order to 
appeal to nationalists in South Korea, Kim Il-sung in his speeches frequently emphasized 
national self-determination and the necessity of unification with the South. However, his 
stance was different from that of Kim Gu who said that the ideological confrontation 
between capitalism and socialism on the Korean peninsula would be merely momentary 
(Kim Gu, 2000: 60). The stance of Kim Il-sung was more similar to that of Rhee Syngman 
who prioritised ideology over the Korean nation or prioritised his personal interests over 
everything else. Nevertheless, Kim had to look like a staunch nationalist who devoted 
himself to the task of unifying the two Koreas to strengthen his position in the domestic 
arena.  
If Kim Il-sung had been a devoted nationalist like Kim Gu, for instance, he would 
have opposed the five-year trusteeship plan agreed upon in Moscow in December 1945 
and would have attempted to delay the formation of a separate government in North Korea. 
He pretended to be a committed nationalist, though, by inviting Kim Gu and Kim Kyu-
shik to have unification talks in Pyongyang in April 1948. The two visitors allegedly felt 
insulted to know that Kim Il-sung had already finished all the preparations for the 
establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and that they just played a 
supporting role on a stage which was intended to show that Kim Il-sung had made sincere 
efforts to unify the two Koreas, before setting up the separate government in North Korea 
(Baek Yu-seon, 2008: 346 and Lee Jong-seok, 1995: 205). 
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Kim Il-sung believed that there were many potential social forces in South Korea 
which could rise against the rightist dictatorship, so he advocated the united front tactic 
to win them over to his side (Choi Wan-Kyu, 1998: 195). The united front tactic, 
elaborated on by the Comintern in 1922, was a method to join with labourers, farmers, 
intellectuals, and so on in the struggle against the bourgeoisie (Marxists Internet Archieve, 
1922). Kim Il-sung applied it as a unification tactic, and nationalists in South Korea were 
the main targets. This tactic was particularly preferred after he experienced the formidable 
military power of the United States during the Korean War, and was officially proposed 
in 1960 when South Korea underwent the April Revolution. Kim considered it a golden 
opportunity. On 18 August of the same year, to attract ‘revolutionary forces’ in the South, 
he proposed to establish the North-South Federation in which each political system would 
remain until the complete unification of the two Koreas (Shin Jong-dae et al., 2013). This 
also reflected Kim Il-sung’s confidence in the North’s system over that of the South at 
that time. However, the proposal went awry because of the coup d’état by Park Chung-
hee who harshly cracked down on all forms of unification movements after he seized 
power (Suh Jung-seok, 2007: 123). 
In July 1971, immediately after US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger 
visited Beijing to talk about the Sino-American diplomatic normalisation, Chinese 
Premier Zhou Enlai visited Pyongyang to explain China's new policy toward the United 
States. Then, Zhou conveyed what Kissinger said on 9 July 1971: “If the relationship 
between our countries develops as it might, after the Indochina war ends and the ROK 
troops return to Korea, I would think it quite conceivable that before the end of the next 
term of President Nixon, most, if not all, American troops will be withdrawn from Korea” 
(U.S. Department of State, 2006a in Schaefer, 2010: 6). This delighted Kim Il-sung who 
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regarded the withdrawal of American forces from the South as the optimal condition for 
his united front tactic. Kim was also delighted by the remarks that Kissinger made during 
his second visit to Beijing: “Our present plan is to withdraw a substantial percentage of 
our forces from South Korea in the next years. If the tensions in the Far East continue to 
diminish, the number of forces in Korea can be expected to be very small” (U.S. 
Department of State, 2006b in Schaefer, 2010: 8).  
While publicly supporting the Sino-American rapprochement, Kim Il-sung 
proposed inter-Korean talks to give Washington the impression that tensions on the 
Korean peninsula were being relieved. Park Chung-hee responded positively to his 
suggestion because, on the one hand, he felt it urgent to improve relations with Pyongyang 
to reduce security threats after the Nixon Doctrine and, on the other hand, he tried to 
utilize inter-Korean talks for strengthening his dictatorship. The talks gave birth to the 
July 4th Joint Communiqué and continued until August 1973, when North Korea declared 
a halt in communication with South Korea because Kim realized that Park exploited the 
talks to legitimise the 1972 Yusin system which allowed little room for the unification 
tactic to succeed by tightening control over the people (Harrison, 2002: 140-141).130 Kim 
Il-sung was allegedly outraged, even though he also used the inter-Korean dialogue ‘as a 
pretext for dictatorship’ and also ‘as a tactic for unification’. Regarding the former, several 
months later, North Korea promulgated a new constitution in which the monolithic 
leadership by the 'Great Leader' was stipulated with the emphasis on the need for the 
dictatorship to prepare for unification (Kim Se-keun, 2006: 141). As for the latter, Foreign 
Minister Heo Dam confessed to the GDR ambassador in Pyongyang in August 1972 that 
                                                 
130 However, the official pretext of the halt was the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung in 1973 (Jeon 
Sang-bong, 1999: 184). 
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the communiqué was merely tactical by maintaining that the North would not retain its 
socialist system at all costs (GDR Embassy Pyongyang, 1972 in Schaefer, 2010: 14). 
Some months later, the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung on 8 August 1973 served as a pretext 
for Pyongyang to officially halt the inter-Korean talks (Kim Jin-guk, 2000: 195). 
During this period, Kim Il-sung told a couple of communist leaders in foreign 
countries about his ideas for unification and inter-Korean relations. For example, he 
revealed that North Korea now preferred the united front tactic to direct invasion to South 
Korea for unification. Kim said to Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu in June 1971 and 
Bulgarian Communist Party leader Todor Zhivkov in June 1975 that a military invasion 
could provoke a global-scale war and that the Soviet Union and China would not want to 
be engaged in such a conflict. Hence, unification would be realized only through the 
'growing revolutionary impetus' in the South.131 At that time, it was noteworthy that he 
had two misunderstandings as follows about the issues of unification and inter-Korean 
relations: first, he was assured that the future democratic government in South Korea 
would make possible 'victory through elections' in which the unified Korea would turn 
out to be a socialist system (Schaefer, 2010: 5); second, the enthusiasm for unification in 
South Korea represented the people’s preference for the North Korean system (Schaefer, 
2010: 29). This excessive optimism was analogous to his miscalculation before the 
Korean War that if the North invaded the South, a great number of South Koreans would 
rise against the Rhee Syngman regime and therefore unification would be realized with 
ease (Goh Jin-seok, 2012: 142).  
Even though the first official talks between North and South Korea ended in 
                                                 
131 For the discussion with Ceausescu, please see Wilson Center (1971), and for the discussion 
with Zhivkov, please see Wilson Center (1975).  
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failure, it was for the first time that the two Koreas had formally recognized each other as 
negotiation counterparts. Prior to that, the North Korean government did not want to talk 
with the South Korean government for two reasons: first, as previously mentioned, North 
Korea regarded the South Korean government as a ‘puppet’ government for the United 
States; second, the two Koreas were in a state of armistice but it was the U.S. government, 
not the South Korean government, who signed the cease-fire agreement—regarding 
military issues, Pyongyang deemed it futile to talk with Seoul because the United States 
had both wartime and peacetime operational command of all forces in South Korea.  
After the inter-Korean talks were broken off, Pyongyang concentrated on having 
direct talks with Washington. In particular, this was inspired by the fact that the 
communisation of Vietnam was possible with the withdrawal of American troops from 
Vietnam, which had been agreed upon by North Vietnam and the United States in the 
Paris Peace Accords in 1973 (Ko Jong-suk, 2003: 134-135). Accordingly, in March 1974, 
the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea suggested a peace agreement to the 
United States while it rejected a non-aggression pact proposed by South Korea (Jeong 
Kyu-seob, 2004: 296-297). However, contrary to Pyongyang’s expectations, the 
suggestion was not accepted by Washington.  
In October 1980, a few months after the Gwangju Democratization Movement in 
South Korea, Kim Il-sung proposed founding a Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo at 
the 6th Party Congress. The proposal suggested a unified Korea on a federation formula, 
with one state, two systems and two governments (Kim Se-kyun, 2006: 132-133). He 
added the term ‘democratic’ to the earlier proposal of the North-South Federation in 1960 
in order to appeal to South Korean people who were indignant with the dictatorship that 
made a bloody suppression of the pro-democracy demonstrators. However, Kim’s 
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intentions were to unify Korea through the united front tactic as before, which manifested 
itself in the prerequisites for the creation of the federation that included the guarantees of 
freedom of thought (including communism) and freedom of organizing any party 
(including a communist party), the abolition of the NSL, and the establishment of a peace 
treaty between the United States and North Korea after the withdrawal of U.S. troops 
from South Korea.   
Kim Il-sung's federation formula was a concrete method for realizing the united 
front tactic. In the name of great national unity, the formula aimed to embrace all social 
standings that were discontented with the ruling establishment and foreign powers 
(Hwang Jang-yop, 2010: 220). It also defined the United States as a foreign force in order 
to attack the alliance between Seoul and Washington and emphasized self-reliance to 
stave off interference from abroad, especially from the United States (Hwang Jang-yop, 
2010: 228). Kim Il-sung sought to appeal to South Korean nationalists with the North 
Korean version of nationalism. However, by the 1980s, the nationalism was nothing less 
than to make the Korean people give blind loyalty to Kim by claiming that his absolute 
rule would suit the interests of the people (Hwang Jang-yop, 2010: 318). 
The easing of the Cold War tensions from the late 1980s and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991 posed a serious threat to the national security of North Korea. The 
South Korean government's normalization of diplomatic relations with Russia, eastern 
European countries, and China raised the severity of the situation (Ha Yong-chul, 2003: 
167). In response, Kim Il-sung attempted to open a dialogue with Seoul. This time, the 
main purpose of talks with South Korea was not to promote unification as in the 1970s, 
but to guarantee its security from the United States by showing that North Korea had a 
cooperative and peaceful relationship with South Korea. Subsequently, the two Koreas 
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started talks on a variety of issues, such as inter-Korean parliamentary talks, high-level 
inter-Korean talks, inter-Korean Red Cross talks, and so on. A series of inter-Korean talks 
resulted in two major agreements: the Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, 
Nonaggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation on 13 December 1991 and the Joint 
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on 31 December 1991.132  
In accordance with the Joint Declaration, an inspection team from the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was allowed into North Korea in May 1992. 
However, the team found that North Korea did not reveal its nuclear facilities fully and, 
in February 1993, the North refused to permit special inspections from the IAEA. To 
make matters worse, in March 1993, it threatened to withdraw from the NPT (Suh Sang-
mok, 2004: 257). It utterly ignored the Joint Declaration in only one-and-a-half years. 
This signified that Kim Il-sung from the outset had no intention to keep the agreement it 
made with South Korea. Then why did North Koreans sit at the negotiation table with 
South Koreans? It was because Kim wanted to impress Washington, not Seoul. This was 
evidenced by the facts that the North willfully brought negotiations with the South to an 
end by threatening to turn Seoul into a 'sea of fire' in March 1994 while it continued a 
series of talks with Washington (Park Hyun-hee, 2005: 82).  
Eventually, Kim Il-sung had North Korea sign the Agreed Framework with the 
United States, not with South Korea, on 21 October 1994, in which the North agreed to 
freeze its plutonium production programme in return for fuel oil and the construction of 
two light-water reactor power plants. The Agreed Framework also specified economic 
                                                 
132 The Joint Declaration on denuclearization forbade both Koreas to test, produce, receive, 
possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons and also banned the possession of nuclear 
reprocessing and enrichment facilities. In 1991, before the completion of the Joint 
Declaration, Washington pulled U.S. tactical nuclear weapons out of the Korean peninsula 
(Yu Ho-yeol, 2004: 300).  
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cooperation and the step-by-step normalization of relations between Washington and 
Pyongyang. Kim Il-sung died in July 1997, about three months before the settlement of 
the negotiation with the United States. Now the ball was in his son’s court.  
In general, South Korean policy was the interplay of the Juche Ideology and the 
hegemonic Partisan Faction's interests. The Juche Ideology was closely connected to 
nationalism, and the most urgent nationalistic goal that North Korea claimed was the 
unification with South Korea. The North argued that, in order to unify with the South that 
was backed by strong U.S. forces, North Korean society should be united under the 
monolithic leadership of Kim Il-sung. Under the pretext of preparing for unification, the 
Kim Il-sung faction purged all (possible) rivals and established the Monolithic Ideological 
System and autarkist Soviet Fordism. In that process, Kim Il-sung and the members of 
the Partisan Faction monopolised material interests in North Korea. 
 
7.2. Inter-Korean Reconciliation as a Hegemonic Project 
  
The ruling political group in the Kim Jong-il era, like that in the Kim Il-sung era, utilised 
the issue of inter-Korean relations as a key instrument to legitimise the new leadership, 
add to its traditional unification efforts, secure the regime from external threats. And yet, 
there was another and more important purpose with regard to the issue to Kim Jong-il. 
Economic recovery was not attainable without a full-scale reform of the system and thus 
the North Korean regime needed outside help urgently. Overcoming the organic crisis 
was of primary significance to revive the backbone of the system: the consent mechanism 
that inculcated North Koreans with the Juche Ideology that justified the dictatorship by 
the Kim family. It was critical to maintain the hegemonic rule in the North. 
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Reconciling with the South Korean government for economic gain had no 
obstacles in domestic politics as long as Kim Jong-il found the legitimacy in his father’s 
words. In that vein, on 4 August 1997, immediately after he was nominated as general 
secretary of the Party, he publicly pledged to carry out Kim Il-sung's instructions on 
unification in an article entitled, “Let's carry out the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung's 
instructions on unification thoroughly” (Yu Ho-yeol, 2004: 303). 
Although the issue of inter-Korean relations was critical in strengthening the 
hegemonic rule, there was little progress in the relationship between North and South 
Korea until the end of 1997. In the South, President Kim Young-sam did not show 
particular enthusiasm for the issue of unification and had no trust in the North Korean 
regime, owing to a series of provocative actions such as the nuclear problem in 1992-
1994 and the submarine infiltration incident on 18 September 1996 (Do Jin-sun, 2001: 
46). In the North, Kim Jong-il was outraged by the fact that, when Kim Il-sung died, Kim 
Young-sam did not offer condolences and even banned South Korean civic groups and 
student organizations from sending delegations to the funeral (Dong-A Ilbo, 21 December 
2011). It was not until the inauguration of Kim Dae-jung as president of South Korea that 
inter-Korean relations began to make meaningful advances. Kim Dae-jung had been a 
nationalist with a sincere interest in unification for decades, and he sent repeated 
suggestions for reconciliation to Pyongyang.  
In fact, North Korea had eagerly anticipated the day that Kim Dae-jung became 
the president since he lost the 1971 presidential election closely. Kim Il-sung expected 
that if Kim Dae-jung became the head of state, he would attempt to engage in dialogue 
with North Korea, and this would enhance the chances of implementing the united front 
tactic (Schaefer, 2010: 5). However, Kim Jong-il at the outset assumed a cautious attitude 
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toward the reconciliation with South Korea because circumstances had changed 
drastically. In the early 1970s, Pyongyang expected that frequent inter-Korean contact 
would enable more and more South Koreans to favour the North Korean system. However, 
in the late 1990s, the situation was reversed. Rapid progress in relations with South Korea 
could be fatal to the regime security as the South was far more economically developed 
than the North. North Korean people had been brainwashed into thinking that they were 
living on an earthly paradise, but frequent contact with South Korean people, culture, and 
products could disillusion them. This could trigger a breakdown of the whole North 
Korean system. Moreover, Kim Jong-il was doubtful about the real intentions of the 
Sunshine Policy. The South Korean leader might have been mindful of unification by 
absorption. This suspicion was not groundless because that was the North’s intention 
when it pursued the reconciliation with the South in the early 1970s (Wilson Center, 
1972b).133  
For the time being, Pyongyang was ambivalent about Seoul's Sunshine Policy. 
On the one hand, North Korea showed strong hostility towards it. It claimed that the 
policy was merely ‘a silly dream’ that could not come true and that South Korea was 
doing a foolish thing in exchanging politics for money. It also said that the policy revealed 
the South's ambition to extend the United States’ colonial rule to the North. Rodong 
Shinmun interpreted the South Korean policy as an anti-unification monologue by 
arguing that its essence was to induce North Korea to reform itself and open the door, 
which meant the categorical denial of the current North Korean system. Until June 1999, 
the North Korean newspaper contended that the policy was nothing but a scheme for 
unification by absorption (Kim Yeong-su, 1999: 12-13). 
                                                 
133 See also Wilson Center (1972a). 
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On the other hand, Pyongyang showed an unprecedented interest in the Sunshine 
Policy. In the past, it had ignored Seoul’s North Korean policies and just urged Seoul to 
accept the proposals from Pyongyang. In contrast, Pyongyang paid great attention to the 
North Korean policy of the Kim Dae-jung administration and strove to minimize the 
possible, negative consequences. Besides, Pyongyang avoided giving a direct rebuke to 
President Kim Dae-jung. It easily branded former South Korean presidents or other 
politicians as puppets but it never called President Kim a puppet. When it wanted to 
criticize South Korean persons, it just called them by their name without using titles. 
However, when it wanted to criticize President Kim, it did not mention his name and 
instead used the term Jipgwonja (meaning the person in power) (Kim Yeong-su, 1999: 
14-17).  
North Korea, after all, had no choice but to reconcile with South Korea at that 
time. Economic necessity was the primary reason. The economic crisis, accompanied by 
massive starvation, destabilized North Korean society to the extent that it threatened the 
very existence of the regime, particularly by undermining the consent mechanism as 
afore-mentioned. Kim Jong-il was implementing a number of drastic politics to overcome 
the economic crisis. However, external assistance was very much needed because the 
main cause of the crisis was the North Korean system itself that established and preserved 
the dictatorship of the Kim family.  
The reconciliation would facilitate inter-Korean economic transactions to the 
advantage of North Korea. Already, North Korea earned a large amount of money from 
the Mt. Kumgang project with Hyundai, which was supported by the South Korean 
government. Full-scale reconciliation would enable more South Korean companies to 
invest in North Korea and bring in huge amounts of capital to Pyongyang. It would be 
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critical to receive foreign aid as well. Without that, North Korea would have difficulty in 
obtaining aid copiously from Western countries, not to mention direct economic 
assistance from South Korea.  
The continuation of antagonistic relations with South Korea could be 
advantageous to the regime in oppressing the people. However, it would block North 
Korea from entering the road to economic recovery and, eventually, lead to a crisis of the 
whole system. Reconciliation with the South could weaken the stability of the regime but 
it would be decisive in reviving the economy. Eventually, according to Park Hyeong-jung, 
a policy switch in favour of reconciliation with Seoul was settled after a series of debates 
between the conservatives and the reformists in the latter half of 1999. They decided that 
North Korea would take advantage of South Korea to solve its economic problems on the 
condition that it should strengthen its internal controls (Park Hyeong-jung, 2000: 24). As 
a measure for the latter, for example, the North used the slogan 'mosquito nets of Juche' 
to block any negative consequences of the reconciliation with the South. By the same 
token, North Korean media frequently claimed that people in the North should beware of 
capitalist elements which could throw society into chaos and destroy the morality of the 
people (Kim Yeong-su, 1999: 21-22). 
Kim Il-sung opted for a self-sustaining economy because they considered that 
economic autonomy from the Soviet Union and China would be beneficial to their 
attaining hegemony. Likewise, Kim Jong-il chose reconciliation with South Korea as it 
could contribute to their maintaining hegemony in the midst of the economic crisis. 
Consequently, the reconciliation process was geared toward enhancing economic 
cooperation for the most part, while military problems were still discussed mainly with 
Washington. In addition, economic cooperation was confined to the form of trade and aid 
254 
 
for the survival of the regime, not devised as a preparation for unification—for example, 
the two Koreas agreed to seek balanced economic development between North and South 
Korea but, in reality, only the projects which could guarantee direct material benefits to 
Pyongyang were carried out.  
The June 15 North–South Joint Declaration was also coined and utilized in ways 
that were conducive to the best interests of the hegemonic group. To North Korea, the 
wording of the first clause, ‘independently without any foreign interference,’ established 
legal grounds for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the peninsula. The second clause 
was interpreted such that Kim Jong-il made the South Korean leader formally 
acknowledge his father's unification formula. The promotion of economic cooperation in 
the fourth clause was of practical help because it provided explicit grounds to receive 
economic assistance from the South. The North Korean media evaluated the historical 
significance of the declaration as follows: first, it was a great achievement of North 
Korea’s leader Kim Jong-il who demonstrated his superior ideas, leadership, and brave 
decisions; second, it showed to the world that the long-cherished wish of unification could 
not be stifled by any anti-unification forces both at home and abroad (Shim Byeong-cheol, 
2002: 160-161). 
North Korea reconciled with South Korea upon the consent of its military. 
Pyongyang pursued the rapprochement in cooperation with the military, not in disregard 
of it. Moreover, the armed forces kept the lion's share of material benefits from the new 
relations with Seoul. Generals earned a lot of money by engaging in trade with South 
Korea. The conditions of soldiers improved first as the regime preferentially distributed 
to the military food and goods it gained from the South. This was helpful for common 
people to sustain their lives any way because when soldiers were not given food and 
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goods, they extorted them from citizens (Hwang Jang-yop, 2001: 293). Meanwhile, even 
after the Joint Declaration, North Korea’s military continued armed provocations against 
South Korea as a show of strength and Pyongyang pushed ahead with nuclear and missile 
development programmes supported with the money it received from the South. This was 
possible because the inter-Korean summit agreement was, primarily, not to promote peace, 
but to prepare for unification, as explained in the previous chapter, and thus it did not 
explicitly include any articles that would be helpful to head off military conflicts between 
the two Koreas.  
The reconciliation with South Korea, first and foremost, contributed to North 
Korea’ economic rebound (Lee Young Hoon, 2005: 205). Inter-Korean trade officially 
began in October 1988 when the South Korean government announced the Basic Guide 
for Inter-Korean Commodities Exchange. The North's major export goods were fisheries 
and textile goods manufactured through process-on-commission, but the profits were 
meagre (Lee Young Hoon, 2005: 182). The introduction of the Sunshine Policy in 1998 
made North Korea enjoy a considerable trade surplus with South Korea, in which the Mt. 
Kumgang Project was a major source of revenue. As the following Table 13 shows, the 
inter-Korean summit in 2000 was another catalyst as the South Korean government 
actively backed the private sector's economic transactions with the North. The volume of 
humanitarian aid also surged from 2000 as shown in Table 14. North Korea registered 
positive economic growth from 1999 after nine years of negative growth. According to 
Lee Young Hoon, were it not for inter-Korean trade and humanitarian aid, North Korea 
would have posted negative growth for the years 1999-2002 (Lee Young Hoon, 2005: 
204).  
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Table 13. Changes in inter-Korean trade volume from North Korea’s perspective from 
1995 to 2002 (1 million USD) 
 
Source: Lee Young Hoon (2005: 186).  
 
Table 14. Changes in humanitarian aid volume from 1995 to 2002 (10,000 USD) 
Source: Lee Young Hoon (2005: 192).  
 
Reconciliation with Seoul also played a significant role in Pyongyang's improving 
relations with the United States. While Washington negotiated with Pyongyang over the 
missile and nuclear issues, Seoul often took Pyongyang's side. For example, President 
Kim Dae-jung showed skepticism about the possibility of the North's nuclear program 
through the media when the Kumchangri issue arose in 1998 (Dong-A Ilbo, 21 November 
1998). Despite a series of high-level talks, after September 1999 during which North 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Outflow 223 182 193 92 122 152 176 272 
Inflow 64 70 115 130 212 273 227 370 
Total 287 252 308 222 333 425 403 642 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
South 
Korea 
government 23,200 305 2,667 1,100 2,825 7,863 7,045 8,375 
private sector 25 155 2,056 1,863 3,513 6,494 5,117 7,061 
total 23,225 460 4,723 3,185 4,688 11,376 13,539 13,492 
Int’l Community 5,565 9,765 6,350 30,199 35,988 18,177 35,725 25,768 
Total 28,790 10,225 31,073 33,384 40,676 29,553 49,264 39,219 
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Korea declared a moratorium on its missile tests, relations between the United States and 
North Korea made little progress. Then, the high-profile inter-Korean summit talks broke 
the stalemate. A few months later, in October 2000 Cho Myong-rok, vice chairman of the 
North's National Defense Commission, visited Washington as a special envoy (Ha Yeong-
seon, 2006: 174). In the same month, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright paid her 
visit to Pyongyang to meet Kim Jong-il as a move to end long-standing enmities between 
the two countries (Jeon Sang-bong, 1999: 164). 
Other capitalist countries followed suit before long. In the case of Japan, it held 
a series of normalization talks with North Korea in 1991 and 1992. However, they all 
ended in failure because of the North's excessive demands for compensation for Japan's 
colonial rule (Ha Yong-chul, 2003: 193). The talks did not resume owing to the issues 
surrounding the North's nuclear and missile programs. The inter-Korean summit in June 
2000 facilitated the progress of relations between Japan and North Korea and, about three 
months later, the first ever summit talks were held in Pyongyang. A month later, 
negotiations for diplomatic normalization officially recommenced (Ha Yong-chul, 2003: 
218-219). 
From 1998, when the reconciliation process began in the peninsula, North 
Korea's relations with Western countries improved fast. In December 1998, the first 
political talks were held between North Korea and the European Union and, in January 
1999, representatives of the European Union visited Pyongyang to have talks with Kim 
Jong-il (Jeong Min-su, 2004: 54). Relations with individual countries were also enhanced. 
This began with the establishment of ambassador-level diplomatic relations with Italy in 
January 2000. North Korea was of more interest to Western countries after the inter-
Korean summit talks. Before long, the North set up ambassador-level diplomatic relations 
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with the United Kingdom in December 2000, the Netherlands and Belgium in January 
2001, Spain and Canada in February 2001, and Germany, Luxembourg, and New Zealand 
in March 2001 (Suh Jin-yeong, 2003: 84). 
 
7.3. Consequences of Inter-Korean Reconciliation on Hegemonic 
Struggles 
  
The hegemonic group of North Korea pursued rapprochement with South Korea 
deliberately. It made use of the new inter-Korean relations as a means to fend off possible 
political instability followed by the unprecedented economic crisis. The crisis broke down 
the public distribution system and had North Korean people engage in trade and stay away 
from their companies and hometowns. The Party’s tight grip on the people became looser 
as more and more people did not participate regularly in the Review Meeting on Everyday 
Life and the political activities of extra-governmental bodies in which the Party 
indoctrinated them with the ideology of Juche that provided legitimacy for the 
dictatorship of the Kim family. The indoctrination through the Party was critical to the 
rule of the hegemonic group. Only when North Koreans accept the legitimacy of the 
absolute rule of the Kim dynasty can the current system be preserved. Hence, overcoming 
the economic crisis was directly related to the maintenance of political power by the 
hegemonic group.  
The economic support from the South was not enough to normalise the North’s 
national economy. However, we can assume that the Number One Plan and plans for the 
Party economy and the defence industry—which were essential to maintaining the 
dictatorship in North Korea—must have been substantially helped by the US dollars, food, 
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fertilizers, and so on from Seoul. In addition, the hegemonic group implemented Silli 
socialism and Seongun politics to stabilize society in the midst of the economic crisis, and 
the economic benefits from the reconciliation with the South were beneficial in 
implementing them more extensively and effectively. For example, they were conducive 
to conducting Silli Socialism by providing relevant supplies and money for the economic 
sector and, also, they were of great assistance in executing Seongun politics by allocating 
food to the military primarily and purchasing military equipment with the money the 
North received from the South. 
The reconciliation benefitted the Party, the military, and the Cabinet of North 
Korea and thus strengthened the power of the state vis-à-vis society. The economic gains 
contributed to the recovery of industrial facilities and thus led many people to go back to 
their workplaces and homes. As a result, more people could participate in the Review 
Meeting on Everyday Life and the political activities of extra-governmental bodies. This 
strengthened the Party's clout, though it was not at the same level as before the economic 
crisis. Even though the military opposed the reconciliation at the beginning, it received 
the lion's share of the fruits of the new relations with South Korea. Besides, regardless of 
the overt rapprochement, the military did not restrain itself from conducting armed 
provocations against South Korea and, moreover, its nuclear and missile development 
programmes were aided with the US dollars it received from the South. The Cabinet had 
been a key advocate for the reconciliation as money, goods, and materials from the South 
would be essential for the successful implementation of the reforms that it attempted to 
undertake. Direct and indirect assistance from the South Korean government helped the 
Cabinet to carry out the July 1 Measures in 2002. 
At the outset, Pyongyang worried about the possible negative consequences of 
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the inter-Korean reconciliation. However, they turned out to be insignificant, at least in 
the short term. North Korea’s various measures to curtail negative consequences took 
effect to some extent. Nonetheless, more fundamentally, the political stability was due to 
the fact that there was no room for a counter-hegemonic group to take root in the North. 
As described in Chapter VI, North Koreans did not have an alternative to the Juche 
Ideology—even books written by Marx or Lenin North Koreans could read only in the 
library with the Party's permission—and Kim Jong-il had no political rivals to challenge 
him. Therefore, no pivotal ideas or persons existed that could mobilize any counterforces 
against the hegemonic group even when North Koreans saw many South Korean and U.S. 
products in the farmers' markets—a sizeable amount of assistance and aid to North Korea 
was diverted for resale in these markets (Manyin and Nikitin, 2011: 12). 
With regard to the military provocations and the nuclear and missile development 
programmes, the South Korean government gave North Korea the benefit of the doubt 
and tried to conciliate with it. On the contrary, the United States did not. In particular, 
after the Bush administration was inaugurated in January 2001, the United States stepped 
up its pressure against North Korea, which culminated in Bush's labelling the North as 
part of an axis of evil, along with Iran and Iraq in January 2002 (BBC, 2 February 2002). 
Eventually, the reconciliation with the South aimed to attain positive results in the areas 
of economy, politics, and security but, from January 2001, achievements in the security 
field vanished. Nonetheless, in a general sense, the reconciliation project with South 
Korea, pursued by the North’s hegemonic group, was successful in preserving its 
hegemony. 
From a Gramscian perspective, the hegemonic project had a national-popular 
outlook of nationalism. The North Korean regime made the reconciliation with South 
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Korea look like a realization of Kim Il-sung’s instructions on unification which was the 
most important task in the pursuit of North Korean nationalism. In effect, however, the 
reconciliation was implemented to alleviate the people’s suffering resulting from North 
Korea's accumulation strategy and to support, albeit in a limited fashion, the new 
economic policy called Silli socialism. We can interpret Pyongyang's hegemonic project 
as being more closely related to its economic objectives and, in that sense, the North had 
more tangible fruits than its southern counterpart through the inter-Korean reconciliation 
from the late-1990s. 
 
7.4. Conclusion 
 
During the Cold War, Kim Il-sung took advantage of inter-Korean relations, on the one 
hand, to strengthen his power in North Korea and, on the other hand, to unify the Korean 
peninsula under communist control. In particular, his federation formula was a means to 
realizing the united front tactic to attract South Korean people with nationalistic 
aspirations to his side and to topple the South Korean capitalist state. With the relaxation 
of Cold War tensions from the late 1980s, one more purpose was added: securing the 
North Korean regime from external threats, particularly from the United States. Talks 
with South Korean leaders were primarily for show to impress American policy-makers. 
Agreements with the South Korean government were mere scraps of paper, as were the 
Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation and the 
Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1991. 
Kim Jong-il and his inner-circles used the inter-Korean rapprochement to fulfil 
the three purposes as well. As for the consolidation of power in the domestic sphere, the 
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new leadership claimed that Kim Jong-il faithfully followed his father's instructions on 
unification, which was helpful in justifying the hereditary succession. Regarding the 
unification of the Korean peninsula, the inter-Korean reconciliation gave the North 
opportunities to expand exchanges in cultural, sports, and so on with the South. There 
was little prospect of unification under the communist leadership in the 2000s. However, 
the reconciliation could at least weaken the capitalist country's power by dividing South 
Korean society ideologically—it is better to have a divided enemy than to have a unified 
one. Last but not least, the new relations with Seoul helped ease Pyongyang's security 
concerns through improved relations with Washington. 
There was one more purpose when Kim Jong-il shook hands with Kim Dae-jung 
at Pyongyang Sunan Airport in June 2000. It was to receive as much help as possible from 
South Korea to overcome the economic crisis. This was of far greater importance than 
the aforementioned three purposes at that time. The economic crisis had impaired the 
Party’s activities that indoctrinated North Korean people with the Juche Ideology which 
justified the dictatorship by the Kim family; therefore, overcoming it was of critical 
significance to the maintenance of hegemony. That is, the reconciliation was a hegemonic 
project by the then North Korean leadership. Hence, it was implemented primarily for 
economic purposes, rather than out of nationalist aspirations even though the North 
claimed this to be so.  
If North Korea truly intended to seek cooperation between Korean people, it 
would not stage armed provocations against South Korean people. Those provocations, 
however, backfired against North Korea by swaying public opinion in South Korea to the 
disadvantage of the North and empowering the existing hegemonic group in the South. If 
North Korea took consistent action for peace on the Korean peninsula, the economic 
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benefits it received from South Korea and other capitalist countries would have been 
much bigger than they actually were and, therefore, would have been much more helpful 
in restoring the economy. 
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Chapter VIII. Conclusion 
 
8.1. Summary: Main Arguments and Empirical Findings 
 
Applying a Gramscian approach, this thesis explores the relationship between hegemonic 
struggles in South and North Korea and the inter-Korean reconciliation from 1998 to 2002 
and it argues that the reconciliation was pursued as hegemonic projects by the ruling 
political groups of the two Koreas.  
In South Korea, the 1997 economic crisis was an organic crisis that Chaebol-
friendly exportist Fordism in the early stages of neoliberalisation yielded. The crisis 
caused the counter-hegemonic liberal nationalists led by Kim Dae-jung to take over 
political power. The new North Korean policy was a ‘national-popular’ programme that 
pursued nationalism to secure hegemony. That is, the reconciliation was devised and 
implemented to appeal to nationalist sentiment of the public for political gain. 
Furthermore, it could end South Koreans’ antagonism toward communist North Korea 
and, hence, weaken anti-Communism which had been the hegemonic group's ideological 
base and the most effective instrument to repress its opposition forces. The rhetoric was 
to enhance peace on the peninsula but, in reality, the reconciliation process was 
undertaken at the expense of tolerating North Korea's armed provocations and nuclear 
and missile development. The ruling political group clung to repairing inter-Korean 
relations because it was a project designed to attain hegemony from the hands of the 
hegemonic group.  
In the case of North Korea, the South Korean policy had a ‘national-popular’ 
outlook of nationalism but, in practice, it aimed to fulfil economic objectives to preserve 
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hegemony. The economic crisis in the 1990s was an organic crisis resulted from 
Pyongyang's autarkist Soviet Fordism that excessively subordinated the economy to 
politics and thus worsened the shortcomings of the socialist system. The economic crisis 
brought about unparalleled damage to the existing system and, most of all, severely 
debilitated the state’s tight grip on society. In particular, the economic crisis undermined 
the Party's consent mechanism that indoctrinated North Korean people with the Juche 
Ideology that legitimized the dictatorship and made hegemonic rule possible. 
Overcoming the economic crisis was vital to preserving hegemony, and the hegemonic 
group needed help from outside because it refused to embark on a thorough reform of the 
existing system which had been designed and implemented for the dictatorship of the Kim 
family. That is, economic aid from the South and other capitalist countries was crucial to 
keeping the existing system without a full-scale reform. Hence, the reconciliation was 
taken primarily for economic gain by the hegemonic group to maintain hegemony in the 
midst of the economic crisis. Pyongyang’s new South Korean policy was not to make a 
genuine reconciliation with Seoul but to preserve the existing system of North Korea with 
the help of South Korea and, therefore, Kim Jong-il could shake hands with Kim Dae-
jung while he secretly developed nuclear weapons. 
More specifically speaking, in South Korea, the new ruling political group was 
made up of liberal nationalists led by longtime dissident Kim Dae-jung. The thesis 
advanced the following three groups as major counter-hegemonic social forces in South 
Korea: liberal nationalists, independent nationalists, and labour activists. Amongst them, 
liberal nationalists were the most powerful group and constituted the leading opposition 
party when South Korea was severely hit by the economic crisis in 1997. Independent 
nationalists and labour activists could not expand their power considerably because of the 
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strong anti-communist sentiment in society, as they were easily branded as reds. Kim 
Dae-jung himself had been branded as a red before, but the democratization in 1987 
released the shackles, at least ‘officially’. Liberal nationalists obtained political power as 
the public became disenchanted with the existing hegemonic group, and also as the 
hegemonic group split over the crisis and Kim Jong-pil, a political icon of Chungcheong 
Province, sided with Kim Dae-jung. 
Hegemony, however, was still in the hands of the existing hegemonic group. The 
group had been formed in the Park Chung-hee era, made up of the ruling party politicians 
including ex-military politicians such as Park himself, large industrial capital (the 
Chaebol), most state bureaucrats, and the conservative press. They were constructors and 
beneficiaries of the historical bloc that achieved an economic miracle in the 1960s and 
1970s. The production process of exportist Fordism determined the economic structure 
of the historical bloc, and the developmental state and anti-Communism constituted the 
superstructures of the bloc. Most members of the hegemonic group had been pro-Japanese 
collaborators in the colonial days and, after independence, survived and prospered by 
advocating anti-Communism which primarily made possible the hegemonic rule. There 
were not a few members who had not collaborated with Japanese colonial rule, but all the 
members were strong anti-communists. 
It was the economic crisis that struck a serious blow to the hegemonic group. The 
group had adapted to new circumstances successfully before the crisis. For example, since 
the early 1980s, it had adopted neoliberalism as a policy guideline and slowly turned the 
state into a neoliberal state. By the time of the presidency of Kim Young-sam, state 
economic bureaucrats were all proponents of neoliberalism even though they could be 
divided into two groups according to their attitude toward the Chaebol. In the mid-1990s, 
267 
 
the hegemonic group still relied upon exportist Fordism for the production process and, 
most of all, anti-Communism to preserve hegemony.  
Interestingly, the counter-hegemonic ‘liberal’ nationalists who obtained political 
power as a consequence of the economic crisis accelerated neoliberalisation including the 
financialization of the economy and greater flexibility in the labour market that the 
hegemonic group had failed to implement in the previous administration. The ruling 
political group’s attitude toward the Chaebol became quite the same as the hegemonic 
group’s when it halted the reform of the Chaebol in mid-2000 for the victory of the 
presidential election in December 2002 as the United States’ dot-com bubble burst in the 
spring of 2000 dampened South Korea's economic growth. The result was Chaebol-
friendly neoliberalisation with continuing exportist Fordism as the production process. 
This was in a sense inevitable because exportist accumulation strategy was considered 
common sense even to the counter-hegemonic group.  
Meanwhile, the ruling liberal ‘nationalists’ relied upon nationalism to maintain 
political power and attain hegemony by appealing to nationalistic aspirations and by 
undermining anti-Communism in society. In that sense, reconciliation with North Korea 
was deemed critical and, thus, it was pursued as a hegemonic project. Therefore, the South 
Korean government did not take appropriate measures against the North's missile tests, 
armed provocations, and suspicious nuclear activities in order to be on good terms with 
the North Korean government. This invited harsh criticism from the hegemonic group, 
particularly from conservative media outlets. More and more people had negative views 
on the inter-Korea reconciliation not only because of the strong oppositions from the 
hegemonic group but also because of North Korea’s continuing military provocations. 
Subsequently, the reconciliation rather intensified ideological disputes and could not 
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lessen anti-Communism in society and, thus, the hegemonic project could not achieve the 
desired outcome. 
In North Korea, Kim Jong-il became the new leader after Kim Il-sung died in 
July 1994 and his era officially began from September 1998. However, before Kim Il-
sung's death, Kim Jong-il, as an heir to and a de facto co-leader with the ‘Great Leader’ 
for more than ten years, had made South Korean policy in accordance with his father's 
thoughts. Also, as Kim Jong-il's perception of inter-Korean relations would not change 
overnight upon the death of Kim Il-sung, policies toward South Korea in his era were 
highly consistent with those in his father's era. Kim Il-Sung had three purposes with 
regard to inter-Korean talks: first, to strengthen his power in the North; second, to unify 
Korea under communist control; and third, to help secure the North Korean regime from 
external threats, particularly from the United States. The new leadership ‘added’ one more 
purpose: to receive as much help as possible from the South Korean government to 
overcome the economic crisis. The fourth purpose was analogous to the third one that 
Kim Il-sung set when the relaxation of Cold War tensions posed a great security threat to 
the North Korean regime, in that it was also set up to take advantage of inter-Korean 
relations in order to weather a serious crisis. This time, it was the unprecedented economic 
crisis from the mid-1990s that the existing North Korean system could not cope with by 
itself and thus brought Pyongyang to the inter-Korean dialogue.  
The historical bloc of North Korea was established in the Kim Il-sung era by the 
hegemonic group which was composed of high-ranking party officials, military generals, 
high-ranking government officials, and (bereaved) families of the so-called 
‘revolutionary fighters’ who had fought with Kim Il-sung against the Japanese colonial 
army—the Partisan Faction—or who had distinguished military achievements during the 
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Korean War. Amongst them, the Partisan Faction and their families who had been loyal 
to Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il were the core members of the group. It is also noteworthy 
that the party bureaucracy was the strongest fraction in the state bureaucracy. The 
hegemonic group helped Kim Il-sung to build the historical bloc which was basically 
intended to strengthen Kim’s dictatorship in the North and free Pyongyang from external 
pressures, particularly from Moscow and Beijing. The bloc was made up of the economic 
structure which was determined by the production process of autarkist Soviet Fordism, 
and its superstructures included the Stalinist state as a form of state and the Juche Ideology 
as a ruling ideology. 
The historical bloc had been weakened slowly because of stagnated productivity 
and the ailing economy which resulted from the socialist system's innate drawbacks and 
North Korea's autarkist Soviet Fordism. The distinctive production process had 
excessively subordinated the economy to politics by, for example, adopting the party 
management committee system in which the party secretary, not the manager, chaired the 
management committee in accordance with political necessities, not economic efficiency 
and rationality. The system was designed to rely more on labour mobilisation to 
compensate for shrinking foreign aid as Kim Il-sung decided to take autarkist 
accumulation strategy to free North Korea under his dictatorship from the pressures of 
the Soviet Union and China. Then, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and a series 
of natural disasters in the mid-1990s had devastating effects on the economic structure of 
the bloc.  
The economic crisis in the 1990s severely damaged the state's control over 
society. As more and more people engaged in trade to survive, owing to the breakdown 
of the public distribution system, fewer and fewer people regularly participated in Party 
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activities such as the Review Meeting on Everyday Life and the activities of extra-
governmental organisations where people were indoctrinated into the cult of personality 
of Kim Il-sung. Eventually, the economic crisis posed a great threat to the historical bloc 
itself as those Party activities were critical in the mechanism of consent—which was not 
created spontaneously but established by the party-state—and the backbone of the unique 
system which made possible the hegemonic rule. Instead of the Party, the North Korean 
state brought the Cabinet and the military to the forefront and carried out Silli socialism 
and Seongun politics to manage the crisis. These measures helped the hegemonic group 
to preserve political power. However, they could not bring sufficient economic recovery 
to stop the expansion of the market and the erosion of the indoctrination system.  
For fear of out-of-control capitalization and liberalisation, the hegemonic group 
could not take a comprehensive reform of the existing system and thus it needed external 
help in forms of aid, trade or compensation which can be more manageable. In that 
context, the reconciliation with South Korea was considered vital to maintaining 
hegemony and, thus, it was pursued deliberately primarily for economic gain even though 
ostensibly it was undertaken to realize Kim Il-sung’s instructions on unification. The 
reconciliation turned out to be a success at least in the short-term by contributing to the 
North’s economic recovery and, indirectly, to improving relations with the United States 
and other capitalist countries. What the North received from the South was not sufficient 
to normalise the national economy but it helped the state regain its power vis-à-vis society 
considerably. Meanwhile, the military could continue armed provocations against South 
Korea even after the June 15 North-South Joint Declaration because it was primarily an 
agreement to prepare for unification, not to promote peace, and thus it did not specify any 
articles that would prevent military conflicts between North and South Korea. 
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8.2. Empirical Implications of the Study 
 
The primary reason why Seoul’s North Korean policy had limited consequences was that 
the ruling liberal nationalists implemented it in haste to lay a foundation for unification 
in order to appeal to the nationalistic aspirations of the public. The reconciliation with 
North Korea should have focused more on enhancing peace than on preparing for 
unification. From a historical perspective of the Korean nation, unification was a very 
urgent issue. However, practically, the issue of unification was close to impossible to 
resolve through talks with the Stalinist leadership in the North in a short period of time. 
It was in the same vein that Kim Il-sung had concluded in the early 1970s that unification 
through talks would be impossible as long as South Korea had a dictatorial regime.  
Historically, the North has been very skillful in taking advantage of nationalists 
in the South. This would be repeated if South Koreans tried to approach North Korea 
under the banner of nationalism. This is because North Korean leaders are not sincere 
nationalists even though they pretend to be. As aforementioned, those people who call the 
Korean nation ‘the Kim Il-sung nation’ cannot be nationalists in a general sense. 
Nationalism has been merely a good instrument to serve their interests. Therefore, those 
South Koreans who want to join hands with the North Korean regime to realize 
unification are doomed to failure, not by criticism from their rivals in the South but, 
decisively, by the betrayal of political leaders in the North.   
The Sunshine Policy, when first devised, well materialized functionalism in 
international relations and, when duly practised, could have contributed a lot not only to 
the unification of the two Koreas in the future, but also to the promotion of peace in the 
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present. However, as the North Korean policy in reality was implemented as a hegemonic 
project in disregard of the initial principles of the Sunshine Policy, many things were 
sacrificed and ignored, such as the institutionalization of an arrangement for peace on the 
peninsula. Furthermore, the North Korean policy magnified social divisions in the South 
and, consequently, one’s attitude toward North Korea became an easy criterion that 
divided friend and foe amongst South Korean people. This had an adverse impact on 
national unity as well. 
There have been doubts about the usefulness of South Korea’s North Korean 
policy in reforming and opening up North Korea. These are reasonable considering the 
harsh and unrelenting dictatorship in the North. Nonetheless, we need to think 
continuously of a better way to lead North Korea to reform and open up, to promote peace 
on the peninsula, to relieve human rights abuses in the North, to prepare for unification, 
and so on.134 One idea from this research is that we have to focus on invigorating the 
North Korean markets because this will weaken the power of the state vis-à-vis society 
and eventually impair the indoctrination system that has justified the dictatorship by and 
hereditary power successions within the Kim family. The state has attempted to close 
down markets many times but has always failed, basically because it cannot provide 
enough food and necessities to people. North Korea now cannot sustain itself without the 
market. South Korea and its allies, or even China, who want reform and opening up of 
the North, can help to vitalize North Korean markets by providing more goods, instead 
of giving money, to the North. For example, South Korean companies gave Choco Pies 
as bonuses to North Korean workers in the Kaesung Industrial Complex, instead of giving 
                                                 
134 The South Korean government did not blame heavily the North Korean government for 
human rights abuses for fear of deterioration of the relationship with North Korea. 
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them hard cash. In the wake of the shutdown of the complex in April 2013, the price of 
the snack skyrocketed in the North Korean markets (Chosun Ilbo, 9 April 2013). This was 
one of the most recent pieces of evidence that goods from foreign countries were easily 
diverted for resale in the markets. Providing qualitative goods to North Korea will 
stimulate the market because traders can set high prices for them and thus will attract 
more people into the market in expectation of high profit margin. Vibrant markets will 
also induce factories to increase non-national or unplanned production to make profits 
and therefore will damage the planned economy. Besides, more goods in the market will 
lead not only to a weaker state, but also to better lives for North Korean people by, for 
instance, reducing poverty.  
In understanding North Korea today, we need an integrative approach that 
includes the analysis at the level of politics, economy, and ideology. An economic factor 
has evidently played a key role in the power shift of Pyongyang, particularly after the 
economic crisis during which the military became a main economic actor. And yet, 
ideology is still a very effective instrument for dictatorship. This integrated approach 
provides an additional and important aspect in examining North Korea today including 
the causes and consequences of major incidents, such as the execution of Jang Sung-taek 
who was uncle-in-law to North Korea’s new leader Kim Jong-un and seemingly the 
number two man who successfully supported his nephew’s inheritance of power from 
Kim Jong-il. To this end, we need to take a look at what has happened after the year of 
2002.  
From the second half of 2005, as North Korea came out of the worst economic 
crisis since its founding, Kim Jong-il elaborated and implemented old-line policy, 
although the country was still in a state of severe economic difficulty. The gist of these 
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changes was to restore the previous role of the party. Jang Sung-taek was a key figure in 
the scheme. In July 2005, the Planning and Finance Department of the party was created 
to check and interfere in the economic policies of the cabinet. In December 2007, Kim 
Jong-il separated the Office of the Administration from the Organization and Guidance 
Department (OGD) and appointed Jang as head of the newly established Administration 
Department (AD) of the party. The new policy required the military to return to its original 
role of defense. The excessive economic activity of the military had caused a laxity of 
military discipline and had damaged the smooth recovery of the national economy at large. 
In accordance with policy direction, Jang restructured the trade sector and, in doing so, 
played a central role in reducing the trade volume of the military. These drastic changes 
were possible because Kim Jong-il was the mastermind of the modifications.  
After two debilitating strokes in 2008, Kim took the succession issue as a matter 
of the highest priority and considered Jang and his wife the most reliable figures to carry 
on the succession process safely and smoothly after his death. Jang became the de facto 
second-in-command and expanded his economic clout more actively. For example, the 
Planning Department of the military, under the control of Oh Geuk-ryul, a sworn brother 
of Kim Jong-il and a rival of Jang for decades, was disintegrated and the newly 
established General Intelligence Bureau took significant parts of the department’s 
businesses. The management rights of Oh’s Cheongsong Associated Corporation, one of 
North Korea's main sources of foreign currency by exporting weapons, was also 
transferred to the bureau. Kim Jong-il's will on 8 October 2011 designated Jang Sung-
taek as the guardian of the next leader Kim Jong-un and his wife Kim Kyung-hee as the 
executor of the will. By late 2011, Jang's political and economic power in North Korea 
was overwhelming. He practically owned the Hapyoung Investment Committee and 
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Section 54, or the Kangsung Trading Company, to name just a few. The Hapyoung 
Investment Committee, established in July 2010, was North Korea’s official organization 
for attracting foreign investment. The committee took over the business interests of the 
Najin Port Development Project from the military’s Kangsung Trade Company in 
November 2011. Section 54 had been the most lucrative organization owned by the 
military, which exported natural resources such as coal and fish. The management rights 
of the organization were transferred to Jang in April 2011.  
During the first stage of Kim Jong-un's rule from December 2011 after his father's 
death, Pyongyang saw the consolidation of the policy line from the second half of 2005. 
Jang Sung-taek was the biggest beneficiary of the course, and the military suffered the 
most. For instance, the Central Committee of the party, instead of the National Defense 
Commission, became the highest authority. In addition, the Central Military Commission 
of the party, whose power had been drastically enhanced at the Third Conference of Party 
Representatives in September 2010, ranked higher than the National Defense 
Commission in authority. In formal ceremonies, the National Defense Commission was 
called third after the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission.  
Most of all, the economic activities of the military were severely curbed. On 14 
May 2012, Kim Jong-un publicly reproved the army for corruption and criticized soldiers 
for being too obsessed with making money. He then ordered that economic reform should 
be led by the party and that the military should not engage in trade. Correspondingly, 
Pyongyang began to transfer management rights of trade and other profitable businesses 
from the military to party-affiliated organizations or the cabinet. For example, the 
military's Chosun Daepung International Investment Group was disintegrated, and Jang’s 
Hapyoung Investment Committee, which officially belonged to the cabinet, was 
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reorganized and expanded even further. The Agency of People’s Security, under the 
command of Jang, also took over the development rights of gold mines and fruit farms 
that had previously been managed by the military.   
Moneymaking by military officers and bureaucrats was not just a remunerative 
sideline. It was a matter of vital significance. North Korean society had witnessed the 
dramatic advancement of marketization from the mid-1990s. Party and military officials 
also had suffered impoverishment to a greater or lesser extent during the economic crisis 
and had thus adapted to this change by becoming involved in business, either directly or 
indirectly. With the risk of another economic crisis always looming, accumulating wealth 
while they could was seen as a wise act. Furthermore, in the absence of a well-functioning 
public distribution system, they could not enjoy life corresponding to their status without 
earning extra money. Moreover, money was the most effective instrument in building up 
their careers. Low-ranking officials had to give money to high-ranking officials for a 
higher position. Senior officials had to contribute to the Kim family’s governing funds for 
promotion or preservation of their ranks. There had been a number of cleanup measures 
against corruption since the mid-1990s, but all of them failed because moneymaking had 
become a central goal for most people in North Korea, whether civilian or military. As 
such, Jang’s pecuniary greed was a great threat to these people’s standards of living and 
economic and political ambitions. 
Core members of the anti-Jang group included the doyens of the OGD and the 
military, such as Jo Yon-jun and Hwang Byung-seo in the OGD and Oh Geuk-ryun in the 
military. They had been supporters and collaborators of Kim Jong-un’s mother Ko Young-
hee and key contributors to the young leader's succession to leadership. In 2012 and 2013, 
a number of senior officials joined this group. Amongst them were Choi Ryong-hae and 
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Kim Won-hong. Choi was another sworn brother of Kim Jong-il, and his deceased father, 
Choi Hyun, was a former Minister of People’s Armed Forces and one of the few people 
who could be referred to as a friend of Kim Il-sung. From April 2012, he was Director of 
the KPA General Political Bureau, the highest position of the party whose role was to 
control the military. He had been a cohort of Jang for decades and expected to rearrange 
the military to the benefit of Jang. Kim Won-hong was Minister of State Security. He had 
been a military man before he became Vice Director of the KPA General Political Bureau 
in 2011, on the recommendation of Jang. The Ministry of State Security is North Korea's 
equivalent of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the head of the intelligence agency had 
been occupied by Kim Jong-il from 1987 and by Kim Jong-un from 2009 due to the 
importance of the position in the dictatorship. Kim Won-hong’s appointment to become 
minister in April 2012 indicated that he had gained an exceptional level of trust from the 
new leader. Many of those who had sided with Jang turned their back on him at this period. 
One critical reason for this change of mind was money. For instance, Choi Ryong-hae and 
Kim Won-hong earned huge amounts of money through trade companies under the names 
of their sons. They were threatened by Jang's swallowing up of lucrative businesses at a 
rapid pace. 
After Lee Young-ho was arrested in July 2012 by Jang Sung-taek's subordinates 
and purged for resisting the party's measures of depriving the military of trade businesses, 
the anti-Jang Sung-taek group expanded considerably. The group bolstered political 
influence apparently and aggressively from winter 2012. The military took a leading role 
in escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula from December 2012 to April 2013. North 
Korea conducted long-range missile and nuclear tests in December 2012 and February 
2013 respectively, ended the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement unilaterally and declared 
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a ‘state of war’ against South Korea in March 2013, and closed South Korean entry to the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex in April 2013. Jang Sung-taek opposed the missile launch 
and the nuclear test. His argument was that these provocations would be obstacles to 
economic reform. However, it was not the primary reason because he himself had 
incapacitated the cabinet from undertaking economic reform by appropriating profitable 
organizations for his own good. His opposition was based upon the fact that a series of 
hostilities would strengthen the power base of the armed forces. Nonetheless, he had to 
give in as continuous development and the possession of ballistic missiles and nuclear 
weapons were the instructions of the late leader.  
Meanwhile, the OGD revised the existing Ten Principles for the Establishment 
of the Party's Monolithic Ideological System. The principles took precedence over the 
constitution of North Korea and governed every individual’s public and private activities 
ever since they were announced by Kim Jong-il on April 14th 1972. No one who severely 
breached the principles would be allowed to escape the death penalty, irrespective of rank. 
The OGD was the main body for enforcing the principles in society for the benefit of the 
dictatorship of the supreme leader. The revision correlated with the reinforcement of its 
clout and the enhancement of its status in Pyongyang. On June 19th 2013, Kim Jong-un 
personally promulgated the new Ten Principles for the Establishment of the Party's 
Monolithic Leadership System in front of senior officials from the party, the military, and 
the cabinet. About a month earlier, at a meeting of chief officials, Kim Jong-un recalled 
the loyalty of Lee Je-gang, the former de facto leader of the OGD and the archrival of 
Jang Sung-taek, and asked them to emulate him. As Kim had publicly condemned the 
military for engaging in business in May 2012, the anti-Jang group had reversed the 
situation just in a year.  
279 
 
The attack on Jang Sung-taek was swift and decisive for fear of revenge in 
consideration of his mighty influence and past. The arrest of Jang during the extended 
meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on December 8th, and the 
judgment of death by the Special Military Tribunal of the Ministry of State Security 
several hours before the execution on December 12th were mere formalities. The heaviest 
charge against Jang was that he severely violated the Ten Principles which were 
announced by the young leader in June. This signified that the execution was carefully 
deliberated much earlier than his arrest in November.  
The death of Jang Sung-taek, however, has not dampened North Korea's fledgling 
economic reforms. Jang was not an architect or even a devoted proponent of economic 
reform. Key trade-related organizations were under his control, and thus he was simply 
the highest profile North Korean associated with trade and foreign investment. His 
interests in business with foreigners were attributed to the pursuit of his own economic 
gain and, as a result, he accumulated great riches for several years. He had been concerned 
more with regulating society for regime stability than with reforming the socialist 
economy. From the late 1990s, he was in charge of the Agency of People’s Security, 
whose main tasks included control of people's market activities across the country. From 
the latter half of 2005, he was the chief administrator of the party-led reorganization of 
the economy that sought to restrain the market and reinforce the role of the party in 
national economic management.  
The military and the OGD are currently at the helm of the economy, the two 
victors of the power struggle. Their victory has brought vast rewards. Powerful figures in 
those institutions took large shares. For example, Oh Geuk-ryul in the military took back 
the management rights of the Najin Port Development Project as well as gold mines, fruits 
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and fishery farms. Hwang Byung-seo in the OGD appointed his foster-daughter Lee 
Young-ran as head of Section 54. She is the daughter of his predecessor Lee Young-chul. 
The authority of the cabinet was enhanced, but its jurisdiction in managing and reforming 
the economy is still substantially limited as it cannot regulate a great number of businesses 
that are practically controlled by the military and the OGD. The military and the OGD 
are seeking immediate economic benefits rather than pursuing the sweeping economic 
reforms which are crucial to solving North Korea’s economic slump. Foreign investment, 
in that sense, is more likely to be the medium for influential figures in Pyongyang to 
accumulate wealth than the source of nationwide economic reform. By the same token, 
the marketization of the economy will be maintained as long as the military and the OGD 
reap enormous profits from the current economic situation.   
Has the demise of Jang Sung-taek contributed to the stability of the North Korean 
leadership? Yes, at least in the short run. The intensive power struggle in the inner circle 
of Pyongyang came to an end with the execution of Jang, who once wielded greater power 
than Kim Jong-un himself. Ostensibly, the dictatorship in North Korea has been tightened 
to a significant extent. All bureaucrats and generals now affirm their loyalty and ‘must’ 
show the utmost politeness to the new supreme leader, which is attributed to the 
introduction of the stricter Ten Principles that the OGD revised in order to purge and 
eliminate Jang. Nobody near to Kim Jong-un now clasps their hands behind their backs 
nor puts them in their pockets as Jang did before. Dozing off at the meeting where Kim 
Jong-un attends can be a sufficient cause for the execution by firing squad. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that the young leader is in full control of North Korean politics, 
let alone its economy and society. 
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8.3. Theoretical Implications of the Study 
 
This thesis has demonstrated the applicability and explanatory power of the Gramscian 
method in explaining inter-Korean relations. Few studies have applied historical 
materialism, not to speak of Gramscian theory, as a main framework for the study of inter-
Korean relations. This thesis contributes to the research by applying the methodological 
framework that is inferred from Gramsci’s ideas on international relations and his 
concepts such as hegemony, historical bloc, and so on. In particular, the empirical study 
of the rapprochement shows the strength of the Gramscian framework through analysing 
inter-Korean relations at the levels of politics, economy, and ideology in an integrative 
manner particularly with the help of the concept of historical bloc, and explaining the 
economic origins of the inter-Korean reconciliation as well as the political purposes of 
the two summits. 
There would be many different ways to apply Gramsci's theory for the analysis 
of international relations. This thesis, amongst them, proposes that we can infer a 
methodological framework for foreign policy analysis from Gramsci's original ideas and 
concepts. This article is an attempt to do that by taking particular note of Gramsci's 
thoughts on the relationship between the national and the international and his concept of 
organic crisis, in addition to his relatively more popular concepts of hegemony and 
historical bloc. The branch of Foreign Policy Analysis in political science that examines 
the processes and outcomes of foreign policy was not frequently explored by Marxist 
theories. This thesis, in that sense, can also add to the academic branch by exemplifying 
the effectiveness of a Marxist approach as well as a Gramscian approach for that particular 
field. 
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With regard to Gramsci’s concept of organic change, organic innovation was 
often used by many scholars, including Robert Cox, but organic crisis was not. This thesis 
underlines the academic utility of the concept as it is useful in explaining social change 
and its consequences on the economy, politics, international relations, and so on. Many 
drastic changes in society and international relations can be explained with the concept. 
For example, we can understand the rise of fascism in Germany in the twentieth century 
as an example of consequences of organic crisis. The change took place after the 
economic crisis and, during the crisis, the superstructures of the then Germany no more 
represented the general interests of the capitalists. This organic crisis brought about 
corporatism in the economic structure and Nazism in the superstructures. The new 
historical bloc helped the process of capital accumulation can advance again on a new 
social basis. 
Also, it is noteworthy that organic innovation and organic crisis are not mutually 
exclusive, even though this thesis apparently distinguishes between them. For instance, 
an organic crisis can lead to an organic innovation. When a group of counter-hegemonic 
forces attains hegemony, the new hegemonic group can bring about an organic innovation. 
If the particular historical bloc is strong enough, the country can become a hegemon by 
reconstructing the world order under its leadership. If an organic crisis cannot lead to an 
organic innovation, the historical bloc will remain unstable. In such circumstances, no 
matter how powerful it once was, the country cannot remain a hegemon. 
Regarding capitalist South Korea, this research uses the concepts of the fraction 
of the class and social categories. Most South Korean Marxist literature in the 1970s and 
1980s put capital in general as a main subject of study, rather than focusing on large 
industrial capital or the Chaebol, a fraction of the capitalist class. This tradition has 
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continued for the most part and exerted a negative influence on the appropriateness of 
Marxism in analysing South Korean society by underestimating the clout that the Chaebol 
have wielded in society. South Korea has a Chaebol-centered social structure and many 
of South Korean society's unique characteristics are due to the structure. For example, the 
reason why there are many more illegal migrant workers in South Korea compared with 
those in Taiwan and Japan is the systematic low profitability of SMEs. As they were 
exploited by the Chaebols, as explained earlier, SMEs had to rely on foreign workers for 
low labour costs and foreigners could easily find their workplaces even if they were illegal 
migrants. Also, as labour rights were not properly protected in South Korea, owners of 
SMEs could readily give them low wages. This increased the number of illegal low-paid 
migrant workers in South Korea. 
In addition, most Marxist studies on South Korea did not make much of the roles 
of state bureaucrats, journalists, scholars, and other intellectuals as the bearers of anti-
Communism and developmentalism (later, neoliberalism), while they emphasized the role 
of students as a main actor in social revolution along with the proletariat. So to speak, 
there were few Marxist researches explaining how the Chaebol ruled society (not how the 
bourgeoisie in general ruled society), who changed society (not who should change 
society), and what the ruling ideology was (not what the revolutionary ideology should 
be). One main reason that intellectuals, including Marxists, did not contribute much to 
the development of South Korean society, such as narrowing the gap between the rich and 
the poor, was that they could not explain reality in society sufficiently and therefore failed 
to provide an alternative. The new ruling political group in the presidency of Kim Dae-
jung had to stop the reform of the Chaebol because there was no alternative with which 
to replace the export-oriented accumulation scheme, and they thus had to rely on the 
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Chaebol to overcome the economic crisis quickly as they had superiority in exports.  
In explaining socialist North Korea, Gramsci's concepts were rarely employed 
because they were primarily formulated to explain a capitalist society, with the 
examination of a socialist society using a Marxist's theory deemed ineffective. Besides, 
due to the collapse of most socialist countries, the utility of applying Gramsci to such 
countries — except for the cases that had capitalist industrial relations such as China — 
was reduced to a great extent, and this subsequently affected the study of North Korea. 
This thesis, nonetheless, argues that Gramsci's concepts can be very useful in explicating 
North Korea, if properly applied. This is not a new attempt when we turn our eyes to other 
socialist countries. In particular, the Soviet Union was often subject to Gramscian analysis. 
Hegemony was a concept of great interest to these researchers. As has been explained in 
the Literature Review, they conducted the coercion-consent analysis of Soviet society 
with an emphasis on the mechanism of consent. This thesis also took note of the 
mechanism of consent in achieving hegemony by the North Korean leadership. 
The thesis, furthermore, argues that for the analysis of North Korea as well as 
South Korea, the concept of historical bloc is inseparable from that of hegemony, because 
a historical bloc shows not only who the hegemonic group is, but also how hegemony is 
materialised and strengthened in a particular historical period. Moreover, the formation 
and preservation of the historical bloc is only possible through the exercise of hegemony. 
Thus, in comprehending how hegemonic rule has materialised in the North, the concept 
of the historical bloc is critical. The concept is also helpful in clarifying the distinctive 
relations of the North Korean economy with its politics. During the formation of the new 
historical bloc, the economic structure was, when compared with other socialist countries, 
more directly connected to the socialist state in the North. There was little autonomy of 
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economic space under the party-state system as economic ownership actually belonged 
to the bureaucrats, which brought about more cohesion between the economic structure 
and the superstructures in established in the socialist country.  
The concept of historical bloc is also helpful in clarifying the distinctive relations 
of the North Korean economy with its politics. During the formation of the new historical 
bloc, the economic structure was, compared with other socialist countries’ cases, more 
directly connected to the socialist state in the North. There was little autonomy of 
economic space under the party-state system as economic ownership actually belonged 
to the bureaucrats, which brought about more cohesion between the economic structure 
and the superstructures in the socialist country. As the party committee controlled the 
production process more directly, the party played a more important role than before in 
the economic sphere. Now important decisions in production were made by the party 
secretary who chaired the committee in keeping with political necessities and, as a result, 
the economy was more systematically subordinated to politics. 
Gramsci's ideology, a constituent of the historical bloc, was another important 
factor in understanding North Korea. The ideology of Marxism and Leninism had played 
a key role in the formation and fortification of the existing historical bloc by linking the 
economic structure with the superstructures, but also by providing the ideological unity 
to the socialist state and other constituents of the superstructures. The new historical bloc 
from the late 1950s was accompanied by a new ideology, Kim Il-sung's Juche Ideology, 
which promoted and facilitated the new production process by reproducing production 
relations which subordinated the economy to politics. The ideological unity was 
incessantly and vehemently pursued by the leadership and, by the early 1980s, the Juche 
Ideology wholly replaced Marxism-Leninism to become the sole ruling ideology of North 
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Korea. During the process, all other ideologies except for the Juche Ideology were 
eradicated from society. The ideological unity was officially established in the system 
under the title of the Party’s Monolithic Ideological System — this is what North Korea 
called its system.   
The concept is also beneficial in understanding social consequences of the 
economic crisis from the mid-1990s, particularly when we interpret them as the process 
of the disintegration of the historical bloc. Briefly speaking, the severity of the economic 
crisis was the result of the party-centered economic structure that excessively 
subordinated the economy to politics. The crisis debilitated the party because less and less 
people participated in party activities, as they had to engage in trade for survival. The 
party's main role was to indoctrinate North Korean people in their workplaces and 
residencies with the Juche Ideology, which justified the dictatorship of the Kim family. 
Accordingly, North Korea in the 1990s saw the weakening of the Party not just in the 
economy but also in its role as the medium of the mechanism of consent. As a result, key 
constituents of the historical bloc, such as the economic structure, the party-state and 
ideology, were no longer tightly connected, so that hegemonic rule became significantly 
impaired.  
‘Soviet Fordism’, amongst the main concepts for the analysis of North Korea in 
this research, is perhaps the least used concept in social science. It has been used by 
scholars who attempted to apply Gramsci’s concept of Fordism to the case of the Soviet 
Union to explain the labour process and production relations of the socialist economy. In 
short, the Soviet Union changed the economic ownership of the means of production, but 
its labour process was essentially the same as that of capitalism. The Soviet labour process 
was controlled by managers, appointed by and answerable to the state, to meet the 
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objectives of the central plan, and integral to this process was the subordination of 
workers to new production relations. This thesis argues that, as Fordism is helpful in 
elucidating the capitalist economic structure, Soviet Fordism would be of help in 
understanding the socialist economic structure. Clarification of the concept is the basis 
for understanding its modified version of North Korea, namely, autarkist Soviet Fordism. 
In that sense, a thorough understanding of Soviet Fordism — established during the eras 
of Lenin and Stalin — is required, which has determined the socialist economic structure, 
particularly as contrasted with autarkist Soviet Fordism of North Korea.  
Soviet Fordism, I argue, conflicted with the market mechanism of original 
Fordism in the United States, where fears of bankruptcy and unemployment were ever 
present. The virtuous circle of Fordism which connected the production process with the 
enhancement of productivity requires, say, innovation of the entrepreneurs, the easy exit 
of nonviable enterprises, flexibility in the labour market, and flexible consumption 
demand. For instance, when a company elicits an enhancement of productivity through 
the innovations of the entrepreneur, it can gain substantial profits and thus accumulate 
capital more efficiently. If these innovations demand extra training and more intensive 
work, workers have to engage in this extra work, because the threat of unemployment and 
the (possible) reward of higher wages spurs them to do so. The companies which cannot 
keep up with innovations will suffer low productivity and go bankrupt, increasing 
joblessness. People out of work would then find new jobs in productive companies as the 
non-productive ones go bankrupt and, consequently, the general productivity of the 
society will gradually increase. Also, as more and more workers receive higher wages, it 
would raise the general consumption level and, accordingly, stimulate more production.  
The socialist caricature of Fordism, thus, could not realize the virtuous circle of 
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original Fordism. For example, state-owned enterprises in a socialist country had soft 
budget constraints, something which Kornai has noted. As they were not allowed to go 
bankrupt, they were always bailed out with subsidies or other instruments and, therefore, 
there was little incentive for mangers to be innovative. The deficiency of an innovation 
mechanism in the production process of Soviet Fordism was a key cause of the widening 
gap in productivity between the Soviet Union and the United States. Also, the socialist 
system banned unemployment, which gave little inducement for workers to work hard 
and learn new skills, because no matter what happened, at least they could subsist from 
state support — this was one of the main reasons why the state repeatedly launched a 
mass movement to enhance labour productivity, like the Stakhanovite movement. 
Moreover, the state planning committee normally decided the total consumption level of 
society conservatively, because what concerned it the most was the possible failure of the 
plan, so there was little room for a consumption-led production boost.  
This thesis argues that the North Korean equivalent of Soviet Fordism, namely 
autarkist Soviet Fordism, caused low productivity because of excessive subordination of 
the economy to politics, which was one of the main reasons of the economic crisis in the 
1990s. However, Soviet Fordism itself was a defective system that could not realise 
sustainable productivity enhancement. Existing studies have rarely examined this issue 
of relations between Soviet Fordism and productivity enhancement. In addition to the 
shortcomings of the planned economy and the absence of market mechanism, this thesis 
points out the weakness of the production processes of the socialist economy, the 
systematic inability to materialise sustainable productivity advancement. This weakness 
was worsened in the case of North Korea, as explained earlier in the thesis. All socialist 
countries suffered an economic depression due to low productivity after a short period of 
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rapid economic growth but, in the case of North Korea, the level of depression was so 
severe that it could not sustain its economy without the foreign aid it received from the 
l990s.  
Last but not least, amongst Gramsci’s main concepts, this thesis did not apply the 
concept of passive revolution in explaining North Korean political economy. The concept 
is used by Gramsci in various contexts. Nonetheless, we can construe that its primary 
usage is to conceptualise processes through which socio-political transformations are 
attained by non-revolutionary means or 'revolution from above'. It is a useful concept in 
understanding, say, socio-political changes after the June 29 Declaration in 1987 in South 
Korea (Choi Jang-Jip, 2005), the dynamics of China's capitalist restoration after Deng 
Xioping's Reforms and Openness in China (Gray, 2010), and so on. The marketisation 
from the 1990s, above all, is a candidate for us to use this concept with regard to North 
Korea. It was first a spontaneous phenomenon in society for survival, but was later 
endorsed and supported by the state, under the slogan of Silli socialism. The North Korean 
leadership, pressured from below, had to take economic reform measures to maintain its 
rule, such as the July 1 Measures in 2002. However, it would be far-fetched if we consider 
any form of marketisation in North Korea today as passive revolution, because the degree 
of socio-political transformation in the North was very limited due to the nature of the 
reform: it was not a ‘reform of the existing system’ but a ‘reform within the system’. 
The marketisation of North Korea, most of all, did not reconstitute its production 
relations into capitalist production relations. Far from it, the North did not even change 
its production process. Still, the party secretary in the party committee made key decisions 
in production management to meet political necessities, and the subordination of the 
economy to politics continued. Only the number of people who engaged in trade 
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significantly increased. There emerged capitalists who earned a lot of money, but their 
businesses were not related to production. They, unlike the case of China, were 
commercial capitalists, and the rise of the number of rich people in North Korea was not 
related to any change of production relations. The new North Korean economy with rapid 
marketisation was, I argue, not a development in a progressive and sustainable manner. 
The reform measures were undertaken by the North Korean state to normalise and protect 
the socialist economy, something which has been evidenced by the new economic policy 
from the second half of 2005, in which North Korea unsuccessfully carried out its old-
line policy which attempted to close most markets in the country and carry out currency 
reform after the North came out of the worst economic crisis since its establishment in 
1945. 
Passive revolution, however, is still worthy of discussion in North Korean study, 
particularly in the case of a ‘reform of the system’ in the future. The North Korean version 
of passive revolution — or revolution from above in a real sense — is possible when the 
reform aims towards the direction of accommodating domestic subaltern demands and 
global capitalist industrial relations. Or, we can say that North Korean reforms proceed 
smoothly when they are implemented towards that direction. Yet this is subject to certain 
conditions. For instance, the main institution for the national economic management shall 
be the Cabinet, not the Party nor the military. They are predatory economic actors, only 
looking for profits without considering the national economy, and thus are not interested 
in, nor capable of, reorganising social relations for a sustainable enhancement of a 
productive force, such as restoring capitalism. The Cabinet, in the early-2000s, had full 
responsibility and power to run the economy. However, it was nominal because real 
economic power remained in the hands of the Party and the military. The first step toward 
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a reform of the system, and the first signal of it given to the outside world, will be the 
substantial role of the Cabinet in the national economic management. 
 
8.4. Future Research 
 
We need more comparative analysis on North Korea. Most North Korean studies are 
based upon materials from North Korea, such as collected writings by Kim Il-sung and 
Kim Jong-il, newspapers, magazines. However, as scholars examined North Korea based 
upon North Korean sources, they encountered an insufficient level of objectivity. 
Uncovering and actively using outside materials, such as minutes of conversation 
between Kim Il-sung and Nicolae Ceausescu in Chapter VII, are needed in order to 
guarantee more objectivity in such research. However, considering the shortage of new 
materials outside North Korea, more comparative analysis is needed for the development 
of North Korean study. This is one method to get over the chronic problem of the dearth 
of North Korea-related objective materials. This thesis is an attempt to do that.   
In the comparative analysis of South Korea and North Korea, conventionally, 
most scholars have not applied a single framework for the analysis of the two Koreas after 
assuming fundamental differences between the capitalist and the socialist systems. This 
thesis, in a way seeking to break from conventionality, actively used Fordism with the 
help of the French Regulation school’s interpretations on the concept as a single 
framework for comparison of the two economies. In the case of South Korea, I coined the 
term ‘exportist Fordism’, instead of ‘peripheral Fordism’ that regulationists frequently 
use to explain the South Korean economy. Implicit in the term is that South Korea's 
export-oriented capital accumulation strategy has given rise to the distinctive production 
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process that brought about the Chaebol-centered economy. In the case of North Korea, 
there have been no particular terms to explain the production process, unlike in the case 
of the Soviet Union where the terms Soviet Fordism, Soviet-style Taylorism, and so forth 
were used to describe its production process. This thesis uses the term ‘autarkist Soviet 
Fordism’ to explicitly show that the distinctive production process was caused by 
Pyongyang's choice of an autarkist path to free itself from the pressures of the socialist 
giants such as the Soviet Union and China. This comparison of the capitalist production 
processes of South Korea and the socialist production process of North Korea has rarely 
been conducted before and thus requires further research.   
Gramsci argued that through ideological struggles structural changes occur. And 
yet, it is not always ideology that matters. In many countries, religion still wields a very 
strong influence over society. In those countries, the division of society can arise from 
conflicts between different sects of one particular religion or between ideology and 
religion. An example of the first is the case of Syria between Sunnism and Shiism, and 
an example of the second is the case of Egypt between secularism and Islamic 
fundamentalism—although conflicts between Sunnism and Shiism in Egypt should not 
be overlooked. Ideology has replaced religion in the West, but still in many places religion, 
instead of secular ideology, determines people's worldview and common sense. When we 
take religion in place of ideology or along with ideology, the Gramscian method can 
contribute more to the analyses of those countries' social changes, political conflicts, 
major policy changes, and so on. 
With regard to inter-Korean relations, South Korean society has a dilemma 
concerning unification. In short, South Korea’s weak social safety nets have deepened 
socio-economic inequalities. It is noteworthy that welfare spending of South Korea has 
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been one of the lowest amongst the OECD countries, and deep-rooted anti-communism 
has been a major cause of this. However, when South Koreans argued for more welfare 
spending, they were severely criticized by the hegemonic group as reds. The inter-Korean 
reconciliation as a hegemonic project gave another pretext to strengthen anti-communism 
by displaying that the then South Korean government collaborated with the communists 
in the North, despite escalating security concerns. In that sense, efforts to realise 
unification have had a negative effect on the welfare of South Korean people. This can be 
referred to as ‘the Unification Dilemma’ within South Korean society. There are many 
other cases of the dilemma. For example, many human rights organisations of South 
Korea refrain from voicing concerns about human rights abuses in North Korea, because 
they believe the North Korean regime is a partner for cooperation in order to realise 
unification. This kind of contradiction happens in many issues in the South. Hence, the 
Unification Dilemma will be, I argue, a valuable subject for further research. 
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